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# PREFATORY NOTE.

The aim of the present paper is to assist in the appreciation of the problem facing the civilized Powers of the World, and more particularly the European Entente Group, by the development of considerable military strength on the part of the Soviet Government of Russia, commonly known as "the Bolsheviks."

In considering this problem, it is necessary to look beyond the actual military situation created by the military undertakings of the Soviet Government, and an attempt has therefore been made to describe the present political and economic conditions in Russia before proceeding to a detailed examination of the military situation on the several fronts.

It is recognized that the physical, moral and financial exhaustion resulting from the war precludes any serious offensive action by the Allies against the Bolshevik forces in Russia, and the Allied Governments have therefore to choose between two policies:—

- (a.) To come to terms with the Bolsheviks.
- (b.) To blockade the Bolsheviks and render all possible assistance to the several Anti-Bolshevik Governments and Armies already in existence in Russia.

With regard to the former policy, it must be remembered that the avowed aim of the Soviet leaders is to spread their doctrines throughout the world, and to this must be traced their present efforts to reach a settlement with the Allied Governments. If it be accepted (and it cannot be disputed), that the Bolshevik tenets are essentially destructive of all the good that civilization has given the world, the first mentioned policy will be at once discarded since it would inevitably afford the Bolsheviks greatly increased opportunities for the use of their chief weapon, direct propaganda.

It is, however, hoped that this paper may be of value in gaining approval for the second policy proposed in (b), which M. Pichon has described as a "cordon sanitaire" round the infected area of Eastern Europe.

Bolshevism is dependent for its vitality on constant conquests, and the break up (consequent on the Armistice) of what was left of the German Eastern front, has given Bolshevism a fresh accession of strength by opening the routes into the Baltic States.

After the Bolsheviks have reached the coast, as seems inevitable, there will be a relapse in their strength, provided the Allies maintain their blockade. This, to be effective, should be as complete as possible, not only in a naval and military sense, but also from a political and economic aspect.

At present it is impossible to say whether we could establish M. Pichon's *cordon* on a line approximately from Riga to Odessa, or whether Bolshevism will take hold of Germany, necessitating the placing of the *cordon* much further west. It is urged that every effort should be made to stabilize conditions in Germany with a view to keeping the infection as far from home as possible.

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GENERAL STAFF,

WAR OFFICE.

12th January, 1919.



## APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA.

### I.—POLITICAL APPRECIATION.

#### 1. GENERAL POLITICAL POSITION OF THE BOLSHEVIKS.

(a.) *External Position.*—Apart from the Bolshevik position *vis-a-vis* the various non-Bolshevik States in Russia, their relations with the Neutrals, with Germany and with the Allies have been of special importance during the last two months:—

(i.) *Neutrals.*—The prolonged outbreak of terrorism on the part of the Bolsheviks during the early autumn has caused the three Scandinavian Governments, Holland, Switzerland and Spain to break off relations with the Bolsheviks, though these ruptures are not in all cases complete.

The two most important are Switzerland and Sweden; in the case of the former the position seems satisfactory since energy has been shown in expelling the Bolsheviks, and British co-operation has been accepted in dealing with the whole question of espionage.

The Swedish Government, however, appears to be behaving dubiously. Vorovski has been deprived of cipher and courier communication with Russia, but he has not been expelled, and it is reliably reported both that wireless communication is still permitted and that he has recently been allowed to draw large sums of money through a Swedish bank. Swedish business circles are, in the main, opposed to a break with Russia, and there are said to be about 20,000 Swedes in Russia, who are stated by their Government to be very unwilling to leave the country. The Bolsheviks are well known to set great store by their commercial and financial relations with the Swedes, who are profiting thereby, and there is no doubt that they are seriously perturbed at the likelihood of a complete break with Sweden: this is probably unlikely to occur without pressure from the Allies.

At Copenhagen more active measures are being taken against the Bolsheviks, and the Danish banks decided in November to refuse rouble transactions. At that time the big Swedish bankers appeared willing to do likewise, but they did not do so, alleging that united Scandinavian action was necessary and that most of such business was done through the small banks.

The general result is that Bolshevik opportunities in neutral countries are already very seriously curtailed and that, if the Allied Governments exercise firm pressure, the neutrals are likely to assist materially in ringing in the Bolsheviks.

(ii.) *Germany.*—The relations of the Bolsheviks with Germany and the progress there of their latest ideas are of the utmost importance since the "Bolshevizing" of the German Revolution is at present the most vital stage of their world revolution. When the German Revolution broke out, Joffe and his mission had just been expelled and they have not been allowed to return.

The Ebert Government have shown firmness in their dealings with the Russian Bolsheviks, assisted, in this respect, by the hostile attitude of the majority of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers towards the Soviet *démarches*. The Bolsheviks have recognized the Ebert Government "as exercising effective governmental power" and have (nominally) accepted the German demand for non-intervention in German internal affairs as the price of the resumption of normal relations. But these efforts at reconciliation do not amount to much, and the Bolsheviks have admitted the seriousness for them of the delay in the triumph of Liebknecht, at the same time intensifying their propaganda by all possible means. It is possible that they have scored an important success in the last few days in the safe arrival (according to German wireless) of Radek in Berlin, but there is as yet no information as to the scope or success of his activities. On the whole, the Bolshevik leaders seem to be well enough informed as to conditions in Germany to be doubtful as to how quickly "the March Revolution" will be succeeded by "the October Revolution," but they are sparing no effort to hasten it.

(iii.) *The Allies.*—Most of the Bolshevik leaders had not believed in the victory of either side in the war, but had staked on a world peace being brought about by successive revolutions. The overwhelming victory of the Allies has both taken them by surprise and destroyed their premises. Faced, as they thought, with the possibility of Allied intervention on a great scale, they decided to make approaches, at



least, to discover any terms the Allies might be willing to grant, hoping no doubt to secure by direct relations with the Allies increased opportunities for propagating their doctrines.

On the 24th October, they proposed an armistice to President Wilson, on the 3rd November they proposed peace negotiations with the Allies, and on the 29th November, Litvinoff arrived at Stockholm; later he moved to Copenhagen, where he is avowedly attempting to enter into negotiations. It was stated on the 4th December that his object is to prevent intervention and to obtain some form of recognition for the Soviet Government, in return for which the Bolsheviks would make great concessions, e.g., by rescinding the repudiation of foreign loans, by releasing British subjects, by giving compensation for the murder of Captain Cromie.

Chicherin has expressed himself as especially anxious to enter into relations with the United States, and Lenin, at a secret meeting of the Central Executive Committee at about the end of October, is reported as stating that it might be necessary to throw sops to the Allies in the shape of economic and financial concessions. His general position, assuming the failure of revolutions outside Russia, appears to be the same as previously adopted as regards the Germans, i.e., the necessity of a "breathing space," to give a respite for the internal consolidation of the Soviet régime and for the creation of a great army. It is obvious that such a policy entirely depends upon the attitude of the Allies, and that, although the Bolsheviks are sincere in their desire for peace, the use they would make of such a peace would be to prepare Russia to come forward again as the leader of the international revolution.

(b.) *Internal position.*—All the evidence still shows that the internal, political position of the Bolsheviks remains strong, and they are better supported by their subjects than during the summer. The prospects of renewed fighting, and of a possible return to the old régime, via a military dictatorship, act as a deterrent in many quarters where there is discontent. Many of the workmen feel that however bad the present conditions, and especially the food and fuel situation, their position under any other government would probably be worse. There is some evidence that Bolshevik influence with the peasantry in the Moscow area has been increased by their institution of "Committees of Poverty." Fears of reprisals by the "*Bourgeoisie*," if they return to power, are widespread and deep. With regard to the food question, many so-called Bolshevik adherents serve undoubtedly only in order to keep themselves alive; but as long as the Bolshevik Government are the only dispensers of food supplies, so long will these unwilling adherents be compelled to support them. Widespread unpopularity is reported owing to the continuation of the system of fixed prices, and of the prohibition of private trade in foodstuffs; but, leaving aside the purely economic aspect, it is clearly of the utmost political importance to the Bolsheviks to control as far as possible the production and distribution of food supplies. In this matter their position should have been improved by their successes since September in the middle and lower trans-Volga districts; but there is no good evidence of the conditions and attitude of the population of these reconquered areas. Further, the Bolshevik administrative machinery has made some progress, and their educational schemes are beginning to have a most important, though necessarily limited, influence, which is strengthened by the free feeding of children attending schools. Finally, their ruthlessness in shooting or getting rid of their own suspect or corrupt officials has thoroughly frightened half-hearted Bolsheviks, and has, perhaps, lessened corruption (except in the matter of food prices).

There have been few important signs during the last two months of any serious weakening in the purely internal position of the Bolsheviks, during which period four points of significance require notice.

(i.) The collaboration of the Mensheviks and of a second group of Social Revolutionaries with the Bolsheviks, largely owing to opposition to Allied intervention. On the 30th November, the Mensheviks were readmitted into the Soviets and various Menshevik and Social Revolutionary leaders are now co-operating with the Bolsheviks, while two important Social Revolutionary leaders, Spiridonova and Sablin, have been reprieved by the Bolsheviks. Although, in Soviet Russia, no political party, except the Bolsheviks, is of much strength or influence, this co-operation is of significance as marking the tendency, which is likely to increase, for non-Bolshevik Socialist parties to gravitate to the Bolsheviks against such Governments as those of Kolchak and Denikin, supported by the Allies.

(ii.) The lack of news as to the activities of the Extraordinary Commissions for combating the counter-revolution. This is now very noticeable as compared with the months of August, September and October. The Bolshevik outbreak of terrorism achieved its object, but in the process the Extraordinary Commissions became so

powerful as to be a challenge to the Soviets. The matter came to a head when Lenin returned to public life after recovering from his wound, and the dispute was settled by the triumph of the Soviets, and of a policy of relative moderation in internal affairs. At present there is little danger for the Bolsheviks of counter-revolution in Soviet Russia, and their organization for dealing with it is extremely effective.

(iii.) The insecurity of Petrograd as a Bolshevik stronghold. This has become more evident since the appearance of the British Fleet in the Baltic and since rumours of operations *via* Finland. The sailors have been for long an uncertain element and require very high pay and rationing. The general condition of the city is very bad and there is evidence that, if the Allies were to be able to attack it, the Bolsheviks would be prepared to abandon it, trusting to the difficulty of supplying food and to their propaganda as means of eventually making the Allies unpopular. In addition, the peasantry of the Northern Commune are in a dissatisfied state, and peasants' risings have broken out in certain districts of Novgorod and Tver. The evidence is insufficient to form a judgment as to how serious these have been, but it is probable that the Bolshevik position in the Northern Commune is considerably weaker than in the Moscow area.

(iv.) Further peasant risings have occurred in the Smolensk, Tula, Ryazan and other areas, the main cause apparently being refusal to be conscripted. It is evident that many of the peasantry have been giving much trouble during the last two months, but the recent revolts have been even more cruelly dealt with than before, and there is as yet no information of a widespread rising. It must be remembered that in Soviet Russia, the Bolshevik authorities control all arms, and any fresh outbreaks are likely to meet with no greater measure of success than those which have preceded them.

(c.) *Conclusions as to the Political Prospects of Bolshevism.*—The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing paragraphs:—

- (i.) The Bolshevik prospects in Soviet Russia itself, as shown above, are good. But against these must be set the fact that a great, though incalculable, number of their subjects would gladly be freed from Bolshevik domination. They would struggle actively for this purpose if they were certain of success, and if they were convinced that the overthrow of the Bolsheviks would not lead to a *régime* still more prejudicial to themselves: this latter doubt obviously does not affect the *bourgeoisie*, but in the case of workmen and peasants these fears seem to be the fundamental causes of their general inaction and submissiveness.
- (ii.) The political prospects of the Bolsheviks depend more upon their relations with foreign powers than upon events in Soviet Russia itself.
- (iii.) If Bolshevik principles find favour in Germany in the near future, their main energies will be concentrated on the immediate spreading of the world revolution.
- (iv.) If, as appears more probable, the extremists in Germany and in most of the Austro-Hungarian States fail to gain the ascendancy, the political prospects of the Bolsheviks would seem to demand the abandonment of the idea of an immediate revolution, and the attempt to gain some *modus vivendi* from the Allies.
- (v.) To gain this they would be ready to grant very considerable concessions, but they would certainly insist on complete independence in socializing their own country and they would in practice continue their propaganda.
- (vi.) It is possible that the Socialist non-Bolshevik parties will become further fused with the Bolsheviks, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (which Lenin has always regarded as only temporary) will be discontinued, on the ground that the *bourgeoisie* are already sufficiently assimilated, and that, if strongly pressed, some form of Constituent Assembly would be allowed by the Bolsheviks, who would count on themselves obtaining a majority.
- (vii.) The alternative for the Bolsheviks, if no *modus vivendi* with the Allies is achieved, and if their propaganda does not cause an explosion in Central Europe, are either capitulation or a continuation of the present struggle. Their present leaders are very unlikely to choose the former course.
- (viii.) The political results of the continuation of the struggle as at present will depend primarily upon the military successes of the Bolsheviks and upon their economic and financial position. The pressure of a vigorous blockade would put a check to the military conquests of the Bolsheviks, and would turn the economic and financial factors still more against them than at present.



## 2. GENERAL POLITICAL POSITION OF THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIKS.

### (a.) POLITICAL SITUATION IN SIBERIA.

In order to understand fully the present political situation in Siberia, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the political events which have taken place since the Bolsheviks in Eastern Siberia were dispersed by the operations of the Allies. At that time there were in existence—

- (i.) The "Omsk Government," mainly composed of members of the Cadet or Right party, who claimed to represent all Siberia.
- (ii.) The "Samara Government," composed of members of the old Constituent Assembly, who had moved their seat of government to Ufa. They claimed to represent all Russia, and were endeavouring to unite Siberia with other parts of Russia. They formed a disunited party, agitated by great differences of opinion.
- (iii.) The Tomsk Provincial Duma, purely Social-Revolutionary, who had been elected by various interested parties.
- (iv.) The Ural Provincial Government at Ekaterinburg, a group of extreme Social-Revolutionary intriguers controlled by Chernoff (whose real name is said to be Feldman), President of the original Constituent Assembly.
- (v.) The "Government of Autonomous Siberia" at Vladivostok, composed of the remnants of the Tomsk Assembly, who were dispersed by the Bolsheviks.
- (vi.) The "Far Eastern Committee" in Harbin and Vladivostok comprising various reactionary elements under the presidency of General Horvat.

During September, 1918, a Conference of all parties, except the Bolsheviks, was held at Ufa. As a result of this Conference the various "Governments" either resigned or were dissolved, and a Central Directorate of five, with five substitute members, was formed. Later on, by an arrangement with the more moderate political elements, the Directorate were invested with supreme powers. The Directorate on their part consented to the appointment of a Business Ministry to conduct the affairs of the various departments; the Ministers to be selected chiefly from the nominees of the Omsk Government, and to be personally responsible to the Directorate.

This arrangement was calculated to satisfy almost everyone, and it was generally thought that at last a solid form of Government had been established. But while the new Ministry were frankly conservative, the Directorate were representative mainly of Socialist interests. Consequently, the elements were fundamentally discordant. It was also recognized that the parties represented at the Ufa Conference might revolt when they realized that the Directorate, having no power to enforce their policy, must become subservient to the Ministry. Chernoff, too, took the opportunity to issue a proclamation to the Socialists at Ekaterinburg, which amounted to an open incitement to rebel. On the other hand, no sooner had Admiral Kolchak taken up his position as Minister for War, than the extreme Right elements began to urge him to effect a *coup d'état*. This was carried out on the night of the 17th November when four members of the Directorate were arrested. The following day Admiral Kolchak was appointed dictator, with the title of "Regent and Supreme Commander-in-Chief."

Since the 18th November, the Government have had to withstand a series of attacks. The members of the Constituent Assembly and the Ekaterinburg Provincial Government took up their abode at Ekaterinburg and Ufa, which they turned into a hotbed of intrigue. On the 5th December, the Government arrested 27 leading Socialists, including 13 members of the Constituent Assembly, on a charge of conspiring against the life of Admiral Kolchak.

Chernoff, with some of his party escaped, and they have since been conspiring with the Bolsheviks to cause a series of risings throughout Siberia with the object of capturing the Government. On 22nd December, a serious rising took place at Omsk. Many prisoners were released, including the members of the Constituent Assembly, who, however, surrendered on learning the real situation. On their return to the prison eight of them were shot. A searching enquiry is being held and the Government intend to take stern measures against the guilty parties. Unfortunately, Admiral Kolchak is seriously ill with influenza complicated with slight pneumonia.

In the meantime the Czecho-Slovak National Council which was opposed to the Omsk Government had created dissension amongst the Czech troops to such an extent that two divisions had to be withdrawn from the front. General Stefanik, the Czecho-Slovak Minister for War, dissolved the Czech National Council on the 15th December despite the strong protests of some of the members who represent the extreme Left party. The situation has been considerably eased by this action.



In Eastern Siberia, General Horvat, who was appointed High Commissioner for the Eastern provinces, is being subsidized by the Japanese, and although he sent a message acknowledging Admiral Kolchak's authority, he is considered to be quietly working to bring about the fulfilment of Japanese policy to create an independent Far Eastern government comprising the districts of Ussuri, Saghalien, Okhotsk and Amur.

Semenoff, the Transbaikalian Cossack Ataman, who has also been subsidized by the Japanese, has refused to acknowledge Admiral Kolchak, and has threatened to declare the independence of Transbaikalia.

Sir Charles Eliot, in an appreciation of the situation, dated the 31st December, states that Admiral Kolchak's prestige has been considerably increased by the capture of Perm and the suppression of the Bolshevik risings. He is receiving the support of all military, official and propertied classes, besides the Cadets and other moderate elements. The more moderate sections of the large group of Social Revolutionaries had also agreed to support him, but the murders perpetrated during the recent troubles at Omsk have caused them to hesitate. If Kolchak does not punish the culprits, the impression produced on all Liberal parties will be deplorable. If he does, he may create ill-feeling amongst his own entourage and lose their military support.

Sir C. Eliot is of the opinion that the Government cannot be called a strong one, but he deems them worthy of support in their operations against the Bolsheviks.

(b.) POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTH CAUCASUS AND THE DON.

An administrative government which administers the liberated portions of the Stavropol and Black Sea Provinces is incorporated with the Volunteer Army. This Government includes several well-known politicians of the old régime, such as MM. Sazonoff and Neratoff, and Generals Dragomiroff and Lukomski.

Although it is probably true that General Denikin himself has no political ambition, and desires solely the restoration of order, local politicians suspect his entourage of monarchist tendencies, and M. Sazonoff has declared, in a interview, that he considers that a constitutional Monarchy is the only form of Government which has any chance of attaining stability. He considers that a large measure of local autonomy should be granted to the various provinces, but not so much as to create anything like a series of independent states.

M. Sazonoff is emphatically opposed to the Ukrainian separation, but admits that the Poles have a right to independence. M. Sazonoff recently transmitted a telegram to His Majesty's Government stating that he had been selected as the representative of the Government of the Volunteer Army at the Peace Conference, and had been instructed to stand for the following policy :—

- (i.) The reconstruction of Russia within the frontiers of 1914, except as regards Poland.
- (ii.) The recognition of the Volunteer Army as being in alliance with the Entente.
- (iii.) Financial and military assistance for the Volunteer Army for the restoration of Russia.
- (iv.) Non-interference by the Allies in the matter of the future form of Government for Russia, or in regional organizations.
- (v.) That his delegation should alone represent Russia at the Peace Conference.

Although the Province of Kuban is governed by its own Rada, under the Presidency of M. Bych, the whole of the territory occupied by the Volunteer Army is under martial law. A certain amount of friction exists between the Kuban Rada and General Denikin's Government, but this is not regarded as serious.

The territory of the Don Cossacks is under a separate government under the Presidency of General Bogaievski, who is said to be wholly in favour of placing the Don forces under General Denikin's command. This course, which was for a long time opposed by the Ataman, General Krasnoff, has now been agreed to by him, and the troops of the Don Government which is strongly anti-Bolshevik, will now co-operate closely with the Volunteer Army.

(c.) POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UKRAINE.

The present Ukrainian Government, composed of a Directorate of Five and a Council of Ministers, represents the Ukrainian National Union, whose organization was consolidated about the beginning of September, 1918, in opposition to Skoropatski. The Union claims to include all the Agrarian, Democratic, Social Revolutionary and Nationalist groups and was opposed to the German domination of the country.

It stands for Agrarian reform in the interests of the peasants; autonomy for the Jews; large rights for labour; the convocation of the National Assembly based on a very wide suffrage; a really democratic régime; good relations with the Entente and an independent Ukraine, if possible to include Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, part of Chelm and the Crimea. The anti-Democratic measures of Skoropatski in the middle of November and his formation of a semi-Cadet Government under Gerbel, in favour of the reconstitution of a united Russia in concert with the other anti-Bolshevik Governments, resulted in a definite rupture with the National Union, whose troops under Petlura advanced from Eastern Galicia towards Kieff, which they occupied on the 14th December, Skoropatski resigning the same day. The German forces at first to some extent prevented hostilities but, their one desire being to go home as quickly as possible, Skoropatski's Government had no armed forces with which to resist Vinnichenko and Petlura.

The Directorate have not established themselves as a real governmental power, and during December a number of local Committees of Workmen and Peasants have been formed, while the Bolsheviks have pressed forward over the old German advanced line of occupation, and have established a Soviet Ukrainian Government, probably centered at Kharkoff. The fact that the Skoropatski Government have done their best to alter the situation of the land question in favour of the large landowners and the most well-to-do peasants provides good ground for the outbreak of Bolshevism, and, although the new Directorate, following on the same lines as the old Rada, profess to be strongly anti-Bolshevik, experience at Archangel and in Siberia has shown that the practical differences between Bolsheviks and Social Revolutionaries are only slight. The independence of the Ukraine from Russia is one of the main planks of the new Government, and this is the crucial point of hostility to the Bolsheviks, but the events of the past year show that there is as yet little prospect of a strong Ukraine being erected on a national basis. The separatist tendency of the Petlura Directorate brings them into conflict with the Government at Ekaterinodar no less than with the Soviet Government at Moscow.

(d.) POLITICAL SITUATION AT ARCHANGEL.

M. Tschaikovski's Provisional Government for North Russia has been in office at Archangel since August, 1918, when its position was assured by the arrival of the Allied expedition. It was joined by the Murman district, where the administration is carried out by M. Yermoloff, who acts as Governor-General under M. Tschaikovski. The Archangel Government is composed of Moderate Socialists, who are anti-Bolshevik and favour the election of the Constituent Assembly. Their immediate object has been the creation of a federation of North Russian States preparatory to the establishment of a larger federation including all states hostile to Bolshevik rule. M. Tschaikovski was a member of the All-Russian Directorate until the latter were dissolved as the result of the recent *coup d'état* in Siberia.

The most important factors in the administration have been the questions of food and finance, and the relations between the Russian Civil and Allied Military Authorities. The food question has been satisfactorily dealt with by the provision of supplies by the Allies for the whole population of the occupied territory, local supplies being quite insufficient. The finance question has presented considerable difficulties, but a satisfactory arrangement was recently made whereby His Majesty's Government agreed to assist the Provisional Government in the establishment of a new rouble currency at a fixed rate of forty roubles to £1 sterling, to be guaranteed by a sterling fund at the Bank of England; the notes to be printed in London.

As regards Civil administration, it has been agreed that the control of the public services; railway, port-control, lighting, &c., and expenditure in this connection should be under the Allies, since the latter are financing the local Government, which, however, retains full control of the Civil administration in all other respects. The Russian Military Administration is exercised by a Russian Governor-General, General Marushevski, who is a deputy of the Provisional Government and is subordinate to the Allied Military Command. General Marushevski's appointment has had a very salutary effect, eliminating friction and improving discipline.

The attitude of the population has been generally satisfactory. In spite of active Bolshevik propaganda, the true facts regarding Bolshevik rule appear to have been appreciated, and it is also apparently realised that previous submission to anti-Bolshevik administration would lead to the usual Bolshevik reprisals. Politically the population appears to favour the election of the Constituent Assembly, and reflects the attitude of the Provisional Government in this respect.



The Provisional Government have been divided in opinion regarding the recent *coup d'état* in Siberia and the abolition of the All-Russian Directorate against which M. Tschaiikovski and certain members have wished to protest publicly. The Allied Political representatives, however, have persuaded the latter to do nothing in the matter which would compromise a future reconciliation between the North Russian and Siberian authorities. The hope has been entertained, moreover, among certain reactionary elements in the political parties that a similar *coup d'état* might occur at Archangel. The Allied Military Command have, therefore, published a declaration emphasizing the fact that the Allied occupation is being carried out on the principle of non-interference in Russian internal affairs, and that no *coup d'état*, or violent political change, favouring either the Right or Left parties will be tolerated. Mention of Siberia was avoided, as being calculated to have the appearance of condemning the movement in that country. It is considered that this declaration has had a salutary effect, and no disturbances are feared.

M. Tschaiikovski has recently informed Mr. Lindley that he has accepted an invitation by his compatriots at Paris to proceed to that place to take part in a Conference, and that he intends handing over the Government temporarily to General Miller. The latter is a former Russian Corps Commander and Chief of Staff to an Army, who has been organizing resistance to the Bolsheviks, and who is believed to have strong influence with the population.

(c.) POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE BALTIC STATES.

(i.) *General*.—Local Provisional National Governments were established in the Baltic States about the time of the signing of the Armistice; although in Estonia the Government had been formed and had worked secretly in Sweden during the German occupation. In Estonia and Latvia these Governments were elected on democratic principles by the lower and middle classes; their internal policy was based on the distribution of land by small holdings among the agrarian population, and their foreign policy aimed at the establishment of close relations with the Entente powers, and the individual independence of each state. The German Baltic Barons were not included in the Governments, and the inhabitants showed themselves, generally, to be anti-Bolshevik and anti-German. In the latter connection a firm attitude has been adopted in Estonia; but German influence has remained somewhat stronger in Latvia. The administration of the local governments was, from the outset, obstructed in every way by the Germans. This, together with the rapidity of the Bolshevik advance, has rendered national development in the States almost impossible.

The Bolsheviks have announced the establishment of Soviet Governments in each of the States. With the exception, perhaps, of Latvia, where most of the country has been overrun, these Governments, however, appear to rest only on the enforced authority of the native Bolsheviks who are preceding the Bolshevik advance, and there is no indication that the inhabitants, generally, welcome their institution.

(ii.) *Estonia*.—The Provisional Government which was established under M. Poska on the 11th November, appears to have been remodelled to include non-Bolshevik socialists, and to have been named the National Council. This Council has issued an appeal that the country may be placed under British protection and that all forces mobilized or mobilizing may be placed under British command. The appeal is signed by A. Birk, who seems to have taken the place of M. Poska, on the latter proceeding to England. Appeals for help from Sweden and Finland have met with a satisfactory response in the shape of volunteer detachments.

(iii.) *Latvia*.—The Bolsheviks, on the departure of the British battleships on the 3rd January, occupied Riga and established a Soviet Government, of the usual type, in the town. Karl Ullman's Provisional Government, which has possessed little authority, has apparently withdrawn to Mitau, whither the German Administration is reported to have gone. This Government will probably move eventually to Libau, where the municipal authorities have been carrying out local organization in an energetic manner, and where conditions appear to be favourable for the reorganization of resistance to the Bolsheviks.

(iv.) *Lithuania*.—The political situation is obscure. The Provisional Government, consisting of members of the Taryba, with Professor Waldemar as Prime Minister, have never exercised much authority in the country, and are a survival of the puppet government put up by the Germans. It is now reported that the Ministry have been remodelled and apparently consist of non-Bolshevik Socialists, one of whom, Slocevicz, is at the head. M. Zaleski, Polish representative at Berne, states that Waldemar asked the



Polish Government to take over the Provisional Government of Lithuania to protect life and property, and that a Polish Committee has been formed for the purpose. Subsequent information given to Lord Kilmarnock and Sir H. Rumbold by Waldemar and Dr. Saulys (Lithuanian Minister at Berlin), however, makes no mention of this alleged fact, which should be accepted with reserve, as the Polish Government would be glad of any pretext for interfering with Lithuania.

(f.) POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND.

(i.) *General.*—The Moraczewski Government, which followed a short period in office of the extreme Socialists under Daszinski, continues in power.\* This Government is composed of the National Left, i.e., the patriotic Socialists, and is kept in office by General Pilsudski, who holds a position somewhat similar to that of a military dictator. General Pilsudski's position, however, has been weakened (i.) by the refusal of the Prussian Poles to collaborate with the Moraczewski Government, on the ground that it is not representative of all parties; (ii.) by the refusal of Marshal Foch to recognize him as Commander-in-Chief, and to place the Polish army in France under his direction; and (iii.) by the pogroms in Galicia and Warsaw, which have had an unfavourable effect on Entente opinion. General Pilsudski has not hitherto dealt firmly with disorders, and lawlessness and attacks on property have increased during the last month. Unemployment is widespread and likely to increase, as the Germans have destroyed or removed large quantities of machinery and rolling stock, and large numbers of Poles are returning from Germany and Austria.

This action of the Germans, combined with their complicity with the Bolsheviks, induced the Polish Government to sever relations with the German Government on the 16th December.

Except in portions of the mining districts, Bolshevism does not appear to have gained any hold in Poland. The Bolshevik advance, however, is rapidly approaching the Polish frontier, and it is the avowed intention of the Bolsheviks to establish their rule by force in Poland.

The outlook in Poland is, therefore, not bright, and it is apparently generally recognized that the country's only means of salvation, other than direct help from the Entente, lies in the attainment of concord between the various political parties, for the securing of united effort in the reorganization of internal affairs and defence against Bolshevik aggression. The prospect of this unity being achieved appears to have improved. Negotiations are proceeding between M. Grabski, the representative of the Polish National Committee, and General Pilsudski and M. Moraczewski for the constitution of a Coalition Government, and the arrival of M. Paderevski at Warsaw is expected to hasten a satisfactory issue. The latter apparently enjoys great popularity in Poland, though his efforts in America have not shown him to be particularly fitted for a political career. The National Committee have strengthened their position owing to the fact that the Diet of Prussian Poland have placed the provisional defence of Polish interests with the Entente in their hands.

The elections for the Polish National Constituent Assembly are to be held about the 26th January. It is probable that the People's Party will be the largest single party in the country. Its programme includes nationalization of large estates, mines and forests, in favour of the peasants. It lays chief emphasis, however, on the preservation of order, and is strongly anti-Bolshevik.

The position of the Jews is obscure, as neither side has any interest in telling the truth. It seems clear, however, that most of the professional Bolshevik agitators are Jews; that most of the Jews are either passively or actively anti-national, and are making claims for Jewish autonomy which would be inconsistent with the Sovereignty of the Polish State.

(ii.) *Frontiers.*—In the question of frontiers the Poles are endeavouring to forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference. In Posen, a Polish Diet with executive powers independent of the Warsaw Government was established on the 3rd December. The ill-feeling between the Poles and Germans, however, came to a climax on the 27th December, when M. Paderevski arrived in the town of Posen on his way to

\* On the 5th January an attempt was made by certain elements of the extreme Right party, supported by a force of civilian militia, to bring about a *coup d'état*, with the object of replacing the Moraczewski Government by a Government representative of all parties. This attempt, however, failed owing to the fact that the troops of the Regular Army did not participate therein; and the political situation, in consequence, has remained unchanged.

Warsaw. Serious fighting ensued in which the Poles, apparently reinforced by Legionaries from Russian Poland, gained the upper hand, with the result that they are in *de facto* control of the province.

The Poles openly announce their intention of incorporating Dantzig in the Polish State and have created great ill feeling among the Germans by the issue of a special loan for the purchase of a large amount of land in the vicinity of the town. The Germans state that the Poles intend, by this means, to represent this land as being Polish with a view to strengthening their claim to Dantzig at the Peace Conference. The German Government, however, have announced their intention of protecting Dantzig against Polish aggression, and of retaining the town in the German Empire.

As regards Eastern Galicia, the Poles have announced their intention of defending their claim to Lemberg at all costs. Fighting between the Poles and Ruthenes has been in progress in this area since early in November, and the Poles obtained definite possession of Lemberg, together with territory to the north, by the 22nd November. Recently, however, the Ruthenians have been reinforced from Austria and Russia, and have succeeded in practically surrounding the Poles, who, with the claims on their resources elsewhere, will find it difficult to maintain their gains.

As regards the South-Western frontier, the Poles appear disposed to come to an agreement with the Czechs.

In the north-east, the Poles lay claim to the Grodno and Vilna areas, and their proposed despatch of troops to defend these areas against the Bolsheviks does not appear to have been actuated by entirely disinterested motives.

## II.—ECONOMIC APPRECIATION.

### 1. BOLSHIEVIK FINANCIAL METHODS AND NOTES ON BOLSHIEVIK CURRENCY.

(a.) *General.*—We see throughout the area controlled by the Bolshevik Autocracy a destruction of the industrial and commercial system which has been based on the models of Western civilization.

Bona fide commerce and industry is at a standstill, necessities of life are scarce and obtainable only at exorbitant prices, expressed in terms of a depreciated currency issued without regard to sound principles of finance.

The peasants employed in agriculture and thus controlling the essential products of the soil, are less imbued with the taint of Bolshevism than the factory hands and town dwellers. They will not sell their supplies for a depreciated currency, but part with them only in exchange for the necessary products of those trades and industries, mainly centred in the towns, which Bolshevism has paralysed or destroyed.

There can be no two opinions as to the fact that the basis of national and international trade and industry is vitally bound up with the banking system. If therefore, the situation created by the Nationalization of all Russian banks is examined, it will go far to show that the assertion freely made that the banking system has completely broken down is perfectly justifiable, and further, that this being so, trade and industry in the accepted sense, when they are not at a standstill, are at any rate not being conducted on an economically sound basis. The paralysing effect which Bolshevik decrees have had upon trade and industry may be thus illustrated:

(b.) *The Nationalization of Bank Balances.*—In effect, this is a provision by which all current accounts become governmentally controlled. Permits to draw on such accounts are granted up to 1,000 roubles per month without any regard to the amount standing to the credit balance of such accounts. As a result, no individual commercial house, shop or business of any kind, which is not controlled by a duly authorized Bolshevik committee, has a credit value of more than 1,000 roubles per month. If it be taken into consideration that the life of any such Bolshevik committee is very precarious and depends to a great extent on the number of bayonets supporting it, it will be clearly understood that the ordinary system of trade and industrial credits has ceased to exist.

All securities, including Government stocks, Treasury bills, bank, trading, and industrial stocks and shares have been nationalized. After a rough and ready valuation, holders of such securities are credited with a cash balance, subject, of course, to the embargo mentioned.

A few comments are illuminating evidence of Bolshevik failure:—

The "People's" Bank can hardly claim any depositors, despite the fact that the last banking institution (Moscow Narodni Bank) which remained outside the nationalization decree was taken under Government control about two months ago. In other words, the "People's" Bank, the only remaining bank, inspires no confidence. This lack of confidence arises from several different causes. Among them may be numbered the absolute insecurity arising out of the wholesale corruption prevalent throughout the Bolshevik administration, and particularly in the Bank administration.

The misvaluation of incredibly large sums of money is of daily occurrence. Other causes are the insufficiency and incompetence of the bank staffs. In fact, the interest of 3 per cent. payable on all bank balances is hardly ever credited. It is no exaggeration to state that under the Bolshevik financial regulations there has been a complete breakdown of the credit system. The cheque has fallen into disuse. There are no longer any securities to enable a trade or an industry to obtain credit, and loans cannot be raised.

It may be well asserted that with production ever on the decrease (in some industries it has fallen to 5 per cent. of the normal) and consumption on a starvation basis (e.g., the population of Petrograd, owing mainly to emigration consequent on unemployment and disease, has dwindled from 2½ millions to about 900,000) the economic system in Russia under Bolshevik influence has had the disastrous results of completely paralysing the trade and industry of the country.



A conclusive proof of Bolshevik economic bankruptcy is afforded by their latest budget statement for 1919, which runs as follows, in round figures :—

Expenditure.			
28 milliards of roubles.		Revenue.	
Taxes...	...	...	2 milliards of roubles.
Contributions from the "Bourgeois classes"	...	10	" "
Deficit to be covered by fresh issues of paper currency	...	16	" "
Total	...	28	" "

(c.) *Ukraine*.—The Bolshevik invasion of the Ukraine destroyed, as it did in Northern Russia, the existing trade and industrial life of the country. It failed, as it has done in Northern Russia, to construct trade and industry on a new basis. The occupation by Germany of the Ukraine re-imposed the old order of things. However much the economic life of the Ukraine must have suffered from these two violent and rapid changes, as an illustration of the confidence restored by the overthrow of Bolshevism, even by a foreign enemy—the re-opening of the private banks at Kieff under their old management, may be quoted. Hundreds of would-be depositors of millions of roubles besieged these banks for days in succession. It is indeed a justifiable presumption that should the Bolsheviks again make themselves masters of the Ukraine, with the greater experience they have acquired since their first inroad into that country, their demolition of trade and industry will be more thorough than on the former occasion. Here as elsewhere under the Bolshevik rule there will then be the same absence of security for capital and industry and the almost equal lack of security for life itself.

(d.) *Notes on Bolshevik currency*.—The following observations with regard to the Bolshevik currency situation are of interest :—

- (1.) The Bolshevik Government have lost large amounts of bullion, and have no possibility of attaining any fresh cover to their paper issue.
- (2.) An issue of two milliards of paper monthly still continues.
- (3.) It appears that the Bolshevik Government have never dared to issue paper money of their own, having relied on fresh issues of Kerensky money, which is still accepted by the people, and probably on illicit issues of, ostensibly, Czar roubles.

In the event of the people ceasing to accept the present paper currency, and of no organization of barter being established in its place, disaster must finally overtake the Bolshevik régime.

## 2. BOLSHIEVİK RELATIONS WITH THE ZEMSTVOS.

The nearest English equivalents to the Zemstvos are the Rural District Councils and the Local Government Board.

They have proved of the greatest assistance during the war. Without the Union of Zemstvos it is doubtful if the Quarter-Master General's department of the Russian army could have coped with the situation, as they undertook practically the whole of the food organization. It is stated that the late Czar credited them with political intrigue and wished to disband them, but this was vigorously resisted by the Grand Duke Nicholas, then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. Under Kerenski the Zemstvos were reorganized and their power amplified. It was projected that they should form the electoral machinery for the Constituent Assembly, but this scheme was not in full working order at the time the Bolsheviks seized power. The Bolsheviks realizing that they had to deal with a body practically controlling the agricultural supplies of the country were very careful in their attitude at first. The Bolsheviks attacked the members of the Zemstvos on the ground that individually they were counter-revolutionary but went no further until with increasing power they felt strong enough to assail the executive branches and finally the whole system. Their purpose was two-fold :—

- (1.) To destroy the machinery for the election of a Constituent Assembly.
- (2.) To obtain complete domination over the peasantry and consequently the handling of rural produce.

Domination of the peasantry they have never really obtained, but they sowed distrust against the Zemstvos by suggesting that these bodies were retarding the distribution of the land. The destruction of the authority of the Zemstvos was not replaced by confidence in the Bolsheviks. The peasants refused to place their produce on the markets as it was so often sequestered. They demanded clothing, agricultural machinery and household goods, and refused the paper money which was of no use to them. The vicious circle was established of complaint by the workpeople that the peasants would not supply food, and on the peasants' side that the workpeople would not supply the implements necessary for their toil. Result—chaos and famine.

### 3 BOLSHIEVİK RELATIONS WITH CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.

These are closely allied to the Zemstvos, but have no administrative functions. The Bolsheviks were very chary of interference with these bodies in the earlier stage, recognizing that they were the embodiment of one branch of socialist thought. The Co-operative Societies, were and are, a body of considerable power representing the financial interests of a large proportion of the peasant population. The "People's Bank in Moscow, which was practically owned by the Co-operatives, was for a time allowed almost unrestricted freedom of action.

A very large percentage of Russian raw material passes through the hands of the Co-operatives, and the Bolsheviks realise that resumption of trade relationship with other countries is in no small way dependent on this functioning of the Co-operatives. These latter have stoutly defended their rights, and many collisions have occurred in the attempts of the Bolsheviks to sequester money and goods belonging to them.

Should the Bolsheviks succeed in the domination of the Co-operatives it will be another blow to the possibilities of reconstruction of Russian economic life.

### 4. NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY.

First attempts at the nationalization of industry were carried out at the Poutiloff (the Russian Krupps) and the Oboukhovski Gun Works near Petrograd. These works, in fact, provided the nucleus of the workmen's army under the Bolshevik régime, as they had also been among the first insurrectionists in the earlier revolution.

The nationalization of factories developed until it included all the Petrograd works and was eventually extended to Moscow.

Having ordained the nationalization of industry, extraordinary measures were adopted by the Bolsheviks in their endeavours to secure apparent success for their schemes. When it was realized that factories could not survive the removal of the brains of the industry represented by the owners, managers and staffs, laws were passed to "protect" the workpeople, among others, a regulation that no workman could be dismissed on grounds of ill-health, incapacity, or idleness. Such questions had to be referred to the Workmen's Committee, who invariably sided with the employee. If a workman was called up as a "Red Guard" he was entitled to demand from his employer full pay during his absence on service, and in certain cases 70 per cent. of the workpeople being absent as Red Guards, the remainder declined to work on the ground that it was impossible to operate the factory, but demanded none the less full pay during their idleness.

The technical staff in most cases followed the example of their employers in declining to serve except where poverty made such a course impossible. Attempts were made by the Soviets to enforce the attendance of the staff, who in such cases attended, but adopted the attitude of passive resistance. Wages increased and output decreased. One may mention the instance of a railway wagon works where, based on the number of men employed, the wages paid and the work done, a completed wagon cost 180,000 roubles. Gradually the owners, either ruined or realizing the impossibility of continuing under these conditions, have surrendered their works to their Soviet masters.

### 5. MINING.

(a.) *General.*—From 1914–1918, the mining industry passed through four phases—

- (i.) 1914. When output was normal.
- (ii.) 1915–1917. Increasing output, qualified by periods of decrease owing to injudicious mobilization of working hands.
- (iii.) 1917. The revolution. Rapid decrease in output and increase in cost of working.
- (iv.) 1917. November to date. Increasing state of chaos. Nationalization. Increase of wages to such an extent that the payment of workpeople had to be subsidized by the State. Output negligible.



It is impossible to give in a short summary full details, but a few figures are quoted from reliable sources concerning key mining industries.

(b.) *Coal*.—In the Donetz basin, on which industrial Russia mainly depends, the first revolution in 1917 resulted in a 13 per cent. decrease. The number of pits working in November, 1918, is given as 30, as compared with 390 in normal times. Only the smaller pits are working; the Bolsheviks, either purposely or through negligence, have flooded the larger pits. As the district contains no spare plant or repairing units, it is impossible to resume work. The Donetz normally supplied about 1,505 million poods\* per annum.

The following statistics show the terrible conditions :—

September, 1917, output ...	1,358,000 tons.
October " " " " " " " "	1,136,000 "
November " " " " " " " "	1,225,000 "
Bolshevik régime—	
December, 1917, output ...	811,000 "
January, 1918, " " " " " " " "	491,000 "

In the Ural mountains the coal production has fallen from a normal 6-7 million poods monthly to 800,000-900,000 poods monthly, i.e., an 86 per cent. decrease.

(c.) *Iron*.—The principal ironfields of Russia are in the south—the Krivoi Rog supplying 75 per cent. and in the Urals. The Krivoi Rog district mined about 3,000,000 tons of ore per annum prior to the war, employing 23,000 hands. The following extract from the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7th November, 1917, refers to ironworks in the Krivoi Rog :—

At the Gdantsevski Works only 400 workmen remain.

The Nikopol Mariupol Works which had a normal monthly output of 500,000 poods, produced only 17,000 poods during April, 1918, and in May, 1918, work stopped entirely.

At the Donetz-Yurievsk, work has been at a standstill since May, 1918.

At Bryansk only 2,500 workmen remain out of 6,000, the normal number.

The Bogoslavski district in the Urals decreased in output from 250,000 poods per month to 200,000 and less. Up to 1st May, 1917, sums to the amount of 195,000,000 roubles had been advanced by the Government, but hitherto with no visible success in the restoration of the industry.

(d.) *Summary*.—The same history applies to copper, oil, manganese as has been touched on in iron and coal. The nationalization, or rather total allocation to the local workpeople, of the works, was based on the firm belief that the profits shown in the past under business organization would be maintained in the future. The saner elements among the workpeople and "commissars" realized that the pace, in wages, &c., could not be maintained, but the extremists continued to agitate, and eventually the Government had to subsidise the industry with its "paper" money in order to placate the extremist elements among the workpeople.

After November, 1918, owing to the rupture of relations with the Ukraine, and the Czecho-Slovak operations in the Urals, the Bolsheviks became dependent on the coal mines in the Moscow district. During the first six months of 1918 these mines produced 10,000,000 poods (161,300 tons) and the northern mines produced 400,000 poods per month, or together less than 2,000,000 poods per month, whereas Petrograd required 14,000,000 poods per month in normal times.

#### 6. AGRICULTURE.

(a.) *Grain*.—When we come to consider the great agricultural resources of European Russia our attention is again directed to the Ukraine, which area, in spite of unsatisfactory systems of land tenure and antiquated methods of farming, produced a large proportion of Russia's total exportable surplus of grain. It exported in 1913 some 33,000,000 tons of grain and, in addition, this region accounted for 80 per cent. of the normal production of beet sugar in Russia.

Present production is hampered to a considerable extent, not merely by the original difficulties mentioned above, but by the unsettled conditions of labour and life generally produced by the war and the revolution.

The pillage of private estates and stores of grain coupled with the bad condition of transport, has deterred production, encouraged waste and prevented the collection and distribution of the produce available.

These adverse conditions have been accentuated by the deficiency of agricultural machinery. Prior to the war, nearly two-thirds of the agricultural machinery used in

\* 1 pood = 36.11,281 lbs. avoirdupois.



the Ukraine (and its use was then increasing, and further increase is now urgent, having regard to the need for improved farming), was of Russian manufacture; the factories having been subsequently converted to war purposes and being now unable, through difficulties of labour and material, to resume their former activities, the Ukrainian cultivators have for some time past been compelled to look to outside sources for their supplies as they will be equally compelled to do for some years to come.

The available information as to the harvest of 1918, and as to stocks existing prior to that harvest, goes to show that production although much reduced is still substantial. In February, 1918, it was estimated that stocks of grain to the extent of some 4,000,000 tons probably existed in the Ukraine, and that efforts to remove these stocks to the Central Empires would meet with only a modest degree of success, owing partly to the attitude of the peasants in refusing to part with their stocks, and in concealing them, and still more to the limited supply and poor condition of the available transport. Subsequent information has confirmed that the Central Powers have not obtained any considerable supplies from the Ukraine.

The total area sown in the Ukraine by the end of the 1918 spring sowings, has been officially stated to be as high as 80 per cent. of the normal, and this statement is probably but little exaggerated.

Estimates of the yield of the 1918 harvest are somewhat variable.

On 31st August, 1918, the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* stated that the Ukraine harvest was above the average, and that 1,600,000 tons would be available for export.

On 5th September, 1918, the *Vossische Zeitung* reported that the summer wheat and rye crops range from inferior to positively bad, while barley and oats were no better. Winter cereals, on the other hand, were above-average, or good.

On 18th September, 1918, *Vorwärts* published an estimate, compiled from official data, stating that the total Ukraine harvest would show a yield of 15,040,000 tons, of which the figures for the four principal cereals were as follows:—

Wheat	...	...	...	...	5,000,000 tons.
Rye	...	...	...	...	3,667,000 "
Barley	...	...	...	...	2,840,000 "
Oats	...	...	...	...	1,800,000 "

On 2nd November, 1918, the *Pester Lloyd*, publishing closely corresponding figures, compared them with those of 1912 (not a particularly good year), which showed that 1918 was about 25 per cent. worse in results. This report also stated that the exportable surplus would be 2,600,000 tons.

On 1st January, 1919, it was reported by the British representative at Odessa that good stocks of grain were lying in the district south of the Dnieper, and west of a line running from Kherson to Perekop, while a large area was sown with winter grain.

The harvest in Great Russia is stated to have been better than was expected, while in the Northern provinces a serious shortage exists of seed grain.

(b.) *Sugar*.—With regard to beet sugar, of which the Ukraine area under cultivation in 1917 was said to be 572,000 hectares, as compared with 750,000 in 1914, the 1918 area will certainly not have been greater than that of 1917. The figures for production (all Russia) are as follows:—

1914-15	...	...	...	...	38,788,000 cwts.
1915-16	...	...	...	...	35,867,000 "
1916-17	...	...	...	...	26,432,000 "
1917-18	...	...	...	...	20,572,000 "

The only report available as to 1918-19 sugar production makes it probable that this will fall far below even the poor result of 1917-18.

(c.) *Live stock*.—With regard to the quantity of live stock at present held in Russia, the Soviet authorities have asserted that stocks have actually increased under their régime, and have published statistics purporting to establish their assertions. Low as stocks must have been when the Bolshevik government was established, it is not possible that they can have increased or even kept their level, and the Soviet statistics must be regarded as fictitious or misrepresented. The Soviet authorities give no explanation as to how any increased stock has been, or can be fed, nor do they state how stocks have increased in face of the urgent demand for food in the towns and the consequent high prices to be obtained for meat.

(d.) *Summary*.—It thus appears that agricultural conditions in the Ukraine are improving subject to the serious obstacles presented by a lack of implements and machinery, insufficient and defective conditions of transport and in spite of unsettled conditions.

That the position in the Ukraine is no worse and thus does not approximate to that obtaining in Northern and Bolshevik Russia must be attributed to the comparative independence from Soviet influence which the Ukraine has succeeded in maintaining.

If however, reports are true as to the gradual encroachment of Bolsheviks into Ukraine territory, a repetition of the state of affairs existent in North Russia is bound to occur. Inasmuch as under normal conditions South Russia practically fed North Russia—the amount of wheat sent in from Siberia being proportionately small—disorganization in these southern provinces would remove all hope of immediate relief to Northern Russia, excepting such foodstuffs as might be imported from abroad. Reliance can hardly be placed on immediate relief from Siberian stocks, as owing to railway disorganization, a considerable period must elapse even after the downfall of the Bolshevik régime before Siberian supplies could be sent into Russia in any quantities.

#### 7. TRANSPORT.

(a.) *General.*—Without sufficient transport the existing Bolshevik régime is doomed, and they appear to have early realized the importance of obtaining control of the railways, although to this day they have a hard fight to maintain their domination, as is instanced by the hostile reception given to Radek when he attempted to address the Vologda Executive of the Railwaymen's Union.

(b.) *Rail transport.*—The railway personnel have shown a greater resistance to Bolshevism than any other branch of labour in Russia. This applies in the main to the operating executive—the repair and workshops being contaminated at an early date. The Railwaymen's Union "Veksel" in the early days of Bolshevism vigorously combated extremist policy, but the Bolsheviks, by careful propaganda, gradually replaced the executive with men favourable to their views.

The minor officials and men on the Nicholas Railway, Petrograd—Ekaterinburg, are anti-Bolshevik but are obliged to conceal their views.

A complete deadlock was reached in Moscow in December, 1917, owing to the political differences between the various sub-unions of railwaymen, causing thousands of wagons of food supplies to be left unloaded. Order was eventually restored by a British officer taking the matter into his own hands and appointing himself controller for the time being. As an instance of the state the railways were in in 1917, an extraordinary commission from Petrograd decided, in view of the food crisis in Russia, to run 20 pairs of trains per day on the Trans-Siberian line. The actual number run was 6 pairs.

The present decay in the maintenance of rolling stock dates from the beginning of the war. A temporary increase of efficiency was produced by the introduction of American rolling stock, but owing to neglect and non-execution of running repairs as much as 37 per cent. of the American locomotives on the Siberian railway were out of action in February, 1918.

The percentage in European Russia is probably still greater.

In the Ukraine it was computed six months ago that from 45 to 50 per cent. of the rolling stock required repair. Spare parts are lacking and the workshops could not cope with the demand, their output being diminished by the reduction of working hours, prohibition of overtime and abolition of piece-work. One of the most serious difficulties resulted from the scarcity of coal.

The interference of the revolutionary committees in railway administration has not only encouraged disorder but has increased expenditure; on the South Western Railway alone it was reckoned that 16,000 superfluous employees were drawing pay at total annual rate of 46 million roubles, while for the whole Ukraine system the total payable to unnecessary personnel was computed at 200 millions of roubles per annum.

Under such disastrous conditions, as is only to be expected, in spite of enormously increased rates the railways are working at a loss, and the deficit for 1918 on the railways of the Ukraine has been put at 800 millions of roubles.

(c.) *River transport.*—The waterways of Russia especially the Volga were in normal times served by an efficient fleet of steamers and barges. The economic life of Russia is in fact bound up with the river and canal systems of the country, much of the oil and grain and practically the whole of the timber transport being effected by water.

Nationalization of vessels and the extremist attitude adopted by many of the "Artels" of the crews, bargemen and lumberers, has brought about a serious decrease in the volume of raw materials and goods carried, and thus the valuable means of communication afforded by the river and canal systems fails to be adequately utilized.

\* Workmen's Associations.



## 8. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS.

From a consideration of the foregoing one is forced to the conclusion that the measures inaugurated by the Bolsheviks, and the means by which they are applied, can have but one end—the bankruptcy of Government and the country.

One may be tempted to wonder that present conditions have subsisted for so long. Though the Bolshevik *régime* must be approaching a *debâcle*, such are the resources and natural wealth of the country that there is still scope for a continuance of present Bolshevik rule.

So long as these conditions prevail the country is deprived of the benefits of trade and industry, and capital is destroyed. Other countries who were the purchasers of Russian raw materials are cut off from these sources of supply, at a time when the need for reconstructing and revictualling great areas of Europe would have rendered the produce of Russia of special value.

Much of Russia's actual and potential wealth remains undiminished in value, while circumstances cause its exploitation to be impossible. This, however, does not apply to its agriculture, and during every month the position becomes more acute, so that eventually seed grain will have been consumed for food, stocks of livestock exhausted, and the difficulties of restoration and reconstruction of this great territory will be vastly increased.

### III.—MILITARY APPRECIATION.

#### 1. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES.

(a.) *Higher organization.*—The National Military Commission (Ministry) of Soviet Russia is presided over by Trotsky, assisted by seven other prominent Bolsheviks; but there is an inner body, named the Revolutionary Military Council, in whose hands the real military power rests. Trotsky is also president of this Council, and is assisted by Vatsetis (a Lett), as commander-in-chief, Lenin, Sverdloff, Stalin, Podvoiski, and five others of less note.

The Commission is divided into five chief sections:—

- (i.) The Supreme Military Inspection.
- (ii.) The Attestation Commission, dealing with mobilization and universal service.
- (iii.) The office of the Military Commissioners of all Russia.
- (iv.) The central office for the equipping of the Army.
- (v.) The General Staff of all Russia.

At the same time, no expenses can be incurred, nor can any schemes be put into force, without the approval of a body called the Military Legislative Council, which supervises and administers all such affairs, as, for instance, Finance, Contre-espionage, Press, Statistics, Transport, Public Works, Employment of Military Resources, Demobilization, Medical Services, Legal Affairs, questions affecting prisoners of war and deserters, &c.

The Military Commission decentralizes by delegating its powers to its representatives in the various divisions into which Soviet Russia is divided. These divisions are as follows:—

- (i.) The "Okrug."\*
- (ii.) The "Government."
- (iii.) The "District."
- (iv.) The "Commune."

Each of these divisions of Russia has its own Military Commission formed from representatives of the sub-division contained in it. (For example, the military administration of the "Okrug" is carried out by the Commissioner of the "Okrug," assisted by the Commissioners of the various "Governments" contained in it, while that of the "Government" is carried out by the Commissioner of the "Government," assisted by the Commissioners of the "Districts" contained in it.)

(b.) *Development of the Soviet Army.*—Up till the beginning of the summer of 1918 the Soviet Army consisted of a heterogeneous collection of so-called divisions, columns, detachments, regiments and battalions, the strengths of which were not indicated in the least by the name of the unit. For instance, a "division" might consist of 250 men, whilst a "battalion" might consist of 2,500. These units, which, except in a few isolated instances, were raised by voluntary enlistment, were sent on to the front without any higher organization and possessed no reserve formations in the interior from which they could draw reinforcements. Their officers were in some cases elected and in others appointed or co-opted. The disadvantages of this lack of system soon made themselves apparent, and at the fifth All Russian Congress of Soviets on the 4th July, 1918, it was decided to introduce a fundamental system of military organization combined with universal liability to service.

Liability to service was imposed on all "honourable and healthy citizens" from 18 to 40 years of age for the purpose of defending the Republic against its foes both within and without, while from the "bourgeoisie" of the above ages, formations were to be created in rear for providing the personnel for non-combatant services and for auxiliary and labour corps. The necessity was recognized of mobilizing several classes at the earliest possible moment and in fulfilment of the general principle of the universal arming of the proletariat, it was deemed necessary that the military training of all who would be liable for service should commence while they were still at school and be divided into three stages, as follows:—

- (i.) Elementary, for citizens up to 16 years of age.
- (ii.) Preparatory, from 16 to 18 years of age.
- (iii.) Active, from 18 to 40 years of age.

Women were to be permitted to serve if they wished.

No person was to be exempted from liability to be called up, but the following

\* Russia is divided into eleven Okrugs or Military Areas, each of which includes several Governments, and some of which are actually in the hands of anti-Bolshevik forces. They are as follows: Yuroslav, Moscow, Orel, White Sea, Urals, Volga, Western Siberia, Central Siberia, Eastern Siberia, Northern Caucasus, Turkestan.



classes were freed from acceptance for actual military service :—

- (i.) Those passed as unfit.
- (ii.) Those who, owing to their moral disabilities, were considered unworthy (*e.g.*, counter-revolutionaries).
- (iii.) Skilled workmen.

By decrees issued between the 12th and 29th of June, 1918, those citizens who were born during the years 1893-7 were called up.

On 11th September orders were given that the formation of all new divisions should be stopped except in the case of those which had already, in whole or in part, been sent to the Eastern and Southern Fronts and of the cavalry divisions, and that all efforts were to be concentrated on the building up of five regularly constituted divisions. These were to be raised in districts as follows :—

Petrograd military "Okrug."		
Yaroslav	"	"
Moscow	"	"
Orloff	"	"
Volga	"	"

They were to consist of all arms, were to be supplied with the usual administrative services, and were to consist of three infantry brigades, three field artillery brigades, one howitzer division, one heavy artillery division and divisional cavalry. The personnel was to consist exclusively of the Class of 1898 and no ex-soldiers of the former Russian Army were to be admitted, as they were considered to be demoralized. The training was to be intensive and to be combined with a course of vigorous revolutionary propaganda. The officers were to be drawn from the old Corps of Officers of the Russian Army. It was presumed that the 1898 Class would consist of 300,000 men, of whom 150,000 would actually be mobilized. For the establishment of the five divisions 100,000 men would be utilized, and the remaining 50,000 drafted in reserve regiments for providing reinforcements to these divisions.

At the same time the formation of a further six divisions was ordered from the Classes 1890-1897, but it was specially laid down that the mobilization of these divisions was not to be allowed to interfere with that of the first five, which were to be considered of primary importance. The same care in selection of personnel was not considered necessary. It was expected that these six divisions would be formed by the 1st December. The first five were in all probability on the various fronts before that date.

(c.) *Commanders and officers.*—The officers generally are provided from two sources :—

- (i.) Ex-officers of the Imperial Army compelled to serve by considerations of safety and the necessity of obtaining food and a living.
- (ii.) Officers drawn from such younger members of the working class as possess an elementary education, and trained in schools established for the purpose in Petrograd and Moscow.

Similarly, the higher commanders are furnished from renegade ex-General Staff officers of the Imperial Army, and from officers trained in special schools of instruction. In addition, a military academy for the training of General Staff officers was opened in Moscow on the 7th December, 1918.

(d.) *Discipline and moral.*—Discipline is certainly becoming very much stricter and is maintained with the aid of various non-Russian units composed of Chinese, Letts, Germans, Czechs, Tartars and Magyars. Cowardice and desertion are punished by death. The Soldiers' Councils are likely to be abolished shortly, and the saluting of officers re-introduced. To accustom the men to these ideas, a vigorous propaganda is now being carried on. Moral is similarly maintained by propaganda, and in this work the young working class officers are taking a most prominent part.

(e.) *Strength and organization in the field.*—From the foregoing it will be seen that the Soviet Army is in the process of transition, and that the forces on the front consist in part of the semi-organized units of the early period and in part of the systematically formed divisions of the new era, a fact which makes accurate calculation of numbers extremely difficult. The Soviet forces are, however, organized in armies numbered from 1 to 12, with a certain number of additional independent divisions. These latter are principally to be found on the Western Front and in the interior of Soviet Russia.

The total forces of the Bolsheviks are estimated to be as follows :—

On the fronts :—	
Northern front ... ..	17,500
Western front ... ..	43,000
South-western (Ukraine) ... ..	40,000
Southern front ... ..	160,000
Eastern front ... ..	120,000
Turkestan ... ..	26,000
	406,500
Garrisons and reserves (estimated) ... ..	119,250
In process of mobilization (called up beginning of December) ... ..	300,000
	825,750

## 2. SITUATION ON THE SEVERAL FRONTS; RECENT EVENTS; STRENGTHS OF OPPOSING FORCES.

### (a.) NORTHERN FRONT.

(i.) *General situation.*—The Allied expeditions landed at Murman and Archangel on the 23rd June and 2nd August, 1918, respectively. Hopes which had been entertained of effecting a junction between the Archangel force and the Northern group of Czechoslovaks were disappointed, and the former force was consequently placed on the defensive in anticipation of the closing of the port of Archangel during the winter.

On the other hand, the Murman force was allowed to occupy the Murman Railway for a length of 350 miles to a point south of Soroka, so as to facilitate the maintenance of communication with Archangel during winter, and in order to be prepared for forward action in the direction of Petrograd should such be demanded by Allied policy. The conclusion of the Armistice with Germany, following on the evacuation of Finland by German troops, has resulted in the Allied forces in Murmansk likewise assuming the defensive.

Until the beginning of November, the Bolsheviks had shown little offensive spirit, but latterly they have attacked the Allied positions on the Archangel front on several occasions. Reports have also recently been received to the effect that they have been strengthening their forward positions.

It would appear unlikely that the Bolsheviks will attempt the severe task of driving the Allies into the sea, but their activity is probably accounted for by a desire to secure direct contact with the Allied troops, in order to facilitate the distribution and circulation of Bolshevik propaganda.

According to latest information, the Bolshevik advanced positions on the Archangel front are at Toronskaya (15 miles south-east of Pinega), Seletskaya (on the River Dvina, 200 miles south-east of Archangel), south of Tarasevskoe (110 miles south of Archangel), south of Kadish (100 miles south of Archangel), south of Obozerskaya, on the Archangel—Vologda line (about 100 miles south of Archangel), Pishobura (about 60 miles south-east of Onega).

On the Murman front the Bolsheviks advanced position is on the River Andoga, (about 40 miles south of Soroka).

The Bolsheviks appear to anticipate an attack on Petrograd from Finland, and they have, in consequence, constructed a line of trenches and fortifications covering that town from the north to an average depth of 10 miles; these run from Tarkhova on the Finnish Gulf to Yukki, and thence to Marino on the new Ladoga Railway.

(ii.) *Bolshevik forces.*—The Northern front was until recently under the supreme command of General Parsky (an ex-General of the former Russian Army), and comprises the area from Viatka to Petrograd (both inclusive).

The strength of the Bolshevik forces on this front is as follows :—

Area.	Unit.	Strength.	Remarks.
Archangel front ... ..	6th Soviet Army ... ..	14,500	Distributed into districts as follows :— Vologda ... .. 2,000 Archangel ... .. 5,000 Kotlas ... .. 3,000 Viatka ... .. 4,500
Murmansk front ... ..	Olonetz Group ... ..	3,000	
	Total ... ..	17,500	



The 6th Soviet Army has its headquarters at Vologda, and is commanded by Captain Gottis, a former General Staff Officer.

The above figures regarding this Army include 300 cavalry and show an increase of about 1,000 men since the middle of November. In addition, there are certain newly mobilized and partially trained and equipped units in the Vologda and Kotlas areas.

The force on the Pinega, which is included in the Kotlas district, is about 500 strong, and appears to be largely composed of local inhabitants whose main object is the securing of booty, and whose numbers vary according to the measure of success which attends the Bolshevik operations in this area.

The 6th Soviet Army is well-equipped, as regards small arms and ammunition, and possesses a fair proportion of 3-inch and 6-inch guns. On the Dwina a number of these guns have been mounted on river craft and were used with good effect before the river became frozen. Each district has two aviation squadrons, which are equipped with a miscellaneous assortment of old pattern Sopwith and Newport machines, hydroplanes and old Russian machines. These have not, however, been used with any effect. Each district also appears to possess a proportion of anti-aircraft guns. Information regarding technical troops and the supply system is somewhat incomplete. The latter is apparently to a great extent dependent on requisitioning detachments.

The Olonetz group is disposed with about 1,500 men holding the front on the River Andoga, and the remainder echeloned along the railway southwards to Petrozavodsk. This force is apparently well equipped, and is organized on the same lines as the 6th Soviet Army. In the Ladoga and Petrozavodsk district there is considerable friction between the Soviet authorities and the peasants, owing to the shortage of food resulting from excessive requisitioning.

In Petrograd there is believed to be one division and one reserve brigade, which are in process of formation, and which total about 5,000 men. On the Finnish frontier, north of Petrograd, there are apparently about 10,000 men. Reports giving much larger numbers have been received, but can safely be discarded as exaggerations.

(iii.) *Allied forces.*—The strength of the Allied forces on this front is as follows:—

Area.	Strength.	Remarks.
Archangel front .. .. .	16,247	Composed as follows:— British .. .. 6,255 Allied .. .. 6,845 Local .. .. 3,147
Murmansk front .. .. .	15,425	Composed as follows:— British .. .. 6,424 Allied .. .. 5,179 Local .. .. 3,822
Total .. .. .	31,672	

Good progress has been made in the training of the Russian troops. Cases of insubordination and refusal to work have occurred, but these have been firmly dealt with by the Russian authorities and recurrences are not anticipated. At Archangel, in particular, the firm manner in which General Marushevski, the new Governor-General, dealt with a company which recently mutinied—shooting the ringleaders after a summary court-martial—has had a very salutary effect. The Allied area of recruiting has been extended to Shenskursk (on the River Vaga, 50 miles south of its junction with the River Dwina), where a battalion is being mobilized. The attitude of the inhabitants in the occupied areas is generally satisfactory, and will presumably remain so, so long as the Allies supply them with sufficient food.

#### (b.) WESTERN FRONT.

(i.) *General situation and recent operations.*—The Bolshevik invasion of the Baltic States commenced with the attack on Narva on the 22nd November, and was followed on the 25th November by an advance on the Pskov—Rejitz—Dvinsk line. Early in December the advance was continued to the south in the direction of Minsk. In Esthonia the Bolsheviks have advanced to an average depth of 80 miles west of the line held by the Germans at the time of the signing of the Armistice; and to the south the advance has been carried forward to an average depth of 110 miles west of that line.

The Bolsheviks are advancing under most favourable conditions, with greatly superior forces, well organized and equipped, and on good parallel roads with adequate lateral communications. Their advance is, moreover, being facilitated in every way by

the Germans, who have done everything possible to prevent the organization of resistance by the local forces. The German evacuation has been carried out by agreement with the Bolsheviks. The latter have in most cases been notified of the time of evacuation and have entered towns simultaneously with the departure of the German troops. The Germans, at the same time, have abandoned large quantities of arms, ammunition and materials to the Bolsheviks.

The immediate objectives of the Bolsheviks are the Baltic ports of Reval, Pernau, Riga and Libau, and the towns and fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Byelostock and possibly Brest-Litovsk.

(ii.) *Present position of Bolshevik forces.*—According to information received up to the 9th January, the positions held by the Soviet forces were as follows:—

Kolk (38 miles east of Reval)—Apel (42 miles south-east of Reval)—Kirbelschhof (40 miles south-east of Pernau)\*—Riga—Neigut (30 miles east of Mitau)—Ponemunok (42 miles west of Dvinsk, on the Dvinsk—Shavli road)—Utsyani (68 miles north-east of Kovno)—Vilna—Listapady (53 miles north-east of Lida)—Novogrodok (30 miles south-east of Lida)—Baranovitchi.

(iii.) *Bolshevik forces.*—The strength of the Bolshevik forces on this front is as follows:—

Area.	Units.	Total strength.	Remarks.
Reval .. ..	7th Soviet Army (2 divisions) ..	8,000	Based on Petrograd.
Riga—Pernau ..	3 divisions .. ..	15,000	" Novgorod.
Kovno—Grodno ..	3 divisions .. ..	20,000	" Vitebsk and Smolensk.
Total .. ..		43,000	

All these forces include a proportion of native Bolsheviks of the invaded territory, who apparently act as advanced guards.

(iv.) *Anti-Bolshevik forces.*—The anti-Bolshevik forces on this front, which may be counted upon to offer resistance, are as follows:—

Area.	Total strength.	Remarks.
Estonia .. ..	25,000	Local forces, which include about 20,000 organizing.
" .. ..	1,000	Swedes: organizing, and in process of transport to Estonia.
" .. ..	2,000	Fins: organizing, and in process of transport to Estonia.
Poland .. ..	30,000	Organizing.
Total .. ..	58,000	

The Germans have deliberately obstructed the local Governments in the organization of their defence forces by the seizure of large quantities of supplies and rolling stock, the destruction of arms and the interruption of communications.

In Estonia, as the result of the mobilization which was ordered on the 16th November, about 20,000 men have been mustered up to date. This force is apparently being organized satisfactorily and is partially equipped, so far as small arms are concerned. There is also in Estonia a force of 3,000 men of the former North Russian Volunteer Army, which after being abandoned by the Germans at Pskoff, retired and placed itself at the disposal of the Estonian Government; but the intention of this force to fight is open to doubt.

Organization, however, has been to a great extent forestalled by the rapidity of Bolshevik advance, and the defence in the field is being carried out mainly by a militia force about 2,000 strong, which was organized prior to the general mobilization. Organizations have been established in Finland and Sweden for the raising of volunteer forces for despatch to Estonia, for assistance in defence against the Bolsheviks. In Finland, two detachments, each about 1,000 strong, have been formed, and a proportion of these have been conveyed to Estonia, and have presumably taken part in the fighting. In Sweden a force of about one thousand volunteers is reported to be organizing.

\* The Estonians claimed, on the 12th January, to have landed troops at Porta Kunda, on the coast, behind the Bolshevik flank; to have made local advances in the direction of Taps and Vegzeva, and to have outflanked the Bolshevik force at Kirbelschhof. These operations, however, have the appearance of being of a purely local nature, and, while indicating an improvement in the Estonian defence, it is not clear whether they have resulted in any appreciable change in the dispositions of the Bolsheviks.



In Latvia hardly any progress seems to have been made towards the organization of local forces. It was proposed to raise a force of 25,000 men, of whom a large number were said to be already trained, and which was to be officered by Lettish officers of the former Russian Army; but no steps appear to have been taken in this direction. When the British battleships left Riga on the 3rd January it was reported that the only resisting force in that area consisted of about 600 German Balts, who were retiring south of the town. At Libau a National Guard is reported to have been formed, but its strength and composition are not known.

In Lithuania no local forces have been organized. The Polish Government on the 21st December announced their intention of sending a force "several thousand strong" to protect Vilna. The German authorities, however, have prevented this transfer of Polish troops, and acting, as on other occasions, in agreement with the Soviet forces, evacuated Vilna on the 4th January, on which date the Soviet advanced troops entered the town. The Poles may endeavour to check the Bolshevik advance west of Vilna. The total Polish forces, however, only number about 30,000, and of these a large proportion are engaged in fighting in Posen and Eastern Galicia.

#### (c.) SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT.

The Soviet forces facing the Ukraine are composed of the "Special Army" which is disposed along the Ukrainian frontier, with the object of forcing its way into the Ukraine and re-establishing the authority of the Moscow Government, and of Krapivlianski's Division, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Ukraine Regiments (Ukrainian Bolsheviks), Krimoff's Cavalry Regiment, of which nothing is known, and Lettish assault troops.

Krapivlianski's Division, which has its headquarters at Starodub, captured Homel on the 1st January, 1919. These forces are at present practically unopposed, in view of the fall of the Skoropatski régime, as the result of the armed rising of Petlura.

The nucleus of the latter's troops was formed from a body of 3,000 Russian prisoners of war held by the Austrians in Galicia, but they have grown considerably, and at Nikolaieff alone 6,000 have been reported. Probably Petlura's total strength is not greater than 15-20,000 men of negligible military value.

Odessa and the Crimea have been occupied by troops of the French 156th Division. The strength of the opposing forces on this front is estimated as follows:—

Bolshevik forces.				French forces.	
"Special Army"	..	..	30,000	Elements of French 156th Division	.. 10,000
Krapivlianski's Division	..	..	10,000		

#### (d.) SOUTHERN FRONT.

(i.) *Bolshevik forces.*—On this front the following Soviet armies are disposed:—

8th Army—Voroñezh	..	..	..	50,000
9th Army—Balashoff	..	..	..	20,000
10th Army—Tzaritzin	..	..	..	30,000
11th and 12th Armies—Kuban territory and				
Caucasus	..	..	..	60,000
				160,000

The Commander is Sutin, with headquarters at Kozloff.

(ii.) *Anti-Bolshevik forces.*—They are opposed by the forces of Krasnoff, Hetman of the Don Cossacks, which number about 100,000, and of General Denikin, numbering about 50,000 rifles and sabres, and although the fronts of these two forces join at a point 65 miles north of Stavropol, it will be possible in considering the operations to examine each separately, as there has hitherto been an almost complete absence of any common strategical plan.

The front runs at present along the following general line:—40 miles south of Tuapse (on the Black Sea)—Kislovodsk—Stavropol—a point 65 miles north of Stavropol—forked railway junction (40 miles west of Tzaritzin)—30 miles west of Kamischin—the point where the Medveditsa crosses the Kamischin-Balashoff Railway—Matchikha, on the Buzuluk River—a point 13 miles north-east of Urupinskaya—Bobroff—the Voronezh-Rostoff Railway, 30 miles south-west of Pavlovsk.

(iii.) *Krasnoff's sector.*—The objective of the Soviet forces operating in this sector has been to destroy the military forces of the Government of the Don, in order to be able to incorporate this rich country in Soviet Russia. They had also a more pressing objective, namely, to free the Volga from Cossack control and to secure river communication between Moscow and Astrakhan. It cannot, however, be claimed that the Bolsheviks have secured either objective, in spite of Trotski having devoted much energy and time to visiting Astrakhan, Tzaritzin and Voronezh in order to harangue the troops, and of the fact that during the months of November and December this front received large reinforcements.

On the other hand, these reinforcements were sufficient to bring to a stop a somewhat premature offensive initiated by Krasnoff. The latter had made a determined effort in October to capture Tzaritzin, and towards the end of that month nearly succeeded. In November, Krasnoff opened a fresh offensive on the whole sector from in front of Tzaritzin to Pavlovsk on the Don. His objectives were in the East Tzaritzin, Kamischin, and the course of the Volga between those places, perhaps with the object of driving the enemy into the bleak expanse of salt marsh country beyond; and in the north Balashoff and Voronezh, presumably as a threat to Moscow. The forces and material at his disposal proved, as was to be expected, insufficient for his purpose, and with the arrival of the Bolshevik reinforcements he lost the ground he had gained. The present position is almost one of stalemate, the advantage lying somewhat with the Bolsheviks.

The available information as to Krasnoff's forces is incomplete and unreliable, but it is estimated that of his 100,000 men about 70,000 form his fighting strength.

(iv.) *General Denikin's sector.*—As shown above the Soviet forces operating against Denikin consist of the 11th and 12th Soviet Armies and number about 60,000 men. Opposed to them are forces possessing a fighting strength of about 50,000. The Bolsheviks are at present in occupation of nearly the whole of the Terek Province, including the important oil fields at Grozni, and are in touch with the Bolshevik forces at Astrakhan by land and sea.

Their objective is to drive the Volunteer Army out of the Cis-Caucasian area and to secure the corn-growing district between Stavropol and Ekaterinodar. There is no evidence, however, that they have made very serious efforts to obtain a decision, and their operations have been practically confined to local offensives in the Vladikavkaz and Stavropol areas.

On the other hand, General Denikin's ultimate aims are:—

1. To drive the Bolsheviks from the Caucasus with the object of—
  - (a.) Securing the oilfields at Grozni, in the Caucasus, and denying these to the enemy.
  - (b.) Opening up communication with the Caspian at Kishar and Petrovsk, and eventually with the Siberian Armies.
2. To organize and equip a force sufficient for an advance on Moscow.

He has, however, also abstained from operations on a large scale, and has contented himself with capturing Stavropol and carrying out an advance along the Rostoff-Vladikavkaz Railway. He is occupying the territory bounded as follows:—From a point 40 miles south of Tuapse—Batalpashinskaya—Stavropol—a point 65 miles north of Stavropol (where his front joins that of Ataman Krasnoff). He has been endeavouring to arrange for unity of command, and negotiations with Krasnoff to this end have now, it is believed, reached a successful conclusion.

(v.) *Comparative values of opposing forces.*—Discipline is enforced in the Volunteer Army on the basis of the principles observed in the old Imperial Army, but in a manner modified to suit the present political situation in Russia. The staff of the army consists chiefly of staff officers of the original Russian armies, and is reported to be efficient. The army is, however, extremely short of every form of military equipment, and their present supply has been obtained to a large extent by capture from the enemy.



As on the Eastern front, there is nothing to indicate that the Soviet forces possess any higher fighting qualities than those of the Volunteer Army.

(vi.) *Composition of Volunteer Army of General Denikin.—Cavalry and infantry.*—3 infantry corps, each of 2 divisions, each division composed of 3 regiments of 3 battalions, plus 1 cavalry regiment per corps; 2 cavalry corps, each comprising 2 divisions of 4 regiments. The total force comprises 54 battalions of infantry and 22 regiments of cavalry.

*Artillery.*

	Guns.
12 field batteries of 4 guns ... ..	48
3 horse artillery batteries of 4 guns... ..	12
3 mountain artillery batteries of 4 guns ... ..	12
1 6-inch howitzer battery of 2 guns ... ..	2
1 4·8-inch howitzer battery of 3 guns ... ..	3
Total ... ..	77

(c.) THE SITUATION ON THE CASPIAN SEA.

A British armed flotilla has been organized on the Caspian Sea, based on Baku, consisting of 8 armed ships. A Bolshevik flotilla is based on Astrakhan (which port it is reported they intend to keep open by means of an ice breaker), and consists of 10 or 11 armed ships, 2 to 4 submarines, and 4 or 5 torpedo boats. The Bolsheviks are stated to have established an ice-free Naval and Military base at Enaskoi (60 miles north-west of Chechen Island).

The situation is complicated by the presence of a Russian flotilla based on Baku consisting of 6 armed ships. The crews of these boats are Bolshevik in sympathy, but it is thought that they will refrain from joining the Bolsheviks, chiefly through the fear of the British naval flotilla, and also owing to the fact that their homes are at Baku.

(f.) EASTERN FRONT.

(i.) *General situation.*—On the Bolshevik Eastern Front the following Soviet armies are disposed from north to south in the order mentioned:—The 3rd, 2nd, 5th, 1st and 4th,\* the whole under the command of Kameneff, with headquarters at Arsamas (55 miles due south of Nijni Novgorod). Their total strength is estimated at about 120,000 men as opposed to a total of about 116,900 Russians, Cossacks and Czechs.

The course of the recent operations has been as follows:—The Soviet Higher Command had as their preliminary objective the clearing of the Volga and Kama from the enemy and the consequent regaining of the rich agricultural country on the banks of those rivers. Secondly, the capture of Ufa and Orenburg as steps towards the final objective, i.e., an entrance into Siberia and the establishing of touch with the Bolshevik forces in Turkestan.

The preliminary objective was attained in the first week of October, and half the second by the capture of Ufa on the 31st December. The loss of Ufa makes it unlikely that Dutoff and his Cossacks, who have been hard pressed for some time, will be able to retain Orenburg much longer, and it must, therefore, be reckoned with that, for the purpose of future operations, the Bolsheviks will have not only gained the corn producing country of the Ural River district, but also the main line of approach to Central Asia by the Tashkent railway.

On the other hand, the plan of the Russo-Czech forces after they were driven from the Volga was to carry out an offensive in the northern sector, thus freeing the valuable mining district north of Ekaterinburg, and aiming at capturing Perm and establishing a line from that place covering Ufa and Orenburg, which would have shortened their front. They effected the capture of Perm on the 31st December after 3 months operations, and drove the Soviet 3rd Army back in a demoralized condition, but lost Ufa before they could reinforce at that point, as had been intended.

The front runs at present along the following general line:—Bogoslovsk (on the railway running north-west from Verkhoturie)—Dedyukhin (on the Chusovsk—

\* The strengths of the several armies is not known.

Solikamsk Railway)—right bank of the Kama at Perm—40 miles west of Kungur—30 miles west of Krasnoufimsk—Birk—3 miles east of Ufa—Sterlitamak—58 miles north-west of Orenburg—22 miles west by south of Uralsk—42 miles north-west of Aktiubinsk.

*Note.*—According to a report dated the 28th November, the Soviet 3rd Army consisted of approximately 40,000 men. As the Siberian Army Command claim to have taken 31,000 prisoners, besides a large quantity of arms and material, the practical destruction of the Soviet 3rd Army may be assumed.

(ii.) *Comparative value of the opposing forces.*—During the course of these operations the Russo-Czech forces have suffered defeat time after time owing to their being tied by lack of transport to the railway and through want of support by the Allies. The Soviet forces continually marched round their flanks, just as in the earlier operations on the Volga the scale was turned by the superior river flotilla of the Bolsheviks. The fighting value of the anti-Bolshevik Russian Army may be considered as, at any rate, equal to that of the Soviet troops and is likely to improve if Kolchak's Government strengthens its position, and if the Siberian Railway emerges from its present chaotic condition sufficiently to allow of a good flow of war material.

(iii.) *Composition of the Anti-Bolshevik forces.*—The following table shows the rifle and sabre strength of the Russo-Czech troops at the front and in close reserve:—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.	Machine guns.
Ekaterinburg front*	1,500	26,400	90	215
Ufa front†	1,400	10,700	69	301
Kama Group...	800	22,700	53	162
Orenburg front	19,500	7,900	27	74
Aktiubinsk front	4,600	2,900	27	74
Semiretch front	3,400	2,500	12	44
Reserves:—				
Ufa front ..		7,200	..	..
Ekaterinburg front	1,100	4,300	..	..
	32,300	84,600	278	870

The total Allied and anti-Bolshevik forces on the Eastern front and in Siberia are as follows:—

1. <i>Allied Forces.</i> —(Composition, see Table A). ( <i>Note.</i> —31,000 Japanese troops, about to be withdrawn, are included) ...	72,436
2. <i>Czechs.</i> —Urals, front line and reserve ...	20,000
In training and on lines of communication ...	16,300
	36,300
3. <i>Russians and Siberians.</i> —Urals, front line and reserve 96,900	
Reserves on Trans-Siberian Railway west of Lake Baikal...	123,100‡
	220,000
4. <i>Semenoff's Force.</i> —East of Lake Baikal (composition, see Table B) ...	19,400
5. <i>Colonel Tolstoi.</i> —Gurieff ...	3,000
6. <i>At Novo Alexandrovsk.</i> —Detachment of Cossacks (strength unknown) ...	...
Total ...	351,136
Total (less Japanese troops to be withdrawn) ...	320,136

\* Includes 4,000 Czech infantry with 32 guns.

† Includes 3,400 Czech infantry with 32 guns.

‡ All Czech.

§ Not all yet trained or equipped.



TABLE A.—*Allied troops in Siberia.*

—	Unit.	Strength.		Location.	
		Officers.	O.R.	Officers.	O.R.
British	25th Bn. Middlesex R.	28	1,036	6	251
				5	144
				17	634
				7	On command.
	1/9th Bn. Hampshire R.	32	954	En route to Omsk. Left Vladivostok 19th December.	
	H.M.S. "Suffolk"	4	25	Ufa region with 5 guns.	
	British total	64	2,015		
Canadians	Advanced party	96	1,016	Vladivostok.	
French...	Colonial Bn.	1,100	all ranks	Cheliabinsk with 1 battalion, 75-mm. and 12—3-inch guns.	
Italians	Contingent	1,600	all ranks	Ural area, 2 mountain guns.	
Americans	Contingent	8,500	all ranks	2 battalions Amur area; 2 battalions Vladivostok area; remainder not accounted for.	
Japanese	3rd Division	58,000*		Chita area.	
	7th Division			Harbin area.	
	12th Division			Amur area.	
	1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion			Nikolaievsk.	

\* Orders for the withdrawal of 31,000 men have been issued.

TABLE B.—*Composition of Semenov's Force.*

Unit.	Men.	Guns.	Rifles.
5th Preamur Corps—			
8th Division	3,600	..	2,037
8th Artillery Brigade	1,000	18	..
Attached	200	..	..
Serbian cavalry	250	..	200
Manchurian detachment	1,000	..	600
Priamur cavalry regiment	800	..	200
Armoured trains	100	..	..
2nd ? Battery	200	4	..
Heavy battery	200	4	..
1st Horse Battery	600	5	..
Railway company	..	..	..
Total	7,950	32	3,037
Chita School	300	..	..
Eastern Cossack Corps—			
1st Transbaikai Cossack Division	3,000	..	2,000
Transbaikai Horse Artillery	600	8	..
Amur Cossack Brigade	550	..	..
Ussuri Cossack Brigade	3,000	..	600
Heavy Battery	200	2	..
Field Artillery	600	12	..
Total	7,950	22	2,600
Tuzemni Corps—			
Composite Cossack Division	2,200	..	..
Buriatski Cavalry Division	1,000	..	..
Total	3,200	..	..
Grand total	19,400	54	5,637
		4 armoured trains.	

Compiled from information by Semenov's staff. (Telegram, Colonel Blair, No. 547, dated 31st December, 1918.)

Note.—The above figures are considered to be in many cases much exaggerated.

## (g.) MILITARY SITUATION IN TURKESTAN.

(i.) *General.*—In May, 1918, a Soviet Congress at Tashkent declared Russian Turkestan to be a Soviet Republic, and appointed a Council of People's Commissaries. The subsequent cruelty and maladministration of this Council estranged a large proportion of the inhabitants of Central Asia from the Bolshevik cause, and led to the creation of an anti-Bolshevik organization in Trans-Caspia, whose headquarters were at Ashkabad. The Ashkabad Government sought, and obtained, military assistance from the British, and their forces have succeeded in driving the Bolsheviks eastwards beyond Merv. The Bolsheviks, realizing that it is impossible for them to open up a line of communication with the Central Soviet forces *via* Krasnovodsk, are directing their main military effort towards establishing communication with Moscow *via* the Tashkent—Orenburg Railway, where they are opposed by General Dutoff's Cossacks in the neighbourhood of Martuk (123 miles south of Orenburg). In Northern Semirechia the Bolshevik forces are engaged with a force of General Ivanoff's Cossacks in the neighbourhood of Kopal.

There are in Central Asia some 40,000 Austro-German prisoners of war, and these prisoners constitute the main fighting elements of the Bolshevik forces. It is hoped that a proportion of these prisoners will shortly be repatriated, and that by this means the fighting strength of the Bolsheviks will be greatly reduced.

The Soviet forces, by reason of their being completely cut off from the outside world are very deficient of all military material, and if they were opposed by resolute forces, their resistance would long since have been overcome. Unfortunately the Ashkabad Government is a very weak organization, is constantly changing, and has shown itself unable to adopt a sufficiently masterful policy in dealing with the heterogeneous elements over which it rules. As an instance of this weakness, it may be mentioned that the Government is practically bankrupt, owing to its being unable to exact any taxes from the inhabitants, although it is reported that there is plenty of money in the country.

(ii.) *Opposing forces.*—The opposing forces in this theatre are operating on three fronts as follows:—

*Bolshevik Forces.*

	Men.	Guns.	
(1) Trans-Caspian Front .. .. .	9,600	8	1 armoured train.
(2) Orenburg Front .. .. .	14,000	36	..
(3) Semirechia Front .. .. .	3,000	..	..
Total .. .. .	26,000	44	1 armoured train.

*British-Indian and anti-Bolshevik Forces.*

	Men.	Guns.	
Trans-Caspian Front—			
Trans-Caspian and Turkomans .. .. .	2,750		
British-Indian .. .. .	2,070		
Orenburg Front .. .. .	4,820	9	1 armoured train.
Semirechia Front .. .. .	11,000	?	..
	5,300	?	..
Total .. .. .	21,320	9	1 armoured train.

(iii.) *Trans-Caspian Front.*—The Bolshevik forces on this front, which are of a very inferior quality, are echeloned between the front at Baram Ali (15 miles east of Merv) and Tashkent. The Trans-Caspian forces opposing them are supported by a British force under General Malleson.

(iv.) *Orenburg Front.*—This is regarded by the Bolsheviks, who have advanced northwards as far as Martuk (123 miles south of Orenburg), as their main front in this theatre. The Russian forces opposing them are commanded by General Dutoff.

(v.) *Semirechia Front.*—Little is known of the Bolshevik forces on this front. They have recently captured the town of Kopal (350 miles south of Semipalatinsk) from General Ivanoff's Cossacks.



#### (h.) INTERNAL GARRISONS AND FORCES.

(i.) *General.*—It must be prefaced that, in view of the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from a vast expanse of country in a condition of despotic anarchy, the numbers given below can only be regarded as an estimate of the internal garrisons and forces. For the purpose of arriving at a definite total, in cases where the strength of a division has not been ascertained, it has been taken to be 3,000 strong, except Workmen's Reserve Divisions, estimated at 2,000 strong. Railway Guard Regiments have been estimated to consist of two battalions, each of 250 men per battalion.

The result arrived at is as follows:—

Garrison of Petrograd	...	...	...	5,000
Garrison of Moscow and district	...	...	...	8,000
Other garrisons	...	...	...	24,000
Frontier Guards	...	...	...	25,000
Railway Guards	...	...	...	8,250
Reserve Army	...	...	...	9,000
Troops of the Extraordinary Commission	...	...	...	40,000
				<hr/>
				119,250

(ii.) *The troops of the Extraordinary Commission.*—These are the instrument by which the Lenin-Trotsky Government maintains its position in the country. They are composed to a large extent of Chinese, Magyars, Germans, Letts and Tartars, and are distributed in comparatively small detachments all over Soviet Russia and carry out the suppression of risings against the authority of the Soviet Government with the greatest ferocity.

(iii.) *The railway guards.*—These are organized in regiments and battalions. The number accepted at present is—

- 14 Regiments.
- 2 Independent Battalions.

#### 3. CONCLUSIONS AS TO BOLSHEVIK PLANS AND FUTURE COURSE OF OPERATIONS.

The main front of the Bolshevik armies may be regarded as facing west with their right flank close to the Baltic at Riga, which has fallen to them, and echeloned back to the Gulf of Finland. The centre is advancing towards Poland and the left is swinging forward through the Ukraine. This line comprises what has been described as the Western and South-Western fronts, with a present strength of about 83,000 men.

The Bolshevik Northern Army protects this main front against attack from the right rear from bases at Archangel and Murmansk.

The Eastern front, originally established to meet the menace of the Czechoslovaks, now closes the "back-door" into Soviet Russia, by way of the Trans-Siberian railway.

The Southern front protects the interior Bolshevik line from attack by the Cossack and Volunteer Armies from the left rear.

It is from the latter direction that the Bolsheviks have most to fear, inasmuch as it is in the south that all the most militant of the anti-Bolshevik elements have established themselves. Further, the opening of the Black Sea has enabled the Allies to supply these elements with their material needs, while the surrendered equipment of the Turkish and Bulgarian Armies lies close at hand.

It may, therefore, be reasonably assumed that the Bolshevik High Command will devote immediate attention to neutralizing the inevitable augmentation of strength to their enemies in the South. To this end, orders have already been drafted for the transfer of the 1st Soviet Army from the Ufa region to the Southern front, the gap thus formed to be closed by the 4th and 5th Soviet Armies extending their flanks. It appears probable, however, that before carrying out this move, the Bolsheviks will endeavour to shorten their line by capturing the salient astride the Samara-Tashkent railway, round the important centre of Orenburg. This would have the further very material advantage of opening up communication from Moscow to the Soviet forces now isolated in Turkestan, with their headquarters at Tashkent. The subsequent reinforcement of the latter forces would bring the Bolsheviks into direct contact with the frontiers of Afghanistan and Persia.

It has already been explained that the first task of the Bolsheviks must be to protect themselves against an advance on the part of the armies under the command of Generals Denikin and Krasnoff, and the severe winter conditions prevailing in the north will allow of detachments being made for this purpose. The Soviet operations in this direction are likely to take the form of an advance along the line Kursk—Kharkoff—Taganrog which would, if successful, effectively prevent the Cossack and Volunteer Armies from interfering with the Bolshevik invasion of the Ukraine which will proceed simultaneously, and will enable the Bolsheviks to swing their left forward to the neighbourhood of Odessa, its final position being dependent on the distance to which French troops are despatched inland, there being no other opposition to be reckoned with here.

Thus, by the spring of 1919 one may anticipate a main Bolshevik front extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, or within a very short distance of the coast on either flank.

#### 4. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR WEST FRONT IN SPRING 1919.

In considering the question as to how many troops the Soviet Government can place on this line by, say, the 1st of June 1919, there are four possible sources from which these may be drawn, namely:—

- (a.) Transfer from other fronts.
- (b.) Transfer of troops (already formed) from the interior.
- (c.) Fresh formations produced by present and future mobilization.
- (d.) Prisoners of war from Germany and Austro-Hungary.

These sources must be examined successively.

(a.) *Transfer of strength from other fronts.*—Taking each front in turn and examining the *Northern front* first, it may be argued that, although during the last 6 weeks the troops of the 6th Army have been slightly reinforced, approximately to the extent of an additional 1,000 men, it is not likely that the Soviet Government will undertake any extensive operations in this theatre in view of the comparatively small danger to be apprehended from the small Allied forces in this region, the limited advantage in the immediate future to be gained by the recapture of the Archangel district and Karelia, and the difficulties of *terrain*. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks will probably rely on the success of their propaganda in the Allied countries to effect the withdrawal of our expedition and will adopt a defensive policy, for which their troops at present on the Northern front would suffice. At the same time it would probably not be politic for them to carry out any reduction.

From the *Eastern front*, where 120,000 Bolsheviks have hitherto been opposed by 116,900 Russian Cossacks and Czechs, the Revolutionary Council have already ordered the transfer of the 1st Army, about 20,000 strong, to the Southern front. On the other hand, they can reasonably count on the final withdrawal of the Czechs before the 1st June, which will reduce the anti-Bolshevik forces on the front to 96,900, and it is improbable that Admiral Kolchak's Government will be in a position to do more than provide sufficient additional trained Russian troops to replace the Czechs and to maintain the units already in position. If this is correct, the Bolsheviks, by remaining on the defensive with their present forces, would be easily in the position to maintain the solidarity of their eastern front.

The transfer of the 1st Army to the *Southern front* will bring the Bolshevik effectives in that region up to about 180,000.

According to Denikin's own estimate, if the Allies supply arms and equipment it will be possible by additional mobilization to increase the Volunteer Army to 120,000 and the Don Cossack Army to 130,000. Accepting this we find that the Bolshevik 180,000 will be faced by 250,000 possessing at least equally good arms and equipment. The transfer of Bolshevik troops from the Southern front will, therefore, be out of the question, and allowance should be made for providing at least 70,000 reinforcements from available sources (see page 33), for this front.

(b.) *Transfer of troops from the interior.*—It can reasonably be assumed that the garrison of Petrograd and Moscow could not be reduced. The troops of the Extraordinary Commission are too essential to the Government for enforcing delivery of supplies, suppressing disorders and carrying out police work to be reduced in view of the huge expanse of country over which they are distributed. Similarly the security of the railways is too important a factor in the military situation to allow of risks being taken by using up the Railway Guards. On the other hand, the 9,000 Reserve Army might be employed in the west, and perhaps half the 24,000 men in garrison centres other than Petrograd and Moscow. (See page 31.)



The situation in Finland remains stable, and there are strong anti-Bolshevik elements there which will render dangerous the weakening of the Frontier Guards (about 10,000) in that direction, and the remainder are probably fully occupied in watching the White Sea coast and North Urals. From the formed troops in the interior, the maximum augmentations on the Western front will not, therefore, exceed 21,000.

(c.) *The formations produced by present and future mobilization.*—At the beginning of December the Soviet Government carried out a further mobilization in the Petrograd and Moscow Governments. This was probably the prelude to a similar step being taken all over the country. There is evidence to show that in September, when the class of the year 1898 was called up, it was not expected by the Soviet Government that more than 150,000 would be actually enrolled. On the present occasion, mobilization in the country districts of the Moscow Government is known to have produced poor results. It is unlikely that from the point of view of organization, more than two annual classes, i.e., 300,000 have been raised, nor is it likely that more than one additional class of 150,000 will be summoned before the 1st of June, which gives a total of 450,000.

The question arises, can these 450,000 men be equipped? The two rifle factories, Tula and Sestroretsk, which are known to be working, are turning out 25,000 and 50,000 rifles a month respectively, which would mean a total of 365,000 from the 1st of January to the 1st of June. Schlüsselburg factory is shortly to be reopened, but this has not yet taken place. Further, a certain number of rifles have been obtained from the German troops during their disordered withdrawal, but considerations of personal safety have probably limited this source of supply. Therefore, provided the state of the railways allows of the delivery of these arms to the required centres of organization, and the difficulties of supplying the army with boots and clothing are surmounted, it is possible that the three new classes totalling 450,000 men referred to above will be formed, armed and equipped by 1st June, 1919.

(d.) *Prisoners of war from Germany and Austria-Hungary.*—It is not possible to estimate the numbers likely to be obtained from this source, as it depends on what steps the Allied Governments take to deal with this problem.

*Conclusion.*—Accordingly, to sum up, it would appear that the following is the maximum strength from all sources which the Soviet Government will be able to put in the field from the Baltic to the Black Sea by the spring of 1919.

1. Already on the front—					
Western front ..	...	...	...	...	43,000
South-Western front ..	...	...	...	...	40,000
					83,000
2. From other fronts...	...	...	...	...	nil
3. From the interior ...	...	...	...	...	21,000
4. New formations ...	...	...	...	...	450,000
					554,000
Less reinforcements for defence of Southern front..					70,000
Total ...					484,000

The maximum fighting strength of the Bolsheviks on the Western front might thus approximate to half a million men by the spring of 1919.

# APPENDICES.

## APPENDIX I.

### TABULAR STATEMENT OF OPPOSING FORCES ON ALL BOLSHEVIK FRONTS.

Front.	Bolshevik Forces.	Allied and anti-Bolshevik Forces.
Northern—		
Archangel .. .. .	14,500	British .. .. . 6,255
		Allied .. .. . 6,845
		Local .. .. . 3,147
		16,247
Murmansk .. .. .	3,000	British .. .. . 6,424
		Allied .. .. . 3,179
		Local .. .. . 5,822
		15,425
Western .. .. .	43,000	Estonian .. .. . 25,000*
		Finns .. .. . 2,000†
		Swedes .. .. . 1,000‡
		Poles .. .. . 30,000§
		58,000
South-Western .. .. .	40,000	French .. .. . 10,000
Southern .. .. .	160,000	Krasnoff .. .. . 100,000
		Denikin .. .. . 50,000
		150,000
Eastern—		
Front and close reserve ..	120,000	Russians and Siberians .. 96,900
		Czechs .. .. . 20,000
		116,900
Turkestan .. .. .	26,000	21,320
Total, all fronts ..	406,500	387,892
Interior of Soviet Russia—		
Formed .. .. .	119,250	
Forming .. .. .	300,000	
	419,250	
Interior of Siberia .. .. .		
		Russians and Siberians .. 145,500
		Czechs .. .. . 16,300
		British .. .. . 2,124
		Canadian .. .. . 1,112
		Other Allied Forces .. 69,200§
		234,236
Grand total .. .. .	825,750	622,128

\* Includes 20,000 organizing.

† Organizing and in process of transport to Estonia.

‡ Organizing.

§ 31,000 Japanese are being withdrawn.

## APPENDIX II.

## NOTES ON BOLSHEVIK ARMAMENTS AND MUNITION SUPPLIES.

(a.) *Artillery.*—The artillery organization of the Red Army is at the present in a very bad state owing to uneven distribution and to the inefficiency of the Battery Commanders. The estimated total of guns is 2,000, of which 4th is composed of heavy pieces (6-inch, 8-inch and 12-inch).

The following table shows the present unequal distribution of artillery among certain armies:—

4th Army	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	554 guns.
6th	"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	115 "
8th	"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	30 "
9th	"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	84 "
10th	"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	157 "
11th	"	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	128 "

The distribution among the other armies is not known. The allotment to artillery divisions and brigades is on the same uneven scale.

The heavy artillery reserve is centred in Ribinsk, Novgorod and Samara, the ammunition supply for this class of gun is small. The field gun reserve is at Vologda and the ammunition supply is fairly good.

Rostoff (north of Moscow) is the centre of the Tractor and Lorry Department, where 450 tractors and 200 lorries are parked, these are often put to agricultural use instead of the hauling of heavy guns. It is stated that there exists 1½ to 2 million shells, some of which are in bad condition.

(b.) *Small Arms and Small-Arm Ammunition.*—There are several arsenals in the hands of the Bolsheviks; the manufacture of rifles is carried on principally at Sestroretsk, where 1,800 rifles are turned out daily; the Tula works turn out 900 rifles a day, and small quantities are also made at Tamboff. Repairs to rifles are carried out in the Moscow artillery workshops (up to 300 rifles a day) and at the 2nd artillery workshops at Sredny Kaluga. In the future, all arms factories will be restored to the private manufacturers, and rifles will be made at the Schlüsselburg factory. There are 3,831 machine guns available and in good condition. The Tula works turn out 600 swords per month, for which there is a great demand by the troops at the front, and by formations which are being called up for the next three years. The small-arm ammunition supply in rear is reckoned at 260 million rounds; sundry workshops, principally at Tula, are turning out 70 million cartridges per month. There is a scarcity of caps for cartridges. Large supplies of ammunition have been found that had not been reckoned on.



# APPENDIX III.

## SITUATION IN FINLAND AND COMPOSITION OF FINNISH ARMY.

### POLITICAL.

General Mannerheim has succeeded Swinhufvud as Administrator, his election being approved by all parties except the extreme Socialists. His policy is based on the maintenance of Finland's independence, the preservation of internal order and opposition to Bolshevik aggression, and the establishment of close relations with the Entente Powers. He has also declared his intention of dismissing Finnish functionaries who are too severely compromised as pro-Germans, and it is evident that the departure of Swinhufvud will soon lead to the complete elimination of the Germanophile element in the Government. In this connection it is noteworthy that Prince Friedrich Carl of Hesse has definitely renounced all claim to the throne of Finland.

The Senate which was elected in November, is composed of seven Monarchists and six Republicans, the Agrarian Party not being represented. This composition has been objected to as not representing the change of opinion in Finland, and new elections are to take place in March.

The demand for General Mannerheim's appointment as Administrator has shown that public opinion in Finland is definitely desirous of a rapprochement with the Entente.

A strong attitude has been adopted towards the Bolsheviks. The Soviet Government's representative has been refused permission to enter Finland; it has been announced that all Russian Bolsheviks found in Finland will be arrested, and that the transport through Finland of Bolshevik literature has been prohibited.

A most serious factor in the internal situation, and one which has been fully exploited by the Bolsheviks, has been the food situation. Since the Red Revolution there has been a great shortage of all foodstuffs, which has recently culminated in a state bordering on famine. This has been brought about by the destruction of agricultural implements, the emigration of the agricultural population to the towns, and the requisitions of the Germans. The Entente Powers, however, have authorized the export to Finland of 120,000 tons of cereals, and the Swedish Government have agreed to the export to Finland from Sweden of 5,000 tons of cereals.

### MILITARY.

(a) *General*.—The organization of the present Finnish Army was commenced under German supervision in February, 1918, in North Finland, and in May, 1918, in South Finland. The Army is maintained on the principle of compulsory service, based on the Russian recruiting law of 1878, providing for the enrolment of men aged from 21 to 40, service commencing with three years with the Colours. The 1895, 1896 and 1897 classes have been mobilized in accordance with this law.

The total population of Finland is about 3,000,000, and the total manhood capable of bearing arms is about 300,000. Owing, however, to the inclusion in this total of about 70,000 Red Guards, who cannot be relied upon, and also, owing to the fact that only about 40 per cent. of the men called up have been enrolled, it is probable that the maximum number of men on whom the Finnish Government can rely is only about 100,000.

The total establishment of the Active Army is 45,000 men, but owing to numerous desertions and failure to enrol all units are under establishment, and the actual strength is probably not more than 30,000. This state of affairs has been due to shortage of food, irregularity of receipt of pay, misconception of the aims of the Army, and some discontent on account of the German influence.

Discipline, moreover, has for these reasons, been very poor, and the general spirit of the Army has been bad. Numerous cases have occurred of men refusing to work. Demobilization has been freely advocated, both among officers and men, and it has apparently been only fear of the Germans and of Bolshevik invasion which has prevented this step being taken.

Though Officers' Training Schools have been established, little progress has been made in this respect, and there is a great lack of properly trained officers, which has resulted in training, generally, being deficient. An attempt was recently made to remedy this deficiency by the introduction into units of Finnish Jägers who were trained in Germany, but considerable dissension was caused by this measure.

To sum up, at the departure of the Germans, in October, the Army did not appear to be in a condition to undertake any work on a large scale. General Mannerheim's accession to power, however, and the improvement in conditions resultant therefrom, is calculated to remedy this state of affairs.

(b) *Higher Command*.—Command is now exercised exclusively by Finns, all German officers having been withdrawn. The supreme authority over the land and sea forces is vested in the War Minister, who has under him the Commander-in-Chief of the fighting forces and the Chief of the General Staff. The latter directs military and naval operations. Colonel Wallden is Minister for War. Colonel von Redern, a German, was Chief of the General Staff, and it is not known who has replaced him. Major-General Wilkman is Commander-in-Chief.

(c) *Active Army*.—The Active Army consists of three Infantry Divisions (1st, 2nd and 3rd) and one Jäger Brigade.

The establishment of an Infantry Division is believed to be as follows:—

- (i.) 3 *Regiments Infantry*.—Each regiment 3 battalions. Each battalion (establishment 650 men) 3 companies and 1 Machine Gun Company of 4 guns.
- (ii.) 1 *Regiment Cavalry*.—6 squadrons and Machine Gun Squadron of 4 guns.
- (iii.) 1 *Regiment Artillery*.—5 eight gun batteries.
- (iv.) 1 *Battalion Engineers*.—4 companies (Field Company: Railroad Company: Bridging Company: Road Construction Company).
- (v.) *Divisional Signal Company*.
- (vi.) *Divisional Supply Column*.
- (vii.) *Field Ambulance*.

The establishment of the Jäger Brigade is believed to be as follows :—

- 5 Battalions Jägers.
- 1 Battalion Cyclists.—Each battalion has eight light machine guns.
- 1 Regiment Mounted Jägers (4 squadrons).
- 1 Battalion Mountain Artillery.—4 six-gun batteries, German pattern.
- 1 Pioneer Company.

(d.) *Aviation*.—The Air Service has not been organized, but the Finns are known to have some machines of German and Swedish make.

(e.) *Equipment*.—The army appears to be well equipped in every way. Arms and ammunition are for the most part Russian.

(f.) *Military districts*.—Finland is divided into 27 military districts. Each district on mobilization for war is to supply one reserve regiment of infantry, one reserve squadron of cavalry, and two reserve batteries of artillery. These reserve regiments, in case of war, form nine reserve divisions.

(g.) *Distribution of the active army*.—The active divisions and Jäger Brigade are disposed as follows :—

1st Division	..	..	..	..	Helsingfors area.	*
2nd Division	..	..	..	..	Viborg area.	
3rd Division	..	..	..	..	Sordavala area.	
Jäger Brigade	..	..	..	..	Vasa (Headquarters), Uleaborg and Rovaniemi.	

(h.) *Other formations*.—The following formations are in existence in Finland, in addition to the active army :—

(i.) *Frontier Guards*.—These apparently number about 1,500, and are distributed along the Swedish and Karelian frontiers.

(ii.) *Civil Guard Militia*.—This force is about 4,000 strong, and was formed from the nucleus of General Mannerheim's former army, and comprises selected men of good character. Their duties are to protect the country against revolutionary attempts and to maintain internal order generally. This force is said to be very reliable.

(iii.) *Battalions for guarding prisoners*.—These are reported to consist of several thousand men, and are employed in guarding the numerous interned Red Guards.

(i.) *The Finnish Fleet*.—The Finns are reported to have three steamers, roughly armed with Russian field guns, on the Lake of Ladoga. At Helsingfors they are said to have three old Russian destroyers and one newly built cruiser armed with 6-inch guns.