D.O. No: 600 C.

CHIEF COMMISSIONER'S CAMP,
N.W. FRONTIER PROVINCE.
16th July 1915.

My dear Campbell,

The Viceroy writes "I have been watching anxiously the news from Chakdara and it has been a source of great satisfaction and pleasure to me to see how the movement of the Swatis, which presented such a serious danger, has been checked by the magnificent forced marches of the moveable column from Nowshera. It reflects the greatest credit on all concerned and I am really very grateful for the effort that was made." I think that you would like to know this and there is no objection to your communicating it to the troops concerned if you feel inclined to. It really was a splendid performance and saved the situation. But for the rapidity of the movement I think that it is beyond doubt that the Upper Swat Lashkar would have come down with a rush, burnt the Nawab of Dir's post close to Chakdara Fort and, as we should have been forced to intervene, would have attacked Chakdara. The arrival of the Column was a check to the "King" (of Swat) and the dangerous moment passed giving the tribesmen time for reflection. The danger at Chakdara was not alone as we have ascertained that on the attack on Chakdara a simultaneous movement was to have been made against the Nawab of Dir from Bajaur, Jandola and the Swat Kohistan, the result would almost certainly have been his defeat and complete chaos would have reigned in the country between Chakdara and Chitral.

Some reports about Buner are rather alarming but I am inclined...
personally to think that they are exaggerated. I wired to Kealy to send you a copy of my telegram of yesterday to Government, I could not repeat it to you as you have not the Foreign Office Cypher and Reilly was so full up with cypher telegrams that I had no one to put it into the Military Cypher. There is not much danger in Buner itself as the Bunerwals are so badly armed but Pacha, near which is the Pir Baba Ziarat, is so close to Upper Swat that if the Hajji Sahib were, intentionally or unintentionally, to light a fire there it might, and probably would, spread into Upper Swat. For myself I think that nothing serious will happen before the 'Id' but the two or three weeks after the 'Id' will be the crucial time and if we can tide over that I think that we shall be all right for this summer as the 'Kaddas' will then begin to come down and the tribes will thus give us many hostages.

[Signature]

Major-General F. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O.,
Commanding 1st (Peshawar) Division,
Peshawar.
Chakdara Camp 30 12 10

TO

Jenl Campbell

both J and the troops under my command much appreciate the congratulations of yourself & stuff

Jenl Beynon

K. B.—The name of the Sender, if telegraphed, is written after the fork.
From The General Officer Commanding, Malakand Movable Column.

To The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, (thru' The General Staff, 1st (Peshawar) Division.)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Swat tribesmen to the number of some 4000, attacked the troops holding the sangars on the LANAAKAI Spur at 10-30 p.m. on the night of the 28/29th August 1915.

The first picquets to be attacked were those on the right of the line on the highest part of the spur, occupied by 5 companies of the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles.

This attack died down towards midnight at which hour a lamp message was received from Lieut-Colonel Hockler, Commanding outposts, to the effect that all was well.

The telephone line to the Headquarters of the Outpost Line had ceased to work since about 10 p.m. and was found next day to be cut, and some considerable portion of the line carried off.

After midnight the attack on the lower picquets garrisoned by two companies 46th Punjabis, increased in intensity and was carried on with vigour till nearly 5 a.m.

The firing was continuous and communication by lamp, with the outpost line was prevented by the heavy fire which the attempt to use the lamp occasioned. All picquets and sangars were more or less engaged all night, but the three sangars on the left centre of the line were most heavily engaged.

The sangar occupied by Subadar Major M.BIBULLA KHAN, 46th Punjabis being attacked most severely.


There were no less than eight separate rushes made on this sangar during the night, some of the enemy reaching within 10 paces of the wall. One standard bearer was shot down about this distance and in spite of all attempts by the enemy to recover the lost standard it was captured by the occupants of the sangar, - when the enemy retired in the morning. This sangar was occupied by Punjabi Mohammedans, many of whom, as is necessarily the case in this regiment, were very young soldiers.

The sangar occupied by Subedar Buhdiul Zaman and garrisoned by six men was also heavily attacked and boldly defended.

During the night the main camp at Haibatgram was twice fired into by snipers but no harm was done.

At 3 a.m. I became anxious concerning the expenditure of ammunition in the sangars. The men had their 100 rounds on person and 100 rounds on the Section Reserve with them but owing to the heavy firing which had continued since 10-30 p.m. I feared that the garrisons might be running short.

I accordingly ordered Lieut-Colonel Money with three companies of the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles and Lieut-Colonel R. Anderson with four companies, 82nd Punjabis to start at 5 a.m., each man carrying 300 rounds to proceed to the support of the picquets which they did. I am glad, however, to report that none of the picquets ran short of ammunition and had plenty in hand when the attack broke off in the early morning.

Shortly after 5 a.m. lamp communication was again restored and satisfactory reports received from the outpost line that all attacks had been beaten off, with 11 casualties, only one severe.

At 7-15 a.m. 29th August the following troops moved out of camp after leaving sufficient troops for its defence:
defence:-

Guides Cavalry.
90th Battery, R.F.A.
25th Mountain Battery, I.M.A.
2 Companies, Durham Light Infantry.
2 Companies, 46th Punjabis.
2 Companies, 24th Infantry.

Shortly after 8 a.m. the 25th Mountain Battery came into action near the village of MELAGAO and the 90th Battery, R.F.A. near the village of JALLALA the Cavalry and Infantry being concealed behind spurs of the hills in the immediate vicinity.

Action was first taken against the fort of KAK which is situated on the right bank of the Swat River and commands the road from camp up to the valley at a distance of some 300 yards.

The 25th Mountain Battery began with Common Shell at a range of 900 yards. The walls of the fort were sufficiently strong at the base and for eight feet up, to resist the impact, but the upper storey was soon pierced and fires were observed to start within the fort.

The target of the 90th Battery, R.F.A. was the tribal gatherings with standards in the villages at the mouth of the SHAMOZAI valley on the right bank of the river. These tribesmen obviously considered themselves out of range as their standards were openly displayed and groups of men were seated among the trees and houses. These gatherings were quickly broken up, the enemy re- treating up the SHAMOZAI valley or along the Swat River.

I now ordered to the Mountain Battery to take up a position higher up and overlooking the fort, from which they could fire directly into the interior. The garrison could now be seen escaping and making their way under cover of water channels and gullies.

Maxim Gun and rifle fire together with occasional shrapnel hurried their movements and many of them were seen to fall.

In the meantime the Cavalry had found a ford lower down and had crossed over.
(4)

A very pretty bit of work was carried out by Major Blois-Johnson and the Cavalry Patrol who advanced taking advantage of the ground and entered the fort after killing four of the enemy who opposed them; they completed the firing of the fort and returned without any casualties.

The enemy having retreated the action was now broken off.

I increased the garrison of LANDAKAI Spur to 1 Battalion 2/1st Gurkha Rifles and four Companies 82nd Punjab and had the sangars strengthened and repaired by working parties of No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners, and the 94th Infantry.

About midday a reconnoitring party of the 82nd Punjabis which had proceeded in the direction of HORASAR reported the enemy in front of them and a Double Company 2/1st Gurkha Rifles was sent and drove them off.

No sign of the enemy could be seen on the left bank of the Swat and it was reported they had fled to their homes.

About midday the Field Battery, Guides Cavalry, Durham Light Infantry and 46th Punjabis returned to Camp.

The Mountain Battery remained on the Spur and fired a few Shells to drive off a few tribesmen in the upper hills.

At 4 p.m. the Mountain Battery, Sappers and Miners and 94th Infantry returned to Camp.

The return of the casualties and sketch of the positions and expenditure of ammunition is attached.

I wish to bring the names of the following officers and men forward for mention for good work done:—

Subadar Major Habibullah Khan, 46th Punjabis, commanded No. K. picquet in the line of outposts.

A large portion of the 62 men in the picquet were young soldiers of less than 1 years service, but under the leadership of the Subadar Major, behaved admirably, and fire was kept well under control. The enemy left after
seven corpses and a standard close to the Sangar.

No.1912 C/Havildar Jagat Sher Gurung, 2/1st Gurkha
Rifles for courage, coolness and general military
ability. He was in command of No.3 picquet of the Out-
post line, which owing to lack of time and material
at hand, was in an uncompleted state. The picquet
held 26 men, and it was here the enemy's attack com-
menced at 10-15 p.m., and the picquet was hotly engaged
by superior numbers until 4 a.m.

C/Havildar Jagat Sher, repulsed four deter-
mined attacks when the enemy charged right up to the
walls.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Most obedient Servant,

(Sd) W. Beynon, Brigadier-General,
Commanding Mekal and Movable Column.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Shrapnel</th>
<th>Star Shell</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28th August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**
- Shrapnel
- Star Shell
- Common Shell

**UNIT 1.4.4**
- 90th Battery, R. E. A.
- 1st Durham Light Infantry
- 25th Mountain Battery
- 2/6th Service Rifles
- 2/6th Punjabis
- 1st Pushtu"
- 94th Infantry
- Golden Cavaliery

**Remarks**
- S. A. A.
- Common Shell
- Shrapnel
- Star Shell
- S. A. A.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1/1912</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/1912</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/1/1912</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2/1912</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Details are subject to change as more information becomes available.

Reference: Swat Report 1915 00013 51432
Ref: Swat Report 1915 00015 51434

King's College London
HEADQUARTERS, 1st (Peshawar), Division.

12th November 1915.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the operation has been carried out with great success under my personal supervision.

I am happy to state that the troops under my command have behaved with the greatest bravery and efficiency.

The results have been satisfactory and I am confident that the operations will be continued until the enemy is completely driven from the area.

I am confident that the enemy will be driven from the area and that the operation will be successful.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

(A.D.) F. Campbell, Major-General, Commanding, 1st (Peshawar), Division.
Ref : Swat Report 1915 00017 51436

King's College London
War in the Switzerland of Asia: Swat Valley

Page 21 of 35

Ref : Swat Report 1915 00018 51437

The Serving Soldier

King's College London
The Swat Report 1915-00019-51438

War in the Switzerland of Asia: Swat Valley

Page 22 of 35

Ref: Swat Report 1915 00019 51438

King's College London
300 Infantry in hand and that had an advance been made into the pass it would have been necessary to picquet both sides of the valley, which looked as if it might be a long and possibly a costly business, and that I was some 6½ miles from Camp and that probably the retirement to Camp would be followed up, I came to the conclusion that the time had arrived to commence the withdrawal.

However, before moving back I ordered both batteries to open rapid fire at the enemy in the pass. This they did and the enemy’s losses at this point are believed to have been heavy.

The retirement of the Column began at 12 noon in the following order. The batteries were sent back to take up suitable covering positions 2,000 yards in rear, and at the same time the Durham Light Infantry Picquet was quietly withdrawn and had orders to watch the nullah on the South of the valley, up which at one period of the advance the enemy had shown signs of coming forward.

The 94th Infantry held a position about 500 yards S.E. of KUZ CHIKHO and the remainder of the Durham Light Infantry retired through the 94th Infantry taking up another covering position 800 yards further back again.

As soon as the Durham Light Infantry had got well away, the Cavalry withdrew from their position in CHIKHO Village, their orders being to watch the right flank of the retirement and to be in such a position that they could take in flank any enemy who might attempt to work down the nullahs on the South side of the Valley.

The 46th Punjabis picquets were withdrawn at 12-50 p.m. and orders were sent to the 82nd Punjabis to move back along the ridge, holding the last two peaks until the Column had turned the corner and was well clear.

The retirement was carried out successfully, the enemy making no attempt to follow up.

The Column reached Camp at 4-0 p.m.

5. It has now transpired that during their retreat through TALASH the people of that valley came down and took many rifles and much ammunition from the tired and retreating
retreating enemy and that more rifles and ammunition were
seized when they had crossed the PANKORA river by the people
on the further bank.

The casualties on the enemy's side are believed to
have been heavier than was at first reported and the result
of the action appears to have been satisfactory.

Latest reports say 60 to 80 killed and 200 wounded.

6. I regret that Subedar Phil Singh, 94th Infantry was
mortally wounded on the previous night by a sniper who fired
into camp.

Our casualties during the day's operations were Indian
ranks, one died of wounds on the field and 3 wounded.

7. The following captures were made by the 82nd Punjabis:-
   1 Standard,
   3 Rifles,
   1 Sword,
   and 3 wounded and 3 unwounded prisoners were brought
   in.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

[Signature]

Lieut-Colonel,

Commanding, 2nd Infantry Brigade.
### APPENDIX A

2nd Infantry Brigade, Camp Ghadur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>British Officers</th>
<th>Indian Officers</th>
<th>British Musk &amp; Pike</th>
<th>Indian Musk &amp; Pike</th>
<th>Required for the Protection of Camp</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Cavalry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, S. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Cavalry, R.C.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Mountain Battery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Light Infantry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Medium Art.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Field Art.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Field Art.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Field Art.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th Field Art.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>S. M. &amp; Pike, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Headquarters, Sign</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**TOTALS**

| 44               | 26               | 362               | 1236               | 0                 | 1520                                | 2000           | Headquarters, Sign        |

King's College London

Ref: Swat Report 1915 00023 51442
OPERATION ORDERS No.1
by
Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Luard,
Commanding, Malakand Mobile Column.

Chakdara Camp,
26th October 1915.

Reference:- Swat Valley Map 1 inch to 1 mile.

INFORMATION. 1. A lashkar believed to be about 2,000 strong has arrived from Talash, and is at present split up in various Aminzai villages. Of these about 500 are in Wuch.

INTENTION. 2. The Commanding Officer intends to drive the enemy back across Panjokara, cutting off those in Wuch.

DISPOSITION. 3. Independent Cavalry will move at 5 a.m. on Wuch. Special instructions have been given to the Officer Commanding.

Advance Guard Commander.
Lt-Col. K. Tweedle.

Troops:-
82nd Punjabis.
25th Mountain Battery.
1st Line Transport.
Guides Cavalry.

Main Body. Brigade Signal Section.
Durham Light Infantry,
(less 1 Company).
90th Battery, R.A.
1 Coy., Durham L. Infy.
46th Punjabis.
94th Infantry (less 1 Coy.).
Hiding Rales.
Brigade Ammunition Reserve.
Field Ambulance.
5 Empty Carts.

Rear Guard.
Commander.- An Officer,
94th Infantry.
1 Coy., 94th Infantry.

PIQUETS. 4. The picquets round camp will be reduced by half their strength to-night, and at 6 - 15 a.m. will be marched out to join the Column under an officer to be detailed by O.C. 46th Punjabis.

5. Units will leave sickly men and such guards as have been
been arranged for verbally.

The O.C. Camp will make all arrangements for the
protection of the camp during the absence of the Column.

6. Units will carry a ration in the haversack.

7. The O.C. 94th Infantry will detail a Company as
escort to Brigade Ammunition Reserve.

8. All reports to the main guard of the Advance Guard.

Watches will be set with the Brigade Major in the
Headquarter Camp at 11-15 p.m. to-night.

R.W. Festing, Captain,
Brigade Major, Malakand Movable Column.

Issued by Orderly at 11 p.m.

Copy No. 1 to O.C. Column.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

= 2 = = = Guides Cavalry.
= 3 = = = Durham Light Infantry.
= 5 = = = 62nd Punjab.
= 6 = = = 46th Punjab.
= 7 = = = 94th Infantry.
= 8 = = = 90th Battery, R.F.A.
= 9 = = = 20th Mountain Battery.
= 10 = = = Sappers & Miners.
= 11 = = = R.A.I.M.S.
= 12 = = = Column Transport Officer.
= 13 = = = Brigade Signal Section.
= 14 = = = Port Chakdara.
= 15 = = = Brigade Ammunition Reserve.
Appendix "B" (1)

Sent by Helio at 7-20 a.m. to O.C. 25th Mountain Battery.
"You will bring your section to join 9th Battery R.F.A.
S.W. of Much Village".
APPENDIX "B" (2)

To the C.O., 46th Punjabis.

This order was verbally given by Captain H.W. Festing, Brigade Major, who personally pointed out to the Double Company Commander the hill to be occupied.

Given at 7-45 a.m.
APPENDIX "B" (3).

This order was verbal and was delivered by Captain Festing, Brigade Major, to the effect that before retiring the 25th Mountain Battery and 90th Battery, R.F.A., should open rapid fire on the enemy who were seen in large numbers near the pass.

Delivered to Q.M.C. Artillery Units at 11-40 a.m.

-------------------
APPENDIX "B" (4).

This order was a verbal message delivered personally by Captain Beadle, Staff Captain, and was to the effect that the picket should be withdrawn on receipt of order, in retiring this company was to watch Nullah on South of the Village.

Delivered at 12 noon to C.O. the Company.

-----------------
APPENDIX "B" (5).

This was a verbal order personally delivered by Captain Festing, Brigade Major, at 18.10 p.m.
APPENDIX "D" (6)

Sent by Helio to the O.C. 82nd Punjabis, 12-50 a.m.

"On receipt of this order commence withdrawing your Regiment back along the ridge, holding the last two peaks until column has turned corner and moved down the road 1 mile towards Camp.

-------------------
### APPENDIX XX.

**MALAKAND DIVISION COLUMN, CAMP CHILBLA.

Return of Ammunition expended in action 27th October 1914.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>18-pr. Shell</th>
<th>10-pr. Shell</th>
<th>Pistol Ammunition</th>
<th>S.A.A. 70's*</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guides Cavalry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Battery, M.P.A.</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th Mountain Battery.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Punjab Infantry.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Punjab</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Infantry.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>250</td>
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