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REPORT OF WORK DONE IN RUSSIA TO END OF NO.

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General Poole's <u>SEPTEMBER 1917</u> Section.

28th. Reported to Lt. Col. Maund, R.F.C. and worked under him in Moscow for some weeks.

OCTOBER 1917.

Was ordered by Lt. Col. Maund R.F.C to Stavka at the summons of General Barter to attend the Russian Aviation Conference to which the French specialists were also invited.

This Conference sat for about five weeks and was composed of officers from every Aviation and Artillery Branch of the Armies in the field, and its technical problem was to introduce Western methods into its very hadly organised services.

Underlying this Conference, which was attended by Kerensky, was a strong political movement, which however, came to nothing.

Moscow under Lt. Col Maund. R.F.C.

DECEMBER 1917. Early December I waslent by General Poole to Lt. Col. J.W. Boyle, of the Canadian Service.

At this time Colonel Boyle had been working for some weeks with the Soviet Government that had just come into power. Previously under the Provisional Government he was employed in the Russian General Staff, on railroad construction and organisation of traffic. The work consisted in clearing the congestion caused by internal affairs (October Revolution) at the Moscow knot.



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By virtue of this congestion, the South Western and Western Armies were cut off from their supplies, and starvation was felt causing massed desertion, which was further blocking the sorely tried traffic. With Colonel Boyle on this work was Major Du Castelle of the French Army, and some Americans.

The knot was successfully cleared and supplies were got through to the starving Armies.

Middle DECEMBER.

In connection with the Russian Roumanian Protocol Colonel Boyle left for Jasi, taking with him the Roumanian Foreign Office Archives, which had been deposited in the Kremlin during the evacuation of Roumania in 1916, the Roumanian Crown Jewels, and some millions of Lei for the Treasury. Permission to transport these had to be wrung from the Bolshevik, and the task was by no means then accomplished as our route lay directly through the armed and fighting parties of the White and Bolshevik Guards of South Russia.

Situation in Roumania.

The Roumanian Government, faced by starvation that was being accentuated by the non-fulfilment of the Russo-Roumanian Protocol on the part of the Russians, was being pressed by the Germans to follow the lead of the Soviet Government in signing an Amistice. Internally, while still feeding their Army and civil population with great difficulty, they were able to maintain an excellent discipline. Their Ally, however, the Russians, were causing every kind of trouble, and had just taken to demobilising themselves. In doing so they disorganised the railroads, used up reserve supply rations, and finally, when



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retreating by road, pillaged, and plundered, to say nothing of often destroying villages they passed through on their way East. The Roumanian Government at once took measure to protect their people from the Russian marauders, being ably assisted in doing this by the loyal troops of General Tcherbachoff.

In restoring order very much friction arose between the Roumanian officials and Russians with Bolshevik leanings, and on a number of occasions fighting took place. This fighting caused trouble on the railways, especially at those points where the Russian removing gangs met, and the transference of stores was held up, causing a shortage of stores in the front. Added to this the Bolshevik had agents on all stations deliberately spending their efforts on sabotage. The first effort therefore was to get improved conditions on the railroads. Accompanied by Russan and Roumanian transport officers, the Sokola Kischinev and other knots were visited. All local disputes were settled on the spot, and friction allayed between the Russian and Roumanian knot contro llers. In places where much labour was needed, and wholesale desertion had taken place from the railroad battalions, Roumanian labour companies supplemented by Austrian prisoners were sent to fill up the gaps and thus a great improvement followed. The 4th Russian Army (General Andreanoff?) had been giving much trouble, and at the direct request of General Tcherbatchoff it was visited. For some time past this Army had been under the full control of its Committee, which was Bolshevik. They had been deliberately starving the Army with a view to rpoducing revolution and had brought their horse transport to a

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standstill, owing to cutting off the fodder. This sabotage was easily stopped. We had half the Army horses shot, and the meat frozen, and the civil and military population rationed on it. The hides were used at once, while the remaining horses were quickly got into a fit condition, owing to there being sufficient fodder.

COMMUNICATIONS.

The construction of the Binderi- Unghany, Bielzi-Unghany and Bessarabskoj lines, had practically ceased owing to constant labour trouble. As the rationing of these gangs was a great difficulty, and the funds for payment had run dry, it was decided to completely shut down construction.

End of December 1917.

The political situation between the Soviet and Roumania was becoming more critical every day. The Bolsheviks, with Dr. Rakovski (the Roumanian) (Bulgarian?) (socialist) at their head, were financing and running a strong agitation against the Government and with their large mass of more or less uncontrolled Russians, were putting a very strong lever on the Roumanian Army. The Soviet wanted to force an issue quickly with Roumania, as they greatly feared an arrange ment with Ukrainia, who was throwing off the Soviett yoke.

M. Bratiano, the Roumanian Prime Minister, wighing to avoid trouble with the Soviet, requested Colonel Boyle, in the name of the Roumanian Government, to visit Petrograd and explain Roumania's position to Trotsky, and her great desire to avoid all friction and misunderstanding. M. Bratiano, in his message, enumerated the following four points;-

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- 1). That they could not and would not allow the Russian troops to leave their positions on the front, march through Roumania armed and pillage as they had done. All Russian troops would be allowed to leave Roumania as soon astransport was available for systematic evacuation. They would leave their arms behind, which would be returned as soon as transport could be arranged.
- 2). The Roumanian Government had not arrested any of the Soviet delegates or Committees, and any arrests of Russan subjects had been carried out by the order of General Tcherbatchoff.
- 5). They could not, however, in future, allow any agitation against themselves to pass without taking steps to check it.
- 4). That it was imperative for Roumania to negotiate with Ukrainia, as geographically, the former depended for supplies upon the latter.

JANUARY 1918.

On the 1st January Colonel Boyle and Staff left for Petrograd via Kieff. While in Roumania Colonel Boyle was in close touch with the Allied Diplomatic Corps and conferred, before leaving, with General Ballard of the British Mission and General Berthelot of the French Mission. The condition of the southern railraids was beyond description. The civil war that had raged in the Donnetz basin had stopped the export of coal supplies, the meagre stores were fast being used up. and the disorderly evacuation of the armies from the South-western fronts had brought the traffic to a standstill.



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On arrival in Petrograd Colonel Boyle saw the Diplomatic Corps, who informed him that their colleague M. Diamandi, the Roumanian Ambassador, had that day been arrested and thrown into the fortress of St.Peter and St.Paul, with all his staff.

As a result of a strong protest on the part of the Diplomatic Corps M. Diamandi and his Staff were set free on the day following the outrage. On the Ministers release, Colonel Boyle went to deliver M. Bratiano's message to the Soviet Foreign Office. This, however, was too late, as their policy was to make war on Roumania at any price, and M. Zalkind, the then acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, made no disguise of their plang. "Starve Roumania into revolution" was the motto.

A few days later a plot was hatched to murder

M. Diamandi with one or two members of the Constitutional assembly. This we heard from an agent, and

M. Diamandi was warned. It is interesting to note
that Messers Chingareff and Kokoshkin were murdered
the day after in the hospital they were in.

Shortly afterwards war was declared on Roumania by the Soviet Government.

A new Staff was formed to take charge of the Roumanian front, at the head of which was placed Dr. Rakowski. He had for his Chief of Staff a Colonel Muravieff (S.R.) and M. Spiro (S.R.) with a Doctor Bronshavon. This Staff left at once for the South.



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Political Situation at end of January 1918.

Everything was extremely critical for the Bolsheviks, and they were daily becoming more unpopular.

Starvation and anarchy reigned in the Capital and the extremely unpopular negotiations of the Brest-Litovsk meeting were in progress. Added to this came a new war with Roumania.

With a view to relieving Roumania from her isolated position, Colonel Boyle determined to go down and effect a peace between the Roumanian and the Soviet Governments.

Permission for Allied Couriers to go South, had been withheld for some time, and heavy bags had accumulated at all the Embassies. A direct offer to go as mediator between Russia and Roumania would certainly not have met with any success, and would have caused suspicion. However, knowing the great chaos that was reigning in the Donnetz Basin, Colonel Boyle offered his services to Nevski, Commissar of Ways of Communication, to go down to do what he could. This offer was not only gladly accepted, but Podvoiski and the Food Controller gave us carte blanche for all work we undertook in the Donnetz Basin.

Leaving Petrograd with the Jassy and the Odessa bags, and two officers being sent to the Caucasus by General Poole (Lts. Nash and Crutchley), we took the Moscow - Kursk - Harkoff route. Our journey was delay-ed some time, as our train ran into a railroad smash, and much damage was done to our car.

Kharkoff was the Head Quarters of the Bolshevik Army operating against Korniloff and Kaledin. The Commander in chief was a powerful Revolutionary named Antonoff.



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Heavy fighting was still going on south of Kharkoff and the whole district was in disorder. Antonoff proved friendly and passed and executed Colonel Boyle's suggestions. At our recommendation he also had many of the old traffic experts reinstated and Superintend—ants and railroad managers given a freer hand in technical matters, and freed them from their ever—suspicious, insolent and very ignorant Committees. In twelve days the food supplies going to the Northern and Western fronts, and the cities of Petrograd and Moscow were increased by 47%.

Measures were also passed which dealt with the movements of troops, and these to a certain extent released the railroads.

From Antonoff we heard that part of the Supreme Council for the anti-Roumanian campaign was in Sebastopol, and that trouble was expected there, as recruiting among the sailors for the Roumanian front was unpopular. Antonoff had been more or less convinced by Colonel Boyle of the mistaken policy of the Soviet leaders in declaring war on Roumania.

This, and the great need for crude oils for railroads and Mechanical Transport (rumours of vast
quantities purported to be stored at Sevastopol)
finally induced him to give us permission to go to
Sevastopol.

Sevastopol. Owing to German circulated news that 79 British pennants had forced the Dardanelles and a Squadron was on its way to smash up the Bolshevik fleet, we were extremely badly received on our



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arrival at Sevastopol. Agitation was rife to murder the British party. Unpleasantness everywhere we went. The Black Sea Congress was sitting, and added a lot of trouble. Our party and Captain Le Page R.N. (who was stationed here) managed to get in touch with the leaders.

It did not take us long to allay their suspicions and win over their goodwill, and then to run the anti-intervention Roumanian propoganda. Recruiting was stopped in the Black Sea fleet. M. Spiro (Internationalist and S.R.) requested us to go and see Dr. Rakovski at Odessa, and to do what was possible to stop the Roumanian war. Rumour already had it (early February) that the Germans were advancing in the North, and Spiro with a few others who feared the Germans, were keen to turn their Southern force, with the Roumanian Army, against the invader.

Before leaving Sevastopol it was arranged that Lts. Nash and Crutchley should leave in a special transport for Batum.

Odessa. The Supreme Council consisted of Dr. Rakovski (the leader), Colonel Murovioff, Commander of the operating armies, and Messrs Spiro, Bronchevan and Workman's and Soldiers Council. This Council's motto seemed to be to down Roumania at any price, and therefore force her into the hands of Germany. On arrival at Odessa, Colonel Boyle called a conference of the Allied officers: - French - Colonel Arquier and Staff; American - the Consul General; British - Captain Pitts, General Service, and British Consul Mr. Landon. This conference opened negotiations with the Supreme Council, with a view to their sending



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a note, the foundation of which might be the basis of a peace between Russia and Romania.

After five days discussion, the Supreme Council, thoroughly discouraged by lack of recruits and general unpopularity of their war, sent a reasonable Note to Roumania, and transferred their attention to their new enemy, the Germans marching on Kieff. Their Note was carried by aeroplane and car to Jassy and except for a few alterations was accepted by the Roumanian Government. Colonel Boyle was flown back to odessa and the Treaty was signed by the Council, then in great fear of the German advance.

colonel Boyle returned to Jassy to make final preparations for the carrying out of the Treat y and the exchange of prisoners.

My orders from Colonel Boyle were to take charge of histrain, staff and baggage, and that I was to carry on to the best of my judgment. I was also to evacuate North and Eastwards on the event of the Germans coming to Odessa.

End of FEBRUARY. I waited at Odessa as long as I could, and then moved on to Nacolaievsk and Kherson to evade the rush of Germans. I took two of M.I.l C. people with me from Odessa as they had orders to leave there.

At Nicolaievsk the Mission joined up with Colonel Muravieff (the Bolshevik leader) andfostered his desire to offend Germany. During the first week in March his army did make a stand, but was hopelessly outnumbered in guns and men, and his rabble came back in great disorder.

However a fair amount of destruction was indulged in and one or two small bridges destroyed.





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At Kherson and Nicolaievsk the British Consuls
were most active and seemed to realise the importance
of agitating the destruction of military material;
Hon. Vice Consul - of Nicolaievsk and Hon.
Vice Consul - of Kherson.

It is interesting to notee that the Red Guards did take a few prisoners, but killed them all, stole their clothes before interrogating them so that their Staff had no idea what troops were against them. We got orders issued that all prisoners should be brought to Headquarters, but after that prisoners were not taken.

Travelled with Muravieff to join Antonoff, at Kharkoff who were getting ready to put up a defence of the Donnetz Basin.

Antonoff's fores were a hopdess proposition, as half of them had turned from Bolshevik to Anarchist and were in favour of allowing their "German brothers" to come and take what they wanted as there was enough for everyone!

M. Spiro had in the meantime elected himself Commissar of the Black Sea Fleet, and Dictator (or Minister) of the new Taurida Republic, and was feverishly organising sailors into a fighting unit for use against the Germans. M. Spiro formed the backbone of the Muravieff-Antonoff army, and it was hoped that something might be done, if not in checking the German advance, then in the destruction of material — an art in which the Red Gyards excel.

Mr. Blakey, the British Consul of Kharkoff, and his assistant Mr. Gillespie (now M.I.1 C.) were working hard and introduced me to some of the prominent French miners, with a view to arranging destruction of



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property and mines.

I also got into contact with the District Mine Owners Union, and with one of their representatives, Engineer X, of the Donnetz District Miners Federation, arranged the destruction and sabotage of certain mines.

Arranged for the clear passage of five echelons of Allied Military Missions evacuating from Roumania.

Middle of MARCH.

Hearing that the 4th All-Russian Assembly of Soviets was about to meet in Moscow, to vote on the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, I decided to leave with my Mission in order to attend same, and arrived on the eve of the opening of the Congress.

On arrival at Moscow I found that our Aviation Mission had already left with the Embassy Staff and Petrograd Military Mission and M.I.l C. offbers. A few went to Vologda and Archangel, the others returned to England.

I then got into touch with M. Fritcher, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and M. Muraloff, the Bolshevik Commander of the Moscow Area, and from them I obtained permits to attend the Congress.

Before attending the Assembly I called on the wardwop consul General, M. Waldrop, who concurred that it was advisable to attend the Congress, and he introduced me to Lt. Reid (M.I.I C.) who had decided to remain behind and was also attending the Congress.

This Conference which opened on the 14th March lasted five days, and the Assembly after very stormy sittings ratified the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

Mr. Lockhart and his Mission arrived about the 20th of April. March.



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At the conclusion of the Assembly I got into close touch with Mr. Lockhart, Colonel Robbins, of the American Red Cross, the American and French Military Missions. Also with the following Soviet Departments;

WAR:- M. Trotsky (new Minister of War), M.M. Muraloff, Podvoisky, Analoff, and their respective Military Staffs;

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Messrs Tchetcherin, Karakow, and Rodak (for Central Empires), and later M. Voznisneski (for Eastern Affairs), and M. Vorovski (now Ambassador at Stockholm), and a large number of their Secretaries EVACUATION: M. Mechonoshin and others;

TRADE & COMMERCE: - M. Bronsky and members of the Central Executive Committee.

I also kept in touch with the Railroad Controllers and Technical Institutions.

END OF MARCH.

The Austro-German advance into South Russia and Ukrania seemed complete; Kieff Odessa, Kherson and Nicolaievsk had fallen, and the road to Roumania was cut off.

Despite the difficulties of communication I had kept more or less in touch with Colonel Boyle, though it would naturally be a long time before he could return to the North, so I telegraphed to General Poole and to the War Office for permission to carry on the work in hand in Russia as long as possible.

General Poole gave me permission to stay in Russia and instructed me that, until his return, I would be under Captain McAlpine, then in Archangel, who would shortly be coming to Moscow.

After conversations with Mr. Lockhart and Colonel Robbins, of the American Red Cross, I gathered that it

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was just possible that the Allies would recognise the soviet Government. I therefore decided that my Mission would make its policy to be a special study of all secondary Bolshevik leaders, who would very likely incline naturally towards Great Britain.

APRIL .

The general situation was, however, so uncertain, and enemy agents were so active, that drastic action in evacuation matters was imperative.

Lt. Pinder, of the British supply Mission to Russia was working on a commercial scheme of evacuation in conjunction with French and British interests, which were preventing the buying up of certain materials by the agents of the "Alliance".

At that time the Bolsheviks were evacuating some of their towns and stations to the west of Moscow, without any order or judgment, but with such activity that they blocked the lines, not only to the West, but also to the East of Moscow, with the rubbish they were saving.

It therefore seemed that a great deal of material in the Moscow Aviation parks might be saved if only the Government could be made to start and prevented from blocking the lines by carting away old limbers and wooden furniture.

The chief difficulties in front of the Evacuation Committees were:

- 1) Lack of order and direction
- 2) Lack of fuel and transport
- 3) Lack of organisation between the evacuation committees and the railroad controllers.

To facilitate our effect on evacuation I got into very close touch with Trotsky and was appointed



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by him as "Inspector of Aviation" and given extensive powers in that Department. This brought me into close touch with the Aviation personnel, and gave me an entree into Aviation Parks and Evacuation Committees.

IDENTIFICATIONS. (D.M.I.)

This work commenced during the last days of March and developed during April.

PROPAGANDA

Towards the end of April propaganda was started. END of APRIL.

I got into touch with Captain McAlpine and instructed Congon. & Congon.

MAY.

- 1) Evacuation continued with great difficulty
- 2) Identifications(D.M I) continued. Amalgamated with M.I.1 C. Department for Identifications and they sent weir material to D.M.I.
- 3) Aviation Much work among Corps who were getting restless.
- 4) Instructed during the month to look into motor and other trades, by Captain McAlpine; this was done.
- 5) Propaganda
- 6) Captain McAlpine visited Moscow.

JUNE

- 1) Evacuation continued.
- 2) Identifications end of the month sent to M.I.1 C instead of D.M.I.
- 3) Aviation General work continued. Request for hydroplanes and personnel. Personnel sent; hydroplanes unobtainable.
- 4) Got into touch with Tcheko-Slovaks and sent message to them.
- 5) Russian invention section organised, and worked go in conjunction with Propaganda.



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6) Recruting started.

JULY

- 1) Evacuation continued, but towards end of the month with very little effect.
- 2) Identifications continued and linked up with the South and Tcheko-Slovak fronts.
- 3) Aviation Sabotage and judicious evacuation fostered.
- 4) Systematic Recruiting started
- 5) Courier service started.
- 6) Station control in Moscow organised
- 7) Attended <u>Congress</u> of All-Russian Assembly of Soviets.
- 8) Preparations for remaining behind.
- 9) Passports, etc.

AUGUST

- 1) Evacuation. Wound up early part of work.
- 2) Identifications. Official channels closed, opened my own.
- 3) Aviation Sabotage
- 4) Recruting ndiscontinued.
- 5) D.M.I. and M.I.1 C. work.

SEPTEMBER

D.M.I. and M.I.1 C. work.

OCTOBER

Left Moscow 2nd October 1918

EVACUATION.

By the beginning of April good progress had been made and the first truck loads of metal were shipped east.

Our work consisted in:-

1) Showing the Evacuation Committee what materiak should be evacuated first; and to get them to pass





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During April. Flax transport was taken up, but later this was turned back to the Commercial Agent of H.B.M. Consulate at Moscow.

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Escaped Prisoners of War.

During May, July and August three British prisoners escaped from German hands into Russia, and were taken charge of and forwarded on to England.

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stringent rules against unnecessary evacuation.

- 2) Allaying the friction arising between the Evacuation Committees and the Transport Controllers.

 Cases were constantly arising where the Sectional Engineers, in their efforts to sabotage refused cars despite Bolshevik Evacuation Committees. In all this sort of strife the Mission stepped in and took over control as a neutral.
- 3) Constantly keeping all hands up to their work.

During April we also took over the sorting of material coming from Smolensky and west of there, as this was blocking our plines.

All material from Moscow went East, and the following places were selected as main dumps:Kotelnitch, Viatka, Nishni-Novgorod, Kazan, Sarapol and PevMaa

It was decided that should there be a rush, the new line, Kazan - Sarapol, would be filled with rolling stock, and lines destroyed west of Kazan.

The Aviation people were persuaded to send a small group of men to Kharkoff, and nearly all the aviation material was saved or destroyed here before the Germans took possession. The first Japanese descent at Vladivostock, however, brought all our work to a standstill and evacuation to the East was forbidden, Later this was counteracted by the arrival of Count Mirbach (of Germany) and the German occupation of Finland, and our work was recommenced.

The month of May opened disastrously, as what with Socialists days, and the three days heliday that followed it, Church holidays and a small strike, very little was got away until the middle of the month.



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June evacuation opened under the dampening effect of the Tcheko-Slovak affar, but proved to be the best month for material evacuated. Besides metal, a great deal was done to move out aviation units from Moscow and get them well scattered over the country, northeast and south-east of Moscow.

JULY

Much sabotage done by Bolshevik Committees and agents and also by German agents, and little material was got away, although many aviation units were sent out to the Tcheko-Slovak fronts. As most of the units commanders were of our orientation, and in league with myself, this was very much encouraged, as we hoped to get whole squadrons deserting to the Tcheko-Slovaks.

AUGUST.

Very little done, but continued to take an interest in squadrons that were being sent to the front. Closed all connection with the various Departments on the 5th August.

The following are the approximate materials evacuated:-

84,000 poods of Aluminium

29,000 " " Steel

10 000 " " other metallic materials

62 Fiat 200 H.P. Engines,

and about 22 squadrons, all complete with spares, to the East.

It should be clearly understood that this evacuation was done by the Bolsheviks and their Committees and that apart from entertaining and feast ing certain dignitaries of theirs, our part was to bully them and to constantly be on the spot.



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The Mission owes great thanks to Messrs Evenenko Chief of the Railway Department, and their Staff, for their constant support and willingness to concur in our suggestions and requirements. Muraloff, the Commander of Moscow, a true hater of Germany, did all he could to aid us until the Tcheko-Slovæk affair started in full. Great thanks are also due to many loyal aviation officers, and members if the aerial Staffs and Commissar of the Aviation Park.

AVIATION During the whole of the time we were in Moscow very close relations were kept with the Air Forces This was partly due to the necessity of my working under Trotsky's cover as "Inspector", and partly that I had good connections with them through Colonel Maund.

It proved very advantageous, and later nearly all my confidential men were from the ranks.

when the recruits were wanted, about 45# were sent to the North; the first party, under Colonel Kazakoff, consisted of six or seven officers. It was also through the Aviation that close relations were maintained with the Cadets and their organisations

COMMERCIAL

In June I received instructions to gain information and details on the Moscow industries. The large motor, aeroplane and electric manufactures were visited, and much general information obtained.

PROPAGANDA.

I tried to do publicity and general information work. Sent out War news (when obtainable) to various departments. Kept closely in touch with those of Allied orientations, and spent much spare time with Bolsheviks, all of wich meant some sort of entertaining

Ref: Russian Civil War booklet 00083 58794



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Considering the very limited material at our disposal fair results were obtained.

Russian INVENTIONS Section

In conjunction with propaganda this section was started in the hope that some useful inventions might be picked up, and to prevent Russians hawking their inventions to the Germans.

Most of these inventions were for "Anti-Aircraft Fire Control", and sighting systems for same.

Next in order, aeroplanes, new machines, ideas and gadgets.

Then followed hosts of automatic rifles, protector shields, etc. Of all the things examined nothing of great interest was discovered, and one felt that all exhibits had long been out on the retired lists at home.

D.M.I. WORK.

It was found at the end of March that very little enemy identifications were going to London. This was due to the departure of the British Embassy and Military Mission from Petrograd, and the Mission in the North owing to the disorganisation caused by the rapid evacuation from Petrograd, were unable to pick up the old threads of information. At the time there were great possibilities of picking up information and having done this work in Salonica, I started a small section for D.M.I. in Moscow:

- 1) To start with sent three men to the Russo-German front for direct indentifications.
- 2) Got the Moscow District Military Commander to organise a Bolshevik identifications section, and promised them every assistance from England.



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n was that the

The reason for forming this section was that the M.I. section of the Russian General Staff had been completely thrown out of action by the Bolsheviks and although still existing, were practically unable to do any work, owing to the lack of support from the Bolshevik.

After the Bolshevik adentification section in Moscow had been firmly established, the Bolsheviks realised at once the importance of the information they were getting, and re-established the M.I. section of the General Staff, and then brought them from Petrograd to Moscow so that one received a very good summary every few days.

During the demobilisation of the Armies and Staffs all the German handbooks were lost, the Russian General Headquarters had one copy dated 1915, and the M.A. of the United States had a copy dated 1916, and although constantly asking for them from London these valuable books never reached us.

From April on, every few days identifications were sent to London, and I was instructed to carry on this work. At the end of the month Lt. Boyce M.I l C.sent Lieutenants Urmston and Small to get in touch with the old General Staff "I" section.

This at first resulted in the overlapping of our work, asthey sent all information to M.I.l C. London. To prevent this it was agreed between Lts. Boyce and Urmston and myself, that we should amalgamate, and thereby cyphering would become simplified, and the very heavy expenses on duplicate telegrams would be saved. From then on all cables went to D M.I. We pooled our Staff and officers, and continued to get good information.

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Besides matter coming from the old General Staff "I" section, and the Bolshevik section Lt. Urmston had haval and personal agents, and I had free lances on the fronts. At the end of June we had some excellent information through Lt. Riley's channels. In July M.I.1 C. insisted that Lt. Urmston (being M.I.1 C.) should cable direct to them. I informed London of this, and asked if they would be willing for my information to go through the same channel, as if not I would have to increase my staff to cope with the extra work; it also meant needless telegraphing. D.M.I. agreed to this change, and from July onwards my information west to M.I.1 C.

HYDROPLANES

Early in June I received messages from General Poole asking that hydroplanes and personnel might be obtained from the Soviet Government for the protection of the ports from German submarines. After consulting with Mr. Lockhart it was decided that it would be extremely difficult to obtain anything from Mr. Trotsky (Minister of War), as relations were then very strained owings to our occapation of Murmansk. The only chance of getting hydroplanes wasto find them, buy them from the owners and sendthem by rail or ship them, through the connivance of one of the Railroad Control Boards. To achieve this I went to Petrograd, but found that all hydroplanes had been evacuated from there, and even the schools had left for the volga District. It therefore seemed extremely unlikely that we could arrange for transport of the planes, with any hope of success, from there.

I communicated with General Poole and informed him that I was sending up Russian personnel who were





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experienced enough to acquaint themselves quickly with the British machines.

RECRUITS.

Early in July it had become evident that recruits would be wanted very shortly for the North, and therefore a new sub-section to deal with this work was formed.

A number of officers of all services were selected and given advances to enable them to reach the North.

It was realised that all recruiting would have to be on a very limited scale until we had established a front, but it seemed that once that were done a large number of recruits could be despatched.

Experience had shown that Russian organisations (benefitting from our funds) had entailed great wastage with small results, therefore preparations were commenced to enable one or two British officers to stay behind "after hosilities had commenced" in order to organise the recruiting.

The idea of course was to combine identifications with destruction and recruiting. I found M.I.1 C. were also making preparations to leave an officer behind. (S.T.). However, at a conference with Lt. Boyce R.N.V.R (M.I.1 C.) and S.T., they pointed out how likely it was the recruiting and organisations would be traced soon after it commenced to function and that this should, despite past experience be handled by a Russian organisation, but they suggested that the courier service already organised by myself, should be developed, and that I should remain behind. Recruting went on, but it was intended to drop it as soon as we went under ground.



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COURIER SERVICE

About the 7th July an order was published prohibiting Allied officers from:

- 1) Leaving the two was they occupied and freedom of movement:
- 2) Incoming their uniforms;
- 3) Stoppage of code telegrams, Consular or otherwise (about the 12th) to the North.

The Courier Service, already started to meet & this eventuality, was put into action and the first courier left on the 8th July for the North by two routes:-

- 1) Moscow Nishni Novgorod Viatka Kotlass
- 2) By the Canal route via Petrograd, Petrosatodsk and the North.

I estimated that 20 to 25 couriers would be sufficient to carry on constant communications with our Army in the North. Results proved that more would be required.

Courier 1 returned after 12 days; he reported a difficult passage North, was twice arrested and searched. He returned by trickery direct from Archangel by train and so cut the journey in half. He said the nervous strain was very great and a good rest would be needed after every journey.

Courier 2 went out on the Petrosavodsk route; he was away 20 days, and had similar experiences to No 1. His journey was however more expensive, as he had had to use horses in certain places.

The service was therefore increased on the 1st of August.

STATION CONTROL.

KING'S LONDON As much movement of troops was expected in the Moscow knot, it was decided, in addition to the College



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information got from various soucres, to put special agents on all the stations for control.

DESTRUCTION GANGS.

A small destruction gang was organised in July. PASSES.

A small section for obtaining false passprts, passes and documents was started in July.

AUGUST 1918.

At a conference with Lieutenants Boyce and Riley I agreed to stay behind and arrange:—
the Courier Service; take charge of coding; continue to use my own channels of information; run a small destruction gang; continue to keep in touch with the Air Force; and work in with 2nd Lt. S. Riley (R.A.F), who was receiving very excellent information from all possible sources. I considered that Lt. Riley knew the situation better than any other British officer in Russia, and as he also had the more delicate threads in his hand, I therefore agreed to co-operate with him, and leave the political control and our policy in his hands.

I had some misgivings about staying on after the Missions left, as I had no instructions from General Poole to do so. However, the obvious necessity for some one to do this coupled with the information I received from Lt. Boyce M.I.l C., that he had applied to General Pools through Mr. Lindley (our Charge d'Affaires) for my services, determined me to remain.

xxx

1st 2nd and 3rd AUGUST

Conferences with Lts.Boyce, Webster and Riley and attending to details for remaining behind. I arranged to keep some of my people and to send the

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rest of the Mission home with Mr. Lockhart's Mission.
4th AUGUST.

We had our last conferences for arranging affairs and Lt. Riley R.A.F. and myself gave Lt. Boyce M.I.1 C. our plans, the proposed work of organisations and our estimate, approximately, of the amount of money we should require to carry on: Our proposals were accepted and authorised by Lt. Boyce M.I.1 C.

The following were my CENTERES:-

- 1) House on Pjatnitzkaia where I lived, stored money, kept papers and documents, coded, directed operations, and where I had my gobetween and secretary.
- 2) Flat on Degtjaranija where the chief courier received all messages for despatch, interviewed his couriers and housed them when necessary.
- 3) Rooms on the Karathi Rjad for recruiting and meetings.
- 4) Rooms on the Bolshaia Dimitrovka, for meetings and destruction organisation.
- 5) Flat at Yamskoe Polye, for Station Control and passes etc.
- 6) Rooms on Bolshaia Poljanka for agents and money store.
- 7) Flat on Mamonovskai, for agents and money store.
- 8) House 16 versts from Moscow, for indirect couriers and odds and ends (Kuskovo.)
- 9) House 60 versts from Moscow as retreat and refuge
 AUGUST 5th.

We had been informed some weeks past, from very reliable sources, that the British Mission and official representatives would be asked to leave, and possibly even be arrested before leaving.



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The situation for some days had been very critical and the Allies were not received by any of the Soviet officials and our agents informed us that the Soviet was divided into two fery strong parties;-

- The arrest of all British and French offiers, pending their enforced departure from the country.
- 2) Our public execution as reprisals for the supposed shooting of some Soviet Commissars at Kem. This by some of the Extremists including Radek.

Therefore I was not surprised when, early on the morning of the 5th, Captain Alfred Hill of Mr. Lockhart's Mission, was arrested. This arrest was followed by the general arrests of French and British officers, and civilians all through the town. I immediately left my flat and went to Lt. Riley's flat: he knew nothing about the events in the town, but immediately got ready to leave his flat, packed up a few remaining things he had, destroyed his papers and areport he was writing, in my presence, and with me, after sending a warning to the American Consulate, left his flat for our secret quarters.

It had been previously arranged that our go-betweens would be women, and each of us had a member on our staff who had been selected for this work. I sent for my adjutant, who had not yet been arrested, and gave him his final instructions about the departure to England, instructing himto pay off all the people who had been working for us, to sell what was possible of our stores, destroy all papers and records and put himself under the orders of Mr. Lockhart, whom we supposed would be leaving very shortly for Engalnd.



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On arrival at our new quarters S.T. and I went through our organisations, arranged passports, and then sent H.l to Lt. Webster asking him to send us all the money stored by M.I.l C., as we considered it no longer safe with them. H.l returned with the news that the money would be sent to us, and one of Biley's girls came with the news that Riley's old flat had been raided, with the object of arresting him "as an allied offical".

Later in the day we heard that Mr. Lockhart with the members of his Misson and the Consulate together with Lts. Boyce and Webster, had been arrested.

1st WEEK IN AUGUST.

Mr. Lockhart, Consuls and Lt. Boyce were all set free, and the latter informed us that the money had been safely hidden in the American Consulate previous to their arrest.

At this time we had great difficulty with our documents, which were not in order and hampered our movements. These papers were legalised early in the second week of August, and another great difficulty was to find a suitable cover to work under. This was no easy task as the Soviet were fusy preparing to exclude all non-Government and manual workers from the city.

Lt. Riley got a job in a technical department while I received papers as a film actor and had an interest in a curio and fancy goods store.

Our go-betweens had commenced their service and things seemed to be running very smoothly. Meetings took place as a rule in the public gardens.



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Lt. Webster was liberated on the 7th August. AVIATION.

as soon as Allied troops had landed at Archangel great unrest commenced among the Air Forces and desertion to our and Tcheko-slovak lines was contemplated by many. This had to be stopped as punishments were being visited on the deserters squadron commander and members of his squadron who had remained behind; the unit was put under very storng supervision, and the petrol supply as a rule confiscated. The only form of desertion of pirates with machines justifiable at that time would have been the desertion of a whole squadron. To this end we stopped all individual desertions and worked for simultaneous squadrons flights.

I guaranteed Rs. 10,000 to the pilot of each aeroplane landed with all accessories in the Tcheko-Slovak lines: Rs 2,500 to each observer: on condition that they went over in flights or squadrons. So far I have had no means of ascertaining if any units did get across the lines.

2nd WEEK IN AUGUST.

Our documents were put in order: Lt. Riley's naval connections reported and much information was obtained in regard to the morale, movements and plans of the naval circle. Sabotage and destruction plans in the event of Germany occupying Kronstadt and Petrograd, were discussed, and the German activities on the Finnish Coast examined.

A courier arrived from my destruction gang at Saratov with news of their plan; pro tem all destruction of naphtha and oils was ordered to be stopped, but I suggested sabotage and systematic propaganda against the proposed movement of the Saratov division to the GS

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Northern front, and if necessary the destruction of the line over which they would have to be transported. (Note. This Division never went North.)

In the middle of the week an order published by the Bolsheviks instructed all former officers, whether employed in any government branch, private business, or those out of work to report for examination and to receive new documents from the Soviet authorities. About 8,000 of the officers stationed in Moscow complied with this order, which broke up any hope of the White Guard organisations being effectively used against the Bolsheviks, as most of the officers examined were promptly arrested, put into barracks outside the town and disarmed. A similar movement had taken place in Petrograd, with the result that a great number of officers found themselves in Kronstadt and the White organisations were broken up by the Bolsheviks with equal success. In Moscow the shattered remnants of these organisations came to me requesting that their men might be sent to Archangel, but owing to the shortage of funds, and the small likelihood of any real attempt being made by these officers to get through to the North, I informed them that it was impossible to help them.

As a set off. however, of the White Guards' fiasco at Moscow, Kazan fell to the White Guards, and again the Bolsheviks' position on the fronts was very critical especially as the Allies seemed to be pressing from the North, and the mysterious disappearance of Trotsky, Commissar of War, caused much unrest in official circles. Many of the Commissars of the various departments were procuring passports and money, and making general personal arrangements for safe departure.



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Despite this victory we were constantly receiving more or less disquieting news as to the state of the Tcheko-Slovak and White armies. Lack of order, supplies ammunition, material, were constantly being reported, and internal strife was rumoured, and we felt that some desperate effort had to be made if this was to be rectified.

It was during this week that Mr Lockhart sent for Lt. Riley for a special interview. On his return frim this visit he informed me that the Letts could probably be won over to our side, as a section of them considered that the time had come when it would be to their interest to come under our protection. At this interview Lt. Riley had been introduced to Colonel Bersin, the leader of the movement, and it had been arranged that the proposition should be handled by Lt. Riley.

COURIER SERVICE.

We had had no messenger return from Archangel since the arrival of No.3 without any reply (He having left the day before the Allied landing). News from other sources was disquieting, conditions were awkward, and one realised how great the chances were against a man getting through the lines, who did not know the conditions.

Until the middle of August the courier routes set out on page 24 were being used; they are shown on map \mathcal{L} .

Each courier that sent out received a large?advance to increase the chances of getting through, and this naturally led to some small leakages. Had the service been satisfacotry, we should have Continued the original plan, but as results were so poor, I decided to discontinue the direct messenger service and attempt to less continue the le

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organise a large chain service, which though requiring a very much larger personnelment costing considerably more to maintain, would not only make the likelihood of the delivery of messages more sure, but would also fulfil the twofold object of messenger service and scout organisation for supplying information as to local conditions and all the munute details to the commanders of the allied troops operating from North to South. (See Map L'.)

The new scheme was to provide a centre innMoscow . From Moscow there would be drelay of messangers to the three following points:-

- 1) Moseow to Tschudowo (about 100 versts south of 2) Moscow to Vologda (not in town but district) .
 3) Moscow to Viatka - three men.

From these points the messages would be taken by the Tschudowo- Vologda - Viatka groups, who consisted of five men and a group commander at each station.

The group commanders duties here would be to organise his men, select suitable places for living in, procure documents and passports, control the funds for carrying on the work, and meet all local needs and conditions as they arose. The commander and his group, would if necessary, work under the Bolsheviks, and in any case live and dress in keeping with the local inhabitants.

Messages would be taken by these groups to the next set of stations consisting of;-

- 1) Petrozavodsk
- 2) A station north of Vologda
- 3) A place in Kotlass.

At these stations the organisations consisted of a group commander and eight men.



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The duty of these groups would be to receive the messages from the southern stations and pass them on through into our lines. The group commanders here in addition to fulfilling the work done at the last stations, would be provided with funds to enable them to get into touch with all local authorities. They also had to find out the best roads, know of all the traps, take stock of the disposition of the Soviet troops, guns, food stores, dumps, and morale of the army, and send these reports verbally to the Allied advance detachements and scouts. also carry out, if desired, reconnaissance work required by these advanced units. If necessary they were to occupy themselves with gentle sabotage. They should also know all those who were pro or anti Ally, reliable and unreliable, for our use during subsequent occupation of villages by us.

It was extremely difficult to find suitable men to volunteer for this work, but by the 22nd August an extremely fine batch of men were got together under experienced and very keen leaders. All these men had suffered and lost everything they possessed owing to the Bolsheviks. They proved themselves from the very start, and had we continued the work, it would have been entirely satisfactory. The parties left Moscow on the 22nd August and the whole chain was expected to be in operation by the first days of September.

On the departure of these groups we immediately set about procuring a further 20 men to replace the casualties that were bound to occur. (Note. Nine of the original $n_{\rm u}$ mber were executed by the "Extraordinary Commissions" in Vologda District).



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LETTISH AFFAIRS

Mr. Lockhart had arranged that Lt. Riley should take charge of all questions dealing with the Letts, and from the first the Allies desired to leave the policy to him. After the first meeting Lt. Riley put me "au courant" with all that had taken place and arranged that I should be fully posted in all matters so that should Lt Riley for any cause be prevented from bringing the work to a finish I should at once be able to pick up the threads and carry on.

To make the following quite clear, it should be borne in mind that Lt. Riley conducted all the negotiations, and that at no time did I see the commander or his staff, but at the conclusion of each meeting Lt. Riley fully explained to me all that had been done.

SITUATION OF LETTS.

It should be remembered that the Letts were a people away from their own country, and the vivil population of them were refugees in Russia, with all their interests in the hands of the enemy - the German-whom they had always hated.

The Lettish battalionshad retreated into Russia and on the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, were a united force without an occupation. They were a people who, by their thought, religion and upbringing, were absolutely strange and foreign to the Russians, and yet had absolutely nothing to lose in serving the Soviet, but rather everything to gain, as it was their temporary means of existence.

The personnel of these regiments was composed of splendid and well tried fitghters, and who in their way were well disciplined.



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The Soviet Government, relying upon what one might term the insularity of the Letts, decided to use them as their main forces, and by giving them special facilities (good food and pay), kept them in their services. From June 1918 on, the Letts were the corner stone and foundation of the Soviet Government. They guarded the Kremlin, gold stock a and the munitions. At the head of the "Extraordinary Commissions", the prisons, the banks and the railroads were Letts. The nucleus of strength on the fronts consisted of Letts, and wherever fighting was to be done the Letts were sent. Russian troops could only be relied upon to act if backed up and coerced by the Letts.

It was relaised that if the Letts could be drawn away from the Soviet, the Government would have to go. At the end of July the main weak spot was in the civil Lettish population, who were absolutely opposed to the Government. As a people they had the principle of co-operation developed to a remarkaable extent and most of them had landed property interests in Lithuania, and the crushing of all financial and social stability made them fear and hate the Soviet.

By August the Lettish troops felt themselves to be pure executioners; they did not like the Allies coming in from the North, nor did they see what good they could hope for from the future, and the discontent of their civil population had commenced a very great impression on them. It was therefore in keeping with the time that leaders amongst them should have made an effort to stop the headlong flight they had launched themselves into, and approach the Allied representative for aid and protection.

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At the first meeting Colonel Bersin made a very favourable impression on Mr. Lockhart, M. Grenard, the French Consul General, and Lt. Riley. Certain sums of money for propaganda and work were promised, and it was arranged that, if on the departure of the Diplomatic Corps all the money had not been handed over, drafts would be left with Lt. Riley to enable us to carry out the scheme.

The scheme which the Allied Diplomatic representatives worked for was: a definite relief on our Northen and Tcheko-Slovak fronts, which was to be brought about by certain Lettish units turning over to our side and thereby weakening the main force against our troops.

The Allies, the Tcheko-Slovak and White Guard troops were straining their utmost to join up with each other and to form a united front. The staged Yaraslovl affair had worn itself into a disastrous failure; the confidence of the White Guard organisation were shaken in the Allies and it was impossible to rely on any mob of theirs for support of the Allied troops; especially was it the case after the arrest of the Moscow Petrograd officers by the Bolsheviks, as already mentioned.

The only sound scheme left was to back the Letts. This had been conceded as sound by most people who knew the conditions in Russia, but a few have had a doubts as to the rights of staging a revolution internally in Moscow and Petrograd.

The proposed turning of the Lettish troops to our cause on the fronts could not be achieved without very seriously affecting the Mostow and Petrograd centres.



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The simultaneous change on the fronts and at Moscow and Petrograd wouldhave destroyed the Soviet Government, and automatically the White Guards would have come into power, and the ammunition, arms and supplies would have been at the disposal of this new force.

Dstruction gangs organised by us for a time would have prevented any possible attempt at interference from the Germans until the Allied forces had linked up, and a national White Guard Army formed.

supplies from the North, corn from the East and produce from the Volga, with a White Guard force, and there would have been no fear of any trouble from the people. This was the possibility of success. In the event of failure and our being found in any plot, Lt. Riley and myself should have simply been private indiviuals and responsible to no one. As we hourly exected the departure of the Allied representatives, the whole brunt would have been borne by us.

x x x

Colonel Bersin considered that everything could be arranged in the space of about five to six weeks. it was proposed to use, among others, the Lettish civil population for propaganda.

Later a Committee of Letts was formed, chosen from the friends of Colonel Bersin, who organised and make arrangments for detail.

Telegrams from Mr. Lockhart and ourselves were despatched to General Poole, informing him of what had been done, and what we proposed to do.

All along we realised that any plot so large the risks were very great, but that any success would be so great that we were justified in carrying on the arrangements.



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About the 22nd of August Lt. Riley informed me of a conversation that he had had with Commander Bersin (at the time I was under the impression "with Bersin's Committee") but this impression has since been corrected. The gist of it was "that it was considered advisable that men like Trotsky and Lenin should be assissinated for the following reasons:-

- 1) Their marvellous oratorical powers would so act on the psychology of the men who want to arrest them that it was not advisable to risk it.
- 2) The assassination of two of the leaders would create a panic so that there would be no resistance.

Lt. Reilly also told me that he had wheen very firm in dissuading them from such a course, and that in mo way would we Support it. He impressed upon the Colonel that the policy should be "not to make martyrs of the leaders but to hold them up to ridicale before the world".

About the 20th August, the Letts had obtained a good secret flat where Lt. Reilly used to visit them.

AUGUST 20th.

About thistime, from independent agents, information came in that a great deal of unrest prevailed among many of the Lettish battalions, that the troops were generally dissatisfied and that a lot of anti-soviet propagada was going on. This was undoubtedly due to the funds we had put into circulation.

At the end of August, Lt. Reilly considered it was necessary for him to go to Petrograd to see the Lettish organisations there, and to get a personal impression of the existing conditions. He left Moscow for Petrograd on August 28th. Before leaving he gave me the complete list of his agents, places that his



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money was stored in. passwords to his agents, and all works he had in hand. In exchange I gave him the same information about my organisations. Colonel Bersin left a day in advance of Lt. Reilly to make arrangements for them to meet the Lettish Committee without any loss of time.

Lt. Reilly also intended to see Commander Cromie (R N,) and Lt. Boyce (R.N.V.R.)

I have not given any detailed reports as to what stage the arrangements with the Letts had been brought as this will be reported fully by Lt. Reilly.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 29TH.

The man in charge of the Saratoff organisations came to Moscow. His report for the month was extremely satisfactory, and sabotage and deliberate frustration of the Bolshevik military plans had gone very well. Stores, ammunition and equipment trains were derailed, without doing any serious damage to the line, but causing three or four days blockage. (Removing one line etc.)

FRIDAY 30TH AUGUST.

Lenin's life was attempted at a mill where he was holding a lecture, and the papers which announced this fact on the Saturday morning also gave a description of the death of Uritzky, the chief for combating the counter revolutionary in Petrograd. The papers at once did all they could to connect the British and French officials with these two outrages. (Note. Later transpired attempt had been instigated by S.R 'sandthe evidence cleared the Allies completely, though this was not published.)

We later heard that on Saturday afternoon the 31st



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the British Embassy had been raided, Commander Cromies killed, all the members of the British Mission and Consulate in the building - arrested, and those who escaped arrest were being hunted. At midnight on Saturday August 31st - September 1st, Mr. Lockhart's flat in Moscow was raided, Mr Lockhart and Mr. Hicks were taken off to the Extraordinary Commission for combating Counter Revolution, but afew hours later were released. At the same time Commandant Devertament (alias Henry) had his flat raided and searched, explosives were found there and the whole place was broken up, Commandant Devertament however escaped.

SUNDAY SEPTEMBER 1st.

About midday Lt. Reilly's chief girl E.E. was arrested. Her house was thoroughly searched, and she was repeatedly asked whether she had not got some friend who was likely to give her away. She posed as innocent though showing much nervousness. Through two friends in the house the money she had in her possession was saved - she carried no documents, Just as the search party was about to leave the house with E.E., whom they assred would be allowed her liberty within a few hours, as nothing had been found against her, a girl by the name of Marie Frede, of the American S.S. appeared. This woman was carrying messages, and on seeing the armed guards seemed to lose her head and game away that she was carrying docments for E.E. This girl was likewise arrested, as a few hours later were her brothers, who also belonged to the American service.

MONDAY SEPTEMBER 2nd.

This was the first day of the Red Terror, and it looked as if the Bolsheviki were prepared for massacre





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Lockhart had been allowed his liberty after three hour s

arrest, while the British and Allied Consulates had

on a very large scale. The papers were extremaly bitter &gainst the supposed attempt on Lenin on the part of the Allies, and openly accused them of having been mixed up with the killing of Uritzky. No news was to be obtained as to why E.E. had been arrested.

TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 3rd.

in no way been violated.

Leading articles in the papers exposed the so-called Lockhart conspiracy, stating that he was the originator of the Lettish plot that was intended to raise the Letts against the Bolsheviks, murder the leaders of the Soviets and resore a monarchy in Russia. They cited Lt. Reilly as Lockhart's spy and admitted the arrest of E.E. and Frede. They also gave an account of the raiding of Commandant Devertament's flat, and a full account of the raid at the British Embassy in Petrograd, and Capt. Gromie's death. From the Press one gathered that Lt. Reilly had been caught in Petrograd during the raid. Later on Tuesday afternoon I sent the message to Mr. Lockhart that " I had been over the network of our organisation and found everything intact, but that there was undoubtedly a fair amount of nervousness among some of the agents". "That I had got all Lt. Reilly's affairs under my own control, and provided I could get money it would be possible to carry on". "That we had the greatest difficulty in getting up our messages to the North, and unless the new chain organisation produced a better result than single messenger service had done it would hetuseless to carry on. However, I thought a lot might yet be done in destruction".



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My messenger arrived at Mr. Lockhart's flat just after he had been arrested for the second time. Captain Hicks received my message and said that he considered it would be imperative for us to lie low for some days to come, and that as far as he knew there would be no money available for the purposes that I required it, as our source for obtaining same had completely dried up since the crash. He also had no news about Lt. Reilly and supposed that he had been arrested. Sent off a message through the new chain service informing General Poole of what had taken place at Moscow.

WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 4th.

It was evident that the Bolshevik were in a panic and were purging themselves of bourgeois and officers employed by them in the various governmental departments and it looked asif our large source of information from these channels would be no longer available for us. Mr. Lockhart wasre-arrested, and his flat had been searched from "top to bottom" and things stolen from it. Some French and Allies had been arrested. Arrest had taken place in the streets, and general panic prevailed. In the morning a girl of Lt. Reilly's came to say that he was safe and in Moscow, having travelled in a first-class compartment from Petrograd. He had arrived on Thuraday the 3rd September, but beyond the fact of knowing that Commander Cromie had been killed and the Embassy raided, he had no suspicion that the Bolsheviks knew of the plans or attempt that was being made to use the Letts against the Soviet. On arrival at the Nicolai Station he had been informed that his chief girl had been arrested, but beyond knowing this he was in entire ignorance of what the morning papers



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were printing. He received his paper on the Tuesday morning and saw that the Lettish affair was known, and his name cited as Mr. Lockhart's spy. For want of a better place he slept at his own flat on the night of Tuesday the 3rd. His message reached me at midday on Wednesday, and I went off to see him at two rooms his agent had found for him at the back end of the town. He had changed his name but had the same disguise and was not going out wring the day or night, not having any documents to prove his identity. He made the following statement about his vist to Petrograd.

the had left Moscow according to plan on Wednesday the 28th August and had arrived at Petrograd without any hitch (the passes he had being excellent), although his train was entremely late in arriving at Petrograd. He drove direct from the station to his flat and on his way there met Colonel Bersin of the Letts, who had been to his flat by appointment, having arrived in Petrograd 24 hours previous to the arrival of LT. Reilly He returned with Lt.Reilly and reported to him, telling him all that he had done and arranging another meeting ar the flat. Lt. Reilly then sent a messenger to Lt. Boyce informing him of his arrival, and requesting him to let him know where they could meet. He then went about openly doing the work he had decided to do there when in Moscow.

A hitch occurred in the transmission of his message to Lt. Boyce, and therefore he did not see him, on Thursday, but owing to a misunderstanding they did not meet. However, about midday on the 31st August he got into touch with Lt. Boyce, and they had a conference together Lt. Reilly explained to him the whole of



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the Lettish plan, and Lt. Boyce said he considered the whole thing was extremely risky but agreed that it was worth trying, and that failure of the plan would drop entirely on the neck of Lt Reilly. He considered that it was extremely important for Lt Reilly to meet Captain Cromie as Ceptain Cromie had had a great deal to do with the Letts. He left Lt. Reilly at his flat to go the British Embassy with the intention of returning by three o'clock with Commander Cromie. Lt. Reilly waited in his flat until after six o'clock, but no one turned up. He afterwards heard of Captain Cromie's death, but in no way connected it with the Letts affair. on Monday by Re hilly booked a sleeper for Moscow. He used the same passes that he had done on his journey North and arrived in Moscow as already described and only then got the first news of the crash.

At this meeting Lt. Reilly said that his mind was entirely open, and that if it was thought better for him to come forward and be openly arrested he was willing to do so. I told him I did not consider this at all necessary, and would in no way clear up the affair, and suggested that it would be the safest thing for him to try and work through to the East via Ukrainia. He strongly objected to taking this step, saying he would lose a lot of time on that trip and bring no one any good, and that if he had to go he should make for the North, either via Finland and out to a neutral port, or direct through a courier line. He wanted passports, some new clothing and as the place he was staying in was entirely unsuitable a fresh lodging. He had already sent to Mr, Lockhart his official report, and what he considered had happened. He also told him that there



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had been no documents or anything of our work found by the Bolsheviks. However, Mr. Lockhart had been arrested before he received this message, though I believe Captain Hicks had it.

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 5th.

Moved Lt. Reilly into new quarters at a Soviet office. Owing to the visible shortage of funds in the near future, and as our expenses were going up daily we felt that the work could not be carried on, and that as I was in no way suspected, it would be best to come to life and try to get out of Russia as an official. Lt. Reilly's postion being different he decided to go to Petrograd and travel by the best available route.

I had a conference on this day with the chief of my couriers, and we condidered that at least six or seven of our couriers had been executed by the Soviet Commissions of the North. I informed him that I should probably discontinue that service, but would want all the men for other work.

FRIDAY the 6th.

The British Consul General, Mr. Wardrop, found that it was impossible for me to be included on his official staff, as he said he did not dare risk having my name on the paper, and thereby endanger the whole of his party. This was after I had explained to him that to the best of my knowledge I was in no way under suspicion, that none of my acts could be traced back to me. Captain Hicks, however, took up the matter, and it was thanks to him after a consultation with his American colleagues, that I was put on Mr. Lockhartts list as an official member. I took off my disguise on



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the Friday afternoon and appeared again under my own name and papers. I had meanwhile given my original G.B.paper to Lt. Reilly, and it was with these papers that he finally got out from Russia and into Finland.

FRIDAY EVENING .

H.1 received aletter from one of our agents Saying that he was being blackmailed by a man called G., in the employ of Lt. Webster, and that unless we paid the sum of R.10,000 .- he would notify the Soviet authorities of our address, and also that he had been asked by Lt. Boyce if he was prepared to do away with one or two prominent members of the Soviet Government: As this agent and the agent through whom it came, belonged to the former M.I.1 C. the matter was forwarded on to Lt. Webster for his consideration. Under the existing conditions, and not knowing the fate of our Mission in Petrograd, of whom we were receiving most disquieting news, he felt it was advisable to pay up rather than have anything fresh brought up against us. He sent by return messenger the sum required and nothing more was heard.

On <u>SATURDAY</u> the 7th on arrival at the American Consulate I discovered that the place was under siege, but owing to a friendly warning of a chauffeur, I mamnaged to get away without being arrested. I later heard that Lt. Tamplin, 2nd Lt. Tomling, Lt. Pinder and Mr. Higgs had been arrested outside the Consulate.

Final preparations were made for Lt. Reilly to leave. We had up to this date only lost one girl, E.E. the rest of our organisations being intact.

SUNDAY the 8th.

Lt. Reilly left for Petrograd, travelling in a sleeper with new documents to conform with the papers

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I had given him. I spent that night at the British Consulate.

MONDAY the 9th.

I saw the chief of the couriers, and gave him instructions to withdraw the whole of the work on Moscow TUESDAY the 10th.

I sent off H.1 to Sweden as I considered it was no longer safe for her to remain behind. However, I continued to use one of my old lodgings as it had not been raided.

SECOND WEEK of SEPTEMBER.

Kalematiano, Chief of the American S.S. was arrested All his downents were found. Lt Reilly's last flat was raided and his agent "C" arrested at the Kremlin.

Nothing was found in his flat, nor any information or papers obtained from "O".

It was extremely difficult at this period to judge how deep the Lettish affair had gone, and whether there was any truth in the Bolshevik statements that they had staged the plot themselves. There was a feeling that the pettish troops had bitter feelings against the Soviet.

By the end of the week Imhad a series of conflicting reports, but the tend of them made me decide that
as we had already spent so much money, it was worth
spending some more to save something of the wreck. I
therefore collected half a dozen Letts personally known
to me, and sent them off on an anti-Bolshevik campaign
showing what possibilities there had been for the Letts
and the harm Latvia had done for herself in the supposed
treachery and double dealing with the Allies. I sent
a small section of pro-Ally Letts to work in Riga.
Mitau, Pernau, and also made attempts to get into touch

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with the pastor of the Lettish Church, one or two of the prominent Letts in Moscow, and a Captain Dzegus, who did excellent work.

From September 3rd all British officers with the exception of one or two panic-stricken consuls, were either imprisoned or besieged in the American Consulate so that it was impossible to get any advice or to confer with anyone. I followed general principles.

DESTRUCTION.

I instructed the destruction gangs at Saratoff to commence operations. About four trains of material were detailed a week. Preparations were made for the destruction of fuel and oil supplies here, and a section was sent to work on the Varonish line.

THIRD WEEK IN SEPTEMBER.

The courier chain organisation was back in Moscow. It was reported to me that 12 of our couriers had been shot, as had also one or two of my independent agents.

Great credit is due to this body of men and to those shot, who could all have saved their lives by giving away the H.Q. address in Moscow. This address was never given away, and every man shot showed the spirit of the 1914 Russian officers. I employed them collectively on one or two jobs in Moscow. As two of them came from the Baltic provinces, they were sent there, and finally the remainder were paid two months money and sent to the East, where I hope to pick them up again and resume work.

I tried to clear up the arrest of Lt. Reilly's agent E E., and had carefully discussed the matter with him, and all other matters connected with the Lettish affair.



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1) The reason for E.E.'S arrest:-

Lt. Reilly remembered that on the 22nd August at the American Consulate he met the S.S agents of France and U.S.A. for the purpose of establishing contact. In giving the address of E E as a connecting link to Commandant Devertament (alias Henry), the Commandant had taken the name down in his note-book as a French name, and Lt. Reilly pointed out that it was a Russian name and should be spelt in a different way. The Commandant said he would put that right when he got home and transferred it into code. Now on making enquiries, it was found that the "warrant for arrect" was made out in the name of "Elizabeth " and not "Elisaveta". We supposed that the Commandant had failedto transfer the address into code or that his note-book had been found when his house had been searched. (We were under the impession that Com. Devertament had been arrested.) When the Bolsheviks arrested any person all addresses found on him were followed up by arresting the addressees. However, later I met Com. Devertement in Finland, and he assred me nothing of his had been found and produced his note-book with the address fully obliterated.

The Commandant's theory was that it had been given away by the treachery of a Frenchman who had attended the meeting on August 22nd. This Frenchman was a M. Marchand who had left a most incriminating letter addressed to President Poincafé on his table (found after his arrest). giving a full description of the meeting of the 22nd August at the American Consulate, and probably giving the Commandant's address away, as prior to this absolutely no suspicion of any

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with the Commandant in the presence of Col. Corbeille, who, though admitting that Marchand had written a very indiscreet letter, helddthat it was more a foolish than a criminal one, and did not think that M. Marchand would give us away to that extent. However, M. Marchand letter written twelve days after his presence at the allied meeting, and three days after the Lettish plot had been printed in the papers, cannot produce a good impression on being read, and one feels that it was likely that he was responsible for E.E.'s arrest, and the raid upon Devertement's rooms.

- 2) As to whether Col. Bersin was a traitor or not, this will be dealt with by Lt. Reilly, though I gather he considered him guiltless.
- The Church. When the Lettish affair burst, the Press alleged that we had been attempting to buy the Church, and that we had made statements to that effect. Lt. Reilly denied ever mentioning the Church, and considers it a pure "try on" on their part, andthat treachery within the ecclesiastical circle may have given the Bolshetiks the required clue.

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Difficulties and general work in Russia.

I. COMMUNICATIONS.

All ordinary and modern means of communication no longer existed in the interior of Russia. Telegraph and postal services only operated in a few instances. Trains took days instead of hours to travel, and the telephone systems of Moscow and Petrograd were not open for the general public to use. All messages had therefore to be sent by trusted messengers. Owing to the suspension of the telephone system, it was quite impossible to give warnings, or to ring up to find if



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the coast was clear when making visits.

II. LODGINGS and COVER.

The new system of House Committees made it almost impossible to get into any lodgings, and certainly not without reference from your old house with Soviet papers, passes, registration and employment documents (infringement of any House Rules being visited upon the offender and the Committee itself). This overcome, however, another great difficulty arose from the constant spying of the Evornik and Servants League. The union of this latter at all their meetings, were exhorting the members to spy upon their employers, and the extraordinary Commission, for combating Counter Revolution offered Rs.10,000. - to any servant who would give evidence that would impeach their employers as enemies of the "people" // 200

At one time in Russia I found it necessary to employ an English girl as a servant in order to safe-guard the house.

Even if one could have found neutral cover to work under, the security would have been slight as exterritoriality was no longer to be expected. Anyone's house might be searched without writ or order, and all houses were constantly being pryed into aon all sorts of pretexts.

In August decrees were issued that everyone had to have an approved occupation if they wished to remain within the City boundaries.

Agents who had taken fictitious jobs, or opened a shop, found themselves in the position of outlaws as the result of some new By-law, which put their industry



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or trade in the Black List. For instance a druggists and antique store (combination only possble in Russia) taken by myself, received two fatal blows in one month.

- 1) It wasdeclared illegal to sell any druggist's goods without a special (prohibitive) licence, and all goods with fats in them were confiscated by the food controllers. (Soaps, etc.)
- 2). It was forbidden to serve antiques, and all such articles in shops were sealed and declared to be "National Treasure; although no mention of recompense appeared at the end of the order.

AGENTS.

The accounts will show the cost of agents to have been very high. This is explained by the very high cost of living, of transport, and high expenses incurred by any man who uses sub-agents or has local bribings and expenses in connection with his work. To-day it is more necessary that agents in Russia should be overpaid, than it is in any other country. To employ men who are reliable, one must pay them well, and allow them to live as they had been in the habit of living. If one resorts to employing a cheap form of agent, it is so very much more expedient for him to sell you than to work for you, that in eight cases out of ten me does so, and in the ninth case blackmails you. It is necessary in towns like Moscow and Petrograd to free agents from standing in provision queues, etc., as this occapation takes the members of the entire family out every dayy for some hours. The cost of flour is six hundred/per pood (36 English lbs.) in Petrograd, if bought without aration card; and one cannot get workout of a man on one eighth of a 1b of bread per day.



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It should be noticed that to-day in Russia notaa single agent will put his name to any piece of paper or receipt, so that if in future agents are to be employed by us in Russia, any hope of establishing control by the old system of vouther must be abandoned.

Russians on the whole have been disgracefully treated, and have paid with their lives as the result of their employers' carelessness with receipts and notes, that one cannot blame them for refusing to sign papers.

I camot point out too clearly that our agents should have sufficient funds to be always able to employ the best men, men of standing or army men with a clean record. It is fatal to deal with the smaller bourgeoisi or the junior commercial man.

MONEY.

This is one of the greatedt difficulties of the Russian S.S. work, and the procuring of money is extremely difficult and dangerous work. To start with trading in Valuta is illegal and punsihable by death! To obtain money against drafts is almost impossible. So few wealthy people now have any money at their disposal, for despite their large credit at the bank, they are only allowed to draw a few hundred roubles a month.

Once the money has been obtained, the storing of it is the next great problem. There are no banks, even the Peoples' Savings Banks cannot be used. No place London 27: Nor. 1918 His Moved Rus Res that is practical is safe, and to us it was a constant

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On October 2nd I left Moscow with Mr. Lockhart's Misson for the Finnish frontier.


The above report therefore covers over a year's work. It has been impossible to give a detailed account of small things undertaken, of the "stunts" that I tried, or of the daily problems that cropped up with our work in Russia. All work was constantly being hampered, during the last six months especially, by direct opposition of the "Anti-Ally" section of the Soviet, by German agents, and the complexities and difficulties of not only acquring, for the Mission, the materials for carrying on, such as housing, firewood, benzine, etc., but even the bare necessities of personal existence food, etc.

The policy of taking up all work on its presentation irrespective of the department it would come under, has put me in close touch with departments I was in no way attached to. This has greatly complicated the proportioning of money in my rendered accounts as time and again I have used the office staff and office in the work of various departments.

It makes it difficult in bringing forward the names of those who so greatly helped me during the months that have been reported on. I therefore beg to submit all names direct to Lt. General Poole. G.O.C. Allied forces in Northern Russia, under the departments that the respective officers worked under.

I beg to state that all success in the evacuation of material from the Moscow Aviation Department, was due to the free hand I was given while under the orders of Captain McAlpine.

I have the honour to submit the following names of College





BRITISH.

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Departments. Russian Supply Mission. R.A.F. D.M.I.

Lt. G.G. TOMLING, R.A.F.

This officer came to Moscow under me at the end of May 1918. While in Moscow he proved himself to be a keen and capable officer, and showed great efficiency in handling all work that was entrusted to him. He voluntarily took up the risky work of recruiting during the preliminary interviews, and later when I had gone under ground, he, at great danger to himself, kept constant contact with me until imprisoned by the Soviet, when he spent 25 days in prason.

I have the honour to bring his name befor eyour consideration for promotion and decoration for constant services rendered under very trying enge A. Hill scap.

conditions!

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2nd Lt. S.G. REILLY, R.A.F.

Temp. attached to M.I.1 C.

This officer has never worked under me, but as the senior Military officer in Moscow, and having worked in close contact with him during the most critical two months we had in Russia, I wish to bring him especially to your notice. This obligation imposes itself all the more upon me as certain absolutely unfounded and preposterous statements have been made about Lt. Reilly by some Allied officials, and what is still more regretable, by some of our own officers.

I have known Lt. Reilly since his arrival in Russia in April 1918, I have had many apportunities of judging his remarkable knowledge of and broad insight into Russian affairs, and I knew of the confidence which both his O.C. Lt. Commander E.J. Boyce and Mr. Lockhart had in his judgement.

This determined me in undertaking with him the very responsible M.I. work which was entrusted to me when all the Missions were expected to leave Russia.

During this work I had many occassions to appreciate Lt. Reilly's organising capacities and untiring energy.

After the failure of the Lettish affair Lt. Reilly, although himself in extreme danger, was chiefly



concerned with doing his utmost to relieve Mr.Lockhart and everyone who got into difficulties through our work. He refused to take the safest way of escape out of Russia (through the Ukraine) because he considered it his duty to reach Stockholm or London by the shortest even if more dangerous route. His escape through occupied territory must be considered a remarkable performance.

I consider that Lt. Reilly has most unjustifiably libelled, and that for his own sake and as a British officer, he should (inview of the impossible of an official enquiry) he completely cleared by some form outward recognition that would give the lie to all rumours and libels.

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RUSSIAN MILITARY.

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Departments. Russian Supply Mission. D.M.I R.A.F.
M.I.1 C.

Captain A. PORETCHKIN, M.C.

This officer was a member of Lt. General Poole's Staff, and was later lent to Colonel Boyle, Canadian Service. He did nine months hard work under very trying conditions. I have the honour to bring his name to your notice for a suitable decoration, suggesting a bar to his Military Cross.

XXXXXXXXX

Departments. Russian Supply Mission.D.M.I. R.A.F. Lt. Colonel Kazakoff. St G.C.

This officer founded the recruiting service organisation in Moscow. He is now with the Air Force in Russia.

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Ref: Russian Civil War booklet 00122 58833



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Departments. Russian Supply Mission. R.A.F. D.M.I. M.I.1 C.

Captain BARKOVSKI.

This officer took on the organisation of Flying Units in Russia. He did much in the recruiting organisation, and was constantly working for the Allied cause, and was at all times ready to take on work no matter how dangerous. He remained begind in Moscow.

(Verbal report.)

XXXXXXXX

Departments. Russian Supply Mission.

Captain VEZENKOFF. 11th Hussars.

This officer organised the courier service, and made personal trips over the courier routes. He did brilliant work.

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
Departments. Russian Supply Mission.

Captain TCHURIEFF. Ufa Cossack Regt.

This officer organised destruction gangs.

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Lt.Col. MERTZALOFF. Aviation Force.

This officer organised information channels and destruction gangs. He also did much fruitful propogan--da work.

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Departments. Russian Supply Mission.

Captain G. KONOPKA.

This officer did constant good service. (Verbal

report.)

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Departments. Russian Supply Mission.

Captain DZEGUSS. 3rd (?) Lettish Inf. Regt.

Verbal report - no decorations at present.

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RUSSIAN MILITARY. XXXX Sergt A. PLATONOFF. ST. G.C. For constant fidelity. XXXXXXXXX Private (Chauffeur) IVAN. For constant fidelity XXXXXXX RUSSIAN CI M. UTCHENKO. Chief of Moscow Railway Knot. and his assistant ------NOTE. As I have named only those who have done real service for the Allied cause, the list is a small one. I have in no case brought forward the names of those Bolsheviks who, despite their political views, helped us greatly.



WOMEN.

HILDA EVELYN PEDIANI. (Spinster).

Italian Subject. Was my secretary for three months and when in August the special work was started, she organised the housing question, acted as contact and constantly exposing herself to great danger.

It was mainly due to her forethought and courage that my sections escaped detection.

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WOMEN.

TATIANA SERGAEVNA MOLOSHNIKOVA (Spinster)

Russian Subject. On M.I.1 C. work showed great courage and resource, and did excellent work.

LUCY LUNN (Spinster) & MARGERET LUNN (Spinster) .

British Subjects. These two ladies put their flat at our disposal. They concealed British officers from arrest, kept papers and money, and were constantly exposing themselves to great risks. They also daily took parcels and comforts to British officers who had been imprisoned by the Bolsheviks.