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D.O. No: 600 C.

CHIEF COMMISSIONER'S CAMP,  
N.W. FRONTIER PROVINCE.  
16th July 1915.*My dear Campbell*

The Viceroy writes "I have been watching anxiously the news from Chakdara and it has been a source of great satisfaction and pleasure to me to see how the movement of the Swatis, which presented such a serious danger, has been checked by the magnificent forced marches of the moveable column from Nowshera. It reflects the greatest credit on all concerned and I am really very grateful for the effort that was made." I think that you would like to know this and there is no objection to your communicating it to the troops concerned if you feel inclined to. It really was a splendid performance and saved the situation. But for the rapidity of the movement I think that it is beyond doubt that the Upper Swat Lashkar would have come down with a rush, burnt the Nawab of Dir's post close to Chakdara Fort and, as we should have been forced to intervene, would have attacked Chakdara. The arrival of the Column was a check to the "King" (of Swat) and the dangerous moment ~~passed~~ giving the tribesmen time for reflection. The danger at Chakdara was not alone as we have since ascertained that on the attack on Chakdara a simultaneous movement was to have been made against the Nawab of Dir from Bajaur, Jandora and the Swat Kohistan, the result would almost certainly have been his defeat and complete chaos would have reigned in the country between Chakdara and Chitral.

Some reports about Buner are rather alarming but I am inclined

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personally to think that they are exaggerated. I wired to Kealy to send you a copy of my telegram of yesterday to Government, I could not repeat it to you as you have not the Foreign Office Cypher and Reilly was so full up with cypher telegrams that I had no one to put it into the Military Cypher. There is not much danger in Buner itself as the Bunerwals are so badly armed but Pacha, near which is the Pir Baba Ziarat, is so close to Upper Swat that if the Hajji Sahib were, intentionally or unintentionally, to light a fire there it might, and probably would, spread into Upper Swat. For myself I think that nothing serious will happen before the 'Id' but the two or three weeks after the 'Id' will be the crucial time and if we can tide over that I think that we shall be all right for this summer as the 'Kaddas' will then begin to come down and the tribes will thus give us many hostages.

*Sincerely  
J. MacKinnon*

Major-General F. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O.,  
Commanding 1st (Peshawar) Division,  
Peshawar.

INDIAN TELEGRAPHS.					
NOTICE.				Charges to pay.	
This form must accompany any inquiry made respecting this Telegram.				Rs.	As.
Handed in at (Office of Origin).		Date.	Hour.	Minute.	Service Instructions.
Chakdara Camp		30	12	30	
TO		Genl Campbell			Words.
		Peshawar			24
		Recd. here at 15			16 M.
Both I and the troops under my command much appreciate the congratulations of yourself & staff Genl Baynon					

K. P.—The name of the Sender, if telegraphed, is written after the text.



Heading:- Reports and Returns.  
Operations.

17/19/Camp.

Headquarters Malakand Movable Column,  
Camp, Haibatgram 1st September 1915.

From  
The General Officer Commanding,  
Malakand Movable Column.  
To  
The Chief of the General Staff,  
Army Headquarters,  
(thru' The General Staff, 1st (Peshawar) Division.)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Swat tribesmen to the number of some 4000, attacked the troops holding the sangars on the LANDAKAI Spur at 10-30 p.m. on the night of the 28/29th August 1915.

The first picquets to be attacked were those on the right of the line on the highest part of the spur, occupied by 5 companies of the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles.

This attack died down towards midnight at which hour a lamp message was received from Lieut-Colonel Mockler, Commanding Outposts, to the effect that all was well.

The telephone line to the Headquarters of the Outpost Line had ceased to work since about 10 p.m. and was found next day to be cut, and some considerable portion of the line carried off.

After midnight the attack on the lower picquets garrisoned by two companies 46th Punjabis, increased in intensity and was carried on with vigour till nearly 5 a.m.

The firing was continuous and communication by lamp, with the outpost line was prevented by the heavy fire which the attempt to use the lamp occasioned. All picquets and sangars were more or less engaged all night, but the three sangars on the left centre of the line were most heavily engaged.

The sanga occupied by Subadar Major HABIBULLA KHAN, 46th Punjabis being attacked most severely. There



There were no less than eight separate rushes made on this sangar during the night, some of the enemy reaching within 10 paces of the wall. One standard bearer was shot down about this distance and in spite of all attempts by the enemy to recover the lost standard it was captured by the occupants of the sangar, - when the enemy retired in the morning. This sangar was occupied by Punjabi Mohommedans, many of whom, as is necessarily the case in this regiment, were very young soldiers.

The sangar occupied by Subadar Budhiul Zaman  
and garrisoned by ~~HHH HHH~~ <sup>Orak Zais</sup> Afridis was also heavily  
attacked and boldly defended.

During the night the main camp at Haibatgram was twice fired into by snipers but no harm was done.

At 3 a.m. I became anxious concerning the expenditure of ammunition in the sangars. The men had their 100 rounds on person and 100 rounds on the Section Reserve with them but owing to the heavy firing which had continued since 10-30 p.m. I feared that the garrisons might be running short.

I accordingly ordered Lieut-Colonel Money with three companies of the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles and Lieut-Colonel R. Anderson with four companies, 82nd Punjabis to start at 5 a.m., each man carrying 300 rounds to proceed to the support of the picquets which they did. I am glad, however, to report that none of the picquets ran short of ammunition and had plenty in hand when the attack broke off in the early morning.

Shortly after 5 a.m. lamp communication was again restored and satisfactory reports received from the outpost line that all attacks had been beaten off. with 11 casualties, only one severe.

At 7-15 a.m. 29th August the following troops moved out of camp after leaving sufficient troops for its defence:-



(3)

defence:-

Guides Cavalry.  
90th Battery, R.F.A.  
25th Mountain Battery, I.M.A.  
2 Companies, Durham Light Infantry.  
2 Companies, 46th Punjabis.  
2 Companies, 94th Infantry.

Shortly after 8 a.m. the 25th Mountain Battery came into action near the village of MELAGAO and the 90th Battery, R.F.A. near the village of JALLALA the Cavalry and Infantry being concealed behind spurs of the hills in the immediate vicinity.

Action was first taken against the fort of KAK which is situated on the right bank of the Swat River and commands the road from camp up to the valley at a distance of some 300 yards.

The 25th Mountain Battery began with Common Shell at a range of 900 yards. The walls of the fort were sufficiently strong at the base and for eight feet up, to resist the impact, but the upper storey was soon pierced and fires were observed to start within the fort.

The target of the 90th Battery, R.F.A. was the tribal gatherings with standards in the villages at the mouth of the SHAMOZAI valley on the right bank of the river. These tribesmen obviously considered themselves out of range as their standards were openly displayed and groups of men were seated among the trees and houses. These gatherings were quickly broken up, the enemy retreating up the SHAMOZAI valley or along the Swat River.

I now ordered the Mountain Battery to take up a position higher up and overlooking the fort, from which they could fire directly into the interior. The garrison could now be seen escaping and making their way under cover of water channels and gullies.

Maxim Gun and rifle fire together with occasional shrapnel hurried their movements and many of them were seen to fall.

In the meantime the Cavalry had found a ford lower down and had crossed over.



(4)

A very pretty bit of work was carried out by Major Blois-Johnson and the Cavalry Patrol who advanced taking advantage of the ground and entered the fort after killing four of the enemy who opposed them; they completed the firing of the fort and returned without any casualties.

The enemy having retreated the action was now broken off.

I increased the garrison of LANDAKAI Spur to 1 Battalion 2/1st Gurkha Rifles and four Companies 82nd Punjabis, and had the sangars strengthened and repaired by working parties of No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners, and the 94th Infantry.

About midday a reconnoitring party of the 82nd Punjabis which had proceeded in the direction of MORASAR reported the enemy in front of them and a Double Company 2/1st Gurkha Rifles was sent and drove them off.

No sign of the enemy could be seen on the left bank of the Swat and it was reported they had fled to their homes.

About midday the Field Battery, Guides Cavalry, Durham Light Infantry and 46th Punjabis returned to Camp.

The Mountain Battery remained on the Spur and fired a few shells to drive off a few tribesmen in the upper hills.

At 4 p.m. the Mountain Battery, Sappers and Miners and 94th Infantry returned to Camp.

The return of casualties and sketch of picquet positions and expenditure of ammunition is attached.

I wish to bring the names of the following officers and men forward for mention for good work done:-

Subadar Major Habibullah Khan, 46th Punjabis, commanded No. 8 picquet in the line of outposts.

A large portion of the 62 men in the picquet were young soldiers of less than 1 year's service, but under the leadership of the Subadar Major, behaved admirably, and fire was kept well under control. The enemy left sev



(5)

seven corpses and a standard close to the Sangar.

No.1912 C/Havildar Jagat Sher Gurung, 2/1st Gurkha Rifles for courage, coolness and general military ability. He was in command of No.3 picquet of the Out-post line, which owing to lack of time and material at hand, was in an uncompleted state. The picquet held 26 men, and it was here the enemy's attack commenced at 10-15 p.m., and the picquet was hotly engaged by superior numbers until 4 a.m.

C/Havildar Jagat Sher, repulsed four determined attacks when the enemy charged right up to the walls.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your Most obedient Servant,

(Sd) W. Beynon, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Malakand Movable Column.




















MALAKAND MOVABLE COLUMN, CAMP HAIBATGRAM.													
Ammunition expended during operations of 28th, 29th, 30th and 31st August 1915.													
U N I T.	28th August				29th August				30th August				31st August 1915.
	Star Shell.	Shrapnel.	Common Shell.	S. A. A.	Star Shell.	Shrapnel.	Common Shell.	S. A. A.	Star Shell.	Shrapnel.	Common Shell.	S. A. A.	S. A. A.
90th Battery, R. F. A.	-	-	-	-	-	335	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1st Durham Light Infy.	-	-	-	2528	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
25th Mountain Battery.	-	-	-	-	-	81	60	-	-	-	-	-	-
No. 6 Sappers & Miners.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2/1st Gurkha Rifles.	-	-	-	4603	-	-	-	602	-	-	-	162	-
46th Punjabis.	-	-	-	12356	-	-	-	1514	-	-	-	-	-
82nd Punjabis.	-	-	-	740	-	-	-	204	-	-	-	312	-
94th Infantry.	-	-	-	485	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guides Cavalry.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1913	-	-	-	-	4
T O T A L S.	-	-	-	20712	-	422	60	4233	-	-	-	474	4
Star Shell 9 rounds. Shrapnel 422 rounds. Common Shell 60 rounds. S. A. A. 25423 rounds.													
REMARKS.													
ø 10 pounder.													

Nominal roll of Officers, Warrant and N. C. Officers and Men, wounded in Action at Camp HAIBATGHAN (Malikand									
No. 6 Combined Field Hospital.									
Movable Column) on the 28th and 29th August 1915.									
Regiment, Corps or Department.	Reglt. No.	Rank and Name	Nature of wound or injury.	Slight. Severe. Dangerous	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000				























hill was awaited in order to be able to move on round the corner.

This Hill, which the 82nd Punjab's took, and held, was the key of the day's operations, as the road runs close under the ridge at this point.

The 82nd Punjab's met with some opposition and finally reached their position about 6-30 a.m.

Owing to the fact that the firing had commenced so early, the enemy in WUCH received timely warning of the impending attack on them, and the Cavalry were therefore balked of their first object, the cutting off of the WUCH party.

At about 6-30 a.m. the Column moved on and the 90th Battery, R.F.A., took up a position some 400 yards North of the road.

The Cavalry were at the same time moving forward on the Northern side of the Valley, but, as explained above, they were unfortunately unable to catch the enemy in the plain, however they opened fire with some effect as they moved up into the Hills.

At this time, about 7 a.m., the enemy could be seen streaming up the Hills both to the North and South, the majority being on the Southern side. The field guns then opened fire, their first target being a collection of about 200 men with a standard, on a small hill about 3,000 yards to the N.W. where they evidently considered themselves to be safe.

The Durham Light Infantry, who were then Advance Guard, had taken up a position 1,000 yards in front of the guns with the Cavalry about 1,500 yards to the right front.

The 25th Mountain Battery was then ordered up and took up a position in line with the field guns and the two batteries were kept more or less together for the rest of the action.

At about 7-45 a.m. a double company of the 46th Punjab's under Captain Hardcastle was ordered to take the hill marked on the attached map and after slight opposition reached the lower part of the ridge and dropping one company as a picquet there, he moved on up the ridge and finally held a point some 300 yards above. These picquets retained these positions until the Column retired.



retired.

The 82nd Punjab had by this time, 8-45 a.m., moved along the ridge and had reached their final position which was a bold bluff behind and above the position held by the 46th Punjab.

The Artillery helped these picquets up and also shelled the enemy on the hillsides to the S.W.

At 9-15 a.m. the Advance Guard and Artillery moved forward and took up positions nearly opposite USAKAI Village and some 1,500 yards to the North of it.

The Durham Light Infantry moved up and took the hill marked on the map, leaving two platoons on the top, the remainder holding some rising ground on the plain below.

The enemy at this time, could be seen moving along the hill sides towards the KATGALA Pass, and the guns obtained some excellent targets, and many were seen to fall.

The Hills, however, along which they were moving are full of deep nullahs which afford excellent cover.

By 11-15 a.m. the Guides Cavalry had moved on as far as the village of KUZ OHIKHO, the Durham Light Infantry held the rising ground opposite that village, with a picquet on the low hills to their left rear. The batteries were in action in the centre of the valley 500 yards East of KUZ OHIKHO, the main body, consisting of two companies 94th Infantry were in position on some higher ground 250 yards in the rear of the batteries. The rear Guard and transport (Brigade Ammunition Reserve, carts and riding mules for sick and wounded) were halted in the Nullah on the road some, 1,500 yards further back.

The 82nd Punjab and 46th Punjab were holding the hills marked on the attached map, the 3rd Company of the 46th Punjab were escort to the 90th Battery, R.F.A.

These positions were the final ones in the advance up the valley.

The enemy could now be seen in large numbers in the KATGALA Pass and the hills on each side of it were strongly held.

Taking into consideration that I now had only 300



Headquarters, 1st (Peshawar) Division

300 Infantry in hand and that had an advance been made into the pass it would have been necessary to picquet both sides of the valley, which looked as if it might be a long and possibly a costly business, and that I was some  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Camp and that probably the retirement to Camp would be followed up, I came to the conclusion that the time had arrived to commence the withdrawal.

However, before moving back I ordered both batteries to open rapid fire at the enemy in the pass. This they did and the enemy's losses at this point are believed to have been heavy.

The retirement of the Column began at 12 noon in the following order. The batteries were sent back to take up suitable covering positions 2,000 yards in rear, and at the same time the Durham Light Infantry Picquet was quietly withdrawn and had orders to watch the nullah on the South of the valley, up which at one period of the advance the enemy had shown signs of coming forward.

The 94th Infantry held a position about 500 yards S.E. of KUZ CHIKHO and the remainder of the Durham Light Infantry retired through the 94th Infantry taking up another covering position 800 yards further back again.

As soon as the Durham Light Infantry had got well away, the Cavalry withdrew from their position in CHIKHO Village, their orders being to watch the right flank of the retirement and to be in such a position that they could take in flank any enemy who might attempt to work down the nullahs on the South side of the Valley.


The 46th Punjabis picquets were withdrawn at 12-50 p.m. and orders were sent to the 82nd Punjabis to move back along the ridge, holding the last two peaks until the Column had turned the corner and was well clear.

The retirement was carried out successfully, the enemy making no attempt to follow up.

The Column reached Camp at 4-0 p.m.

5. It has now transpired that during their retreat through TALASH the people of that valley came down and took many rifles and much ammunition from the tired and retreating





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Units	British officers	Indian officers	British Rank & File	Indian Rank & File	Remained for the protection of Camp.	Total Strength	Remarks.
Guides Cavalry.	7	9	-	189	23	228	2 Machine Guns. 4 Guns.
90th Battery, R.F.A.	3	-	98	7	26	136	110 horses.
25th Mountain Battery.	2	1	-	88	2	93	2 Guns, 4 Horses and 57 Mules.
Durham Light Infantry.	8	-	264	-	135	407	2 Machine Guns.
82nd Punjabi.	6	11	-	442	163	627	S.A.S. & Orderly.
46th Punjabi.	10	6	-	244	250	510	2 Machine Guns.
94th Infantry.	8	9	-	386	46	449	g including M.O.
Sappers & Miners.	-	-	-	-	170	170	2 Machine Guns.
T O T A L S	44	36	362	1356	822	2620	Headquarters, Signa Section and Depart- ments not shown.

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LTX "B"

OPERATION ORDERS No.1

Copy No.14.

by

Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Luard,  
Commanding, Malakand Movable Column.

Chakdara Camp,  
26th October 1915.

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Reference:- SWAT VALLEY Map 1 inch to 1 mile.  
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INFORMATION. 1. A lashkar believed to be about 2,000 strong has arrived from TALASH, and is at present split up in various ADINZAI Villages. Of these about 300 are in WUCH.

INTENTION. 2. The Commanding Officer intends to drive the enemy back across PANJKORA, cutting off those in WUCH.

DISPOSITION. 3. Independent Cavalry will move at 5 a.m. on WUCH. Special instructions have been given to the Officer Commanding.

Independent Cavalry.  
Commander.-  
Major B. Johnson,  
Guides Cavalry.

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Advance Guard  
Commander.  
Lt-Col. H. Tweddell.  
Troops.-  
82nd Punjabis.  
25th Mountain Battery.  
Riding Mules.  
1st Line Transport.  
Guides Cavalry.

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Main Body.  
Brigade Signal Section.  
Durham Light Infantry,  
(less 1 Company).  
90th Battery, R.F.A.  
1 Coy., Durham L. Infy.  
46th Punjabis.  
94th Infantry (less 1 Coy.).  
Riding Mules.  
Brigade Ammunition Reserve.  
Field Ambulance.  
5 Empty Carts.

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Rear Guard.  
Commander.- An Officer,  
94th Infantry.  
1 Coy., 94th Infantry.


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PICQUETS. 4. The picquets round camp will be reduced by half their strength to-night, and at 6 - 15 a.m. will be marched out to join the Column under an officer to be detailed by O.C. 46th Punjabis.


5. Units will leave sickly men and such guards as have been

CAMP GARRISON.


































APPENDIX "C".MALAKAND MOVABLE COLUMN, CAMP CHAKDARA.Return of Ammunition expended in action 27th October 1915.

Unit	18-pr. Shell	10-pr. Shell.	Pistol Ammunition	S.A.A. .303"	Remarks.
Guides Cavalry	-	-	-	1744	
90th Battery, R.F.A.	250	-	-	-	
25th Mountain Battery.		14 C.S. 102 10-pr.	-	-	Including Tubes & Fuses etc.
Durham Light Infantry.	-	-	-	425	
82nd Punjabis.	-	-	-	1611	
46th Punjabis.	-	-	-	3973	
94th Infantry.	-	-	-	108	
T O T A L S	250	116	-	7861	