Calendar: 1927-1928 Page 494

ON THE USES OF THE STUDY OF WAR IX to public opinion Here then is enough to furnish an interesting and highly important course of study But the reactions of public opinion do not tend only to affect preparations for war they affect always the actual conduct of war well-established misconception of war is at least in countries with democratic system of government likely to be very mischievous will give one example During the course of the war it was from time to time part of my business to have discus- sions with or to listen to discussions with allied statesmen and generals Few things struck me more than their lack of what we call sea-sense Things that we treat as axiomatic in regard to the sea had to be elaborately explained to them On the other hand think it is also true to say that despite the fact that millions of our sons took part in the greatest war in history we as nation have not acquired the military sense such an instinctively correct view of military problems as is to be commonly found say in France Still we do with con- siderable justice pride ourselves on our sea-sense Yet that pride led us astray and our just confidence in our Navy made us claim for it powers which no sailor supported Francis Bacon in his essay Of Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates said We see the great effects of battailes by sea The Battaille of Actium decided the Empire of the world The Battaille of Lepanto arrested the Greatness of the Turke There may be examples when Sea-fights have been finall to the Warre But this is when Princes or States have set up their Rest upon the battailles But this much is certaine that hee that commands the Sea is at great liberty and may take as much and as little of the Warre as he will Now am not going to follow Bacon into ancient history but will content myself with the last of his sentences which have quoted Just as Clausewitz's doctrine influenced the minds of many who had never read line of his works so believe that Bacon's hee that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much and as little of the Warre as he will" came to be accepted as an axiom by many who had never read the essay think that it was the prevalence of this belief backed by desire to make good check to our naval arms in the Baltic which was behind the popular enthusiasm for war with Russia in 1854 to which have already referred and led us to think that our ill-found expedi- tion supported by supremacy at sea could walk into Sebastopol where we found that we could not have as little of the war as we would think also that it was the prevalence of this like that of Clause- vitz insufficiently challenged belief which led us into what was perhaps our initial error in regard to the Great War We thought we could make war which concerned vital national interest war of limited liability and were inclined to consider that Kitchener was exaggerating till experience taught us better when he said we could not Our Navy by keeping the seas open for us enabled us to draw supplies from all parts of the world not actually controlled by hostile forces enabled us to send our troops anywhere with amazingly small